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REDEEMING WHITENESS IN THE 
SHADOW OF INTERNMENT: EARL 
WARREN, BROWN, AND A THEORY OF 
RACIAL REDEMPTIONt 
SUMI CHO* 
INTRODUCTION 
Earl Warren is a civil rights/civil liberties icon. During his reign 
as Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1953-69, the Court 
set standards of liberal judicial activism on race issues by which future 
Courts would be judged. Chief Justice Warren presided over momen-
tous decisions that outlawed segregation in public education l and 
t © 1998 Sumi Cho. 
* This work is made possible by a collaborath'e grant from the Civil Liberties Public Educa-
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with particular thanks to Jim Goodridge and Barbara Vaccaro Garavaglia. The staffs at the 
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ing and administration process. My law school dean, Teree Foster, generously provided a summer 
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Finally, I thank my colleagues in Asian American Studies for my interdisciplinary training that 
informs this work, especially Ronald Takaki for my early training in Asian Pacific American history 
and Michael Omi for my understanding of sociological theories of race. 
I See Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring separate-but-
equal public education to be unconstitutional). Brown lis the most famous of such cases, in which 
Warren played a pivotal role in forging a unanimous 9-0 ,'ote by catering to his southern brethren 
on the bench who were reluctant to "embarrass" the South. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 
657-99 (1975) [hereinafter KLUGERJ. For examples of other significant ch'il rights cases in which 
the Warren Court presided, see Green v. County Seh. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 
(1968) (disallowing a "freedom of choice" desegregation plan designed to forestall or subvert 
integration); Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. ofPrinee Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (holding 
that public school closure in Prince Edward County, Virginia amounted to a denial of equal 
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public facilities,2 invalidated Jim Crow laws designed to prevent Mrican 
Americans from exercising the vote3 and found anti-miscegenation 
laws to be unconstitutiona1.4 President Eisenhower came to regret his 
wayward Republican appointment,5 and "Superchief' Warren's legacy 
certainly rivals those of Eisenhower and the other presidents of his era. 
Warren's tenure, perhaps the most significant since John Marshall's, is 
understood in overtly political terms as a "revolution in race relations. "G 
protection); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (striking a desegregation plan permitting 
students to transfer to schools in which their race would be a majority as a pretext for maintaining 
segregation); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (announcing that the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution mandates that state officials desegregate public schools); Board of Trustees of U niv. 
ofN.C. v. Frasier, 350 U.S. 979 (1956) (pel' curiam) (affirming lower court il~unction to restrain 
the University of North Carolina from barring admission to undergraduate students because of 
race); Lucy v. Adams, 350 U.S. 1 (1955) (per curiam) (reinstating il~unction that enjoined and 
restrained officials at University of Alabama from preventing Autherine Lucy from enrolling); 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (reading an inherent equal protection clause into the 5th 
Amendment to declare segregated schools in the District of Columbia as violative of the Consti-
tution). See generally ABRAHA~1 L. DAVIS & BARBARA LUCK GRAHAM, THE SUPREME COURT, RACE, 
AND CIVIL RIGHTS 117-28 (1995) [hereinafter DAVIS & GRAHAM). 
~ See \'liatson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963) (declaring as void, city ordinances 
prohibiting integrated use of public parks and recreational facilities); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 
284 (1963) (re\'ersing breach of peace convictions of six Blacks for playing basketball in a 
segregated park in Savannah, Georgia, and not dispersing upon orders of local police); Boynton 
v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Act prohibited a bus 
terminal restaurant from refusing service to a Black customer); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 
(1956) (striking state statutes and local ordinances requiring segregated motor buses under the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (pel' curiam) (striking 
segregated municipal golf courses as unconstitutional); Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City 
v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (striking city-maintained segregated public beaches 
as violative of tl;e Fourteenth Amendment). See generally DAVIS & GRAHAM, supra note I, at 
138-46. 
:l See Gaston Count)' v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (prohibiting reinstatement of state 
literacy test under Voting Rights Act ofl965); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (voiding 
New York election law of English-language reading and m'iting requirement under Section 4(e) 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Harpel' v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) 
(invalidating state poll taxes as a requirement for \'oting in state elections); South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 30 I (1966) (upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as constitutional under 
Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965) (declar-
ing as unconstitutional state "interpretation tests" that required prospective voters to interpret a 
section of the state or federal constitution to the satisfaction of the registrar of voters); Tancil v. 
Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (striking Virginia statutes mandating the maintenance of racial lists 
of YO tel'S and residency certificates); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (voiding Louisiana 
law requiring the race of candidates on ballots); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) 
(holding that racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional). See generally DAVIS & GRAHAM, supra 
note 1, at 131-38. 
4 See Lm'ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (im'alidating Virginia statute prohibiting mixed-
race malTiages). 
5 See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 337 (1997) (recording Eisen-
hower's comment characterizing his appointment of\'liarren as Chief justice as "the biggest damn 
fool thing I ever did"). 
6 MORTON HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 3 (1998). 
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Despite this iconography, there is another less-detailed aspect of 
Warren's career that looms large in a critical understanding of the 
Warren Court's race jurisprudence. This aspect predates his work on 
the Supreme Court, going back to World War II ("WWlI") when War-
ren was Attorney General of California and a gubernatorial candidate 
in the 1942 elections. During this period, Warren counted himself 
among California's anti-Asian "native sons and daughters."7 In fact, 
Warren was a key actor in the anti-Asian movement that culminated in 
the 1942 internment of over 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, 
two-thirds of whom were United States citizens.8 
This Article details Warren's prominent leadership role in advo-
cating for the internment and the repression of that role by Warren 
scholars. Further, it contemplates the theoretical significance of this 
self-imposed historical amnesia and re\isionism for civil rights jurispru-
dence. Part I reviews how representative samples of secondary litera-
ture have dealt with Earl Warren's World War II years in California. 
Part II examines the historical record, focusing on how Warren's po-
litical career intersected with the internment of Japanese Americans. 
Using archival materials and other sources, Part II concentrates on the 
following areas: 1) Warren's actions as California Attorney General in 
response to the bombing of Pearl Harbor; 2) the campaign rhetoric 
and strategy used during his successful bid for Governor in 1942 and 
3) his continued activism against Japanese Californians9 while Gover-
nor. 
Part III forwards a "racial redemption" theory to frame this his-
tory. I define "racial redemption" as a psycho-social and ideological 
process through which whiteness maintains its fullest reputational 
value. In the post:Jim Crow era, the reputational value of whiteness-
diminished to the extent it remains implicated in the pre\ious era's 
blatant racism-is restored by rejecting traditional white racism prem-
ised upon biological determinism. I suggest that racial redemption 
consists of three operations: 1) repudiating white supremacy's "old" 
regime; 2) burying historical memories of racial subordination and 
3) transforming white supremacy into a viable contemporary regime. 
Part III views Warren's historical legacy and the role of the postwar 
judiciary through the lens of racial redemption theory, rejecting the 
uncomplicated heroization of Warren and adopting a more critical 
7 See infra Part II.B.2.b. 
8 See infra Part II. 
9 I use this term to refer to both immigrants and American citizens of Japanese ancestry 
living in California at the time. By World Wa.- II, approximately two-thirds of the Japanese 
Californians were citizens. See infra note 95 for a fuller explanation of this terminology. 
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understanding of possible motivations and meanings of his civil rights 
activism. Let me emphasize: I am not arguing that "but for" Warren's 
individual need for redemption from the shame of internment there 
would have been no Warren Court as we know it. Rather, I contend 
that the theory of racial redemption provides a potent multi-level 
narrative which converges Warren's individual need for redemption, 
the judiciary's more structurally functional move to redeem itself from 
overt forms of white supremacist adjudication and society's redemp-
tion of whiteness in the post:Jim Crow era of race relations. 
Part IV concludes by placing redemption theory precisely within 
this broader picture of postwar racial formation, as part of a pivotal 
"racial project. "II) Warren's individual quest, the judiciary's institutional 
move to purge its racially complicit past and society's assertion of an 
innocent postwar colorblindness, are parts of a politic of representation 
that underwrites new structures of contemporary (colorblind) racial 
domination. As such, the processes of racial redemption are important 
animators of now dominant prejudice-based, intentionality-driven ap-
proaches to antidiscrimination law and attendant colorblind, individu-
alistic ideologies. In short, many regressive legal racial projects of the 
recent past are unimaginable absent the racial project to redeem 
whiteness. 
I do not suggest that Warren intentionally meant to contribute to 
this or any particular racial project (except internment). Rather, I 
believe that his equivocations regarding his (and society's) racial past 
became central to the conditions that permitted the later retrench-
ment of (reformulated) white supremacy. Nonetheless, one could take 
this argument a step further and say that Warren himself-directly 
through his biographers and indirectly through neoconservative and 
neoliberal mythological invocations of Brown-is now but an ~ffect of 
the racial project of redemption that is the dominant lens through 
which the man and the era are understood. 
10 See MICHAEL 0]\.[[ & HOWARD \\'INANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM 
THE 19605 TO THE 1990555-56 (2d ed. 1994) (defining racial formation as the socio-historical 
process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed and destroyed). Omi and 
\\'inant define a racial project as ''simultaneously an interpretation, representation, or explana-
tion of racial d}11amics" combined with a "redistribution of resources along particular racial lines." 
Id. at 56. For a more in-depth discussion of these concepts, see discussion infra Part IV.A. 
December 1998] 19 B. C. THIRD WORllJ LAW jOURIVAL 73 
I. TOWARD CRITICAL RACE JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY AND LEGAL 
HISTORY 
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Secondary sources pertaining to Earl Warren's role in internment 
include both historical works on internment and judicial biographies 
of the Chief Justice. Both genres consistently downplay Warren's in-
ternment-related activities by employing methods that impede critical 
race understandings of this historical actor. Before detailing my re-
search on Warren's role in internment, I will review briefly the limita-
tions of the secondary literature that condition both academe's and 
the general public's understanding of Earl Warren. 
A. Warren and Judicial Biographers-A Fraternity of Admirers? 
Judicial biographies are often "admiring," in part because they are 
selected or "contracted," by the subject or the subject's family.1I As one 
scholar has observed, judicial biographies tend to read like "Lives of 
the Saints"-that is, "respectful, conservative, uncritical and oriented 
toward explicating the Great Man's Thought .... "12 Because a biogra-
pher seeks, or already has, close ties to his subject, there may be explicit 
or subtle pressures for the biographer to self-censor his content in 
exchange for access to, or approval from, his subject. 13 Personal or 
political gain may also be at stake.14 Indeed, some ofthe most respected 
judicial biographies were written by former clerks of the Justices being 
profiled. 15 While such intimacy with one's subject may afford greater 
11 See Gerald Gunther, "Contracted" Biographies and Other Obstacles to "Truth," 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 697 (1995) (sketching the pitfalls of "contracted" biographies in which biographers are 
selected by the subject or subject's family, potentially compromising one's "objecth·ity"). See 
generally Morton Horwitz, Commentm)', 70 N.Y.U. L. RE\,. 714 (1995) (raising the question of 
whether "admiring biographers" are able to "re\'eal the warts" of the subject). 
12 DennisJ. Hutchinson.]udicial Biograph),: AmiClls Cm7.ae, 70 N.Y.U. L. RE\,. 723, 724 (1995). 
13 See injiYlnotes 272-77 and accompanying text (discussing Warren's exchange with biog-
rapher John D. Weaver). 
14 Scholars have pointed out how political objectives may be pursued through the crafting of 
biography. See Sarah Barringer Gordon, Commentm-y: The Creation of a Usable judicial Past: Max 
Lerner, Class Conflict, and the Propagation of judicial Titans, 70 N.Y.U. L. RE\,. 622, 629 (1995) 
(commenting on Max Lerner's work on Holmes and Brandeis as part of a "self-consciously 
ambitious and aggressive effort to redefine and redirect American law and politics"); G. Edward 
White, The Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis: Epistem%g)' and judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 576 (1995) (explaining the canonization of Holmes and Brandeis as the biographers' 
need to endorse "epistemological modernism" and progressive political perspectives). 
15 See, e.g., JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL: A BIOGRAPHY (1994) (Jeffries 
clerked for Justice Powell in 1973-74); G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE (1982) 
(White clerked for Chief Justice Warren in 1971-72); MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS 
LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1931HJ1 (1994) (Tush net clerked for 
Justice Marshall in 1972-73). 
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access to confidential documents, it raises the question of perspective. 
For example, former clerks may be more likely to have a positive view 
of their subjects and to have an affinity for the institution of the 
judiciary as a whole, on account of their personal membership in the 
elite fraternity of Supreme Court clerks. J6 
Biographies of Earl Warren, which are often admiring portraits, 
have no doubt contributed to the repression of Warren's role in in-
ternment. Even the most respected biographies on Warren minimize 
this aspect of his life. 17 Warren biographers employ three common 
strategies that blunt otherwise careful scholarship and candid assess-
ments of Warren's wartime activities. 
The first strategy, similar to the "Nuremberg defense," acknow-
ledges participation in wartime injustices while downplaying individual 
agency by suggesting that the subject's decision making process was 
subordinated to a greater authority. For example, Professor G. Edward 
White correctly acknowledges Warren's leadership in fomenting hys-
teria against Japanese Americans, admitting that Warren "engineered 
one of the most conspicuously racist and repressive governmental acts 
in American history. "18 Given this historical legacy, it would appear 
difficult to lessen the significance of such a pivotal event. Immediately 
following this unflinching assessment, however, White suggests a miti-
gating context in which Warren "was by no means alone in his efforts 
or attitudes": 
Congress immediately approved Roosevelt's executive order 
authorizing the evacuation and internment of Japanese and 
provided criminal penalties for violations of military direc-
tives under order. The United States Supreme Court twice 
sustained constitutional challenges to the relocation pro-
gram. Among those who defended the program and its con-
stitutionality were Walter Lippmann, Harlan Fiske Stone, Fe-
16 This demographic homogeneity among the fraternity of former judicial clerks CUIn judicial 
biographers may further narrow the range of critical interpretations. Recent statistics on the 
hiring record of Supreme Court clerks I-eveal that this "fraternity" is not at all diverse along the 
lines of race or gender. See Tony Mauro, Only 1 Nelli High Court Cll!1k Is A Minority, USA TODAY, 
Sept. 10, 1998, at 9A (revealing that only one of 34 total Supreme Court law clerks for the coming 
yeal- is a person of color); Tony Mauro & Aaron Davis, Clnks l'vIostly White Men, USA TODAY, Sept. 
10, 1998, at 9A (sidebar) (concluding that out of the 428 law clerks selected by the sitting nine 
justices, 75% ha\'e been men and the vast majority-93%-have been white). 
17 One of the most respected works by a legal scholar was written by one of Warren's fonner 
law clerks and University of Virginia law professor G. Edward White. See supra note 15. The recent 
effort by journalist Ed Cray has also received considerable praise and attention. See generally CRAY, 
supra note 5. 
lMWHITE, supra note 15, at 75. 
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lix Frankfurter, William O. Douglas, and Hugo Black. Not a 
single California political leader opposed the decision to 
evacuate .... 1') 
79 
Inexplicably, White does not consider Warren's role in influencing 
the President, Congress, the Supreme Court, journalists and other 
politicians. Similarly, Ed Cray's recent biography characterizes War-
ren as "one of many calling for evacuation,20 and hardly the most 
strident. "21 Moreover, "the clamor for [internment] of all persons 
of Japanese descent was irresistible."22 In Cray's view, Warren was 
just another actor capitulating to an irresistible impulse from above. 
The second blunting strategy deploys a critique of "presentism"2~ 
and calls for historical contextualization of behavior a later era con-
demns as oppressive. In the field of history, a guiding canon is to judge 
one's subject in the context of his time, by "recreat[ing] the world as 
it looked to those who lived it,"24 and evaluating historical figures 
within their era's social, moral and political norms. To do otherwise is 
presentist-illegitimately assessing historical figures based upon COI1-
19 Id.; see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPRBIE COURT-A 
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 15-16 (1983) (pointing out that "if Warren admcated the remO\'al of the 
Japanese, he was hardly alone .... Virtually every politician, labor leader, and newspaper ... 
supported the evacuation. "). 
20 "Evacuation" (like the term "relocation") is a common euphemism for internment. See 
Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied: Report 
of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians xx\iii (1982) [hereinafter 
CWRIC] (explaining how the term "evacuee," referring to one who is "removed from his house 
or community, in a time of war or pressing danger as a protective measure" is a euphemism "[i]n 
light of the Commission's conclusion that remo\<ll ,,<IS not a military necessity"). 
21 CRAY, supra note 5, at 123. 
22Id. at 122. 
2~ "Presentism" refers to a critical posture that erases the historical contingency of a practice 
based on a logic that is tested only by contemporary obsen'ations. See JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES 
THAT MATTER 223-28 (1993) (describing as "presentist" the conceit of autonomy that one arrh'es 
in the world without history and absent power relations, thereby enabling one to reclaim or 
resignify temporal meanings by virtue ofindhidual "'ill or choice). 
24 Laura Kalman, COlnlllentm)': The Wondpr of the Harren COllrt, 70 N.Y.U. L. RET. 780, 781 
(1995); see also John T. Noonan, Jr., CO/nmentmJ: The Secular Search for the Sacred, 70 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 642, 643-44 (1995) (obsening that a biographer ,,'ho lives in a different generation from 
his subject "can assure his complete dominance O\'er the case by showing how the judge's values 
have become out-of-date" and proclaiming that it "takes a generosity of spirit to see the case as 
the judge saw it"). But see, e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AKD THE FOVNDERS: R-I.CE AND LIBERTY 
IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 145 (1996) (criticizing "anti-presentist" historians of Thomas Jefferson 
for their "willingness to distort the historical record to protect Jefferson as a s)111bol for the 
modern era"); PETER NOYlCK, THAT NOBLE DREAM 436 (1988) (describing the political nature 
of the critique of presentism). Novick explained: "Terms with positive valence ('disinterested,' 
'evenhanded') were claimed for one's o\\'n camp; those \\"ith negative connotations (,present-
minded,' 'partisan') were ascribed to one's enemies." NO\'lCK, SlljJ)'{J, at 436. 
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temporary values and goals. 25 In Warren biographies, authors contex-
tualize and normalize his anti:Japanese agenda by socio-historically 
referencing norms of the era that relieve him of individual gUilt.26 
Bernard Schwartz, for example, acknowledges that by today's stand-
ards, Warren's wartime statements were "indefensible. "27 Ironically, the 
biographer then goes on to cite Carey McWilliams28 to explain how 
Warren "was entrapped to a certain extent by ... a kind of political en-
vironment out of which he came in California. "29 "Then, too," Schwartz 
urges, "we should not forget the situation on the West Coast at the 
beginning of 1942," noting that Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, 
then a lawyer in the Department of Justice, asserted that "you have to 
live it to understand the feeling Californians had about the people of 
Japanese descent after Pearl Harbor. "30 
This hermeneutic approach indulges a form of cultural determi-
nism that discounts the role of individual agency and, thus, account-
ability for the egregious acts of powerful and privileged actors. Such 
an approach resembles what Robert Cover referred to as the retreat 
into legal formalism adopted by judges deciding fugitive slave cases.3\ 
In both instances, political and moral abdication is rationalized 
through the methodological dictates of disciplinary and professional 
power/knowledge practices. For legal historiography, the result is that 
25 For a discussion of the alleged problem of presentism within the field of historical biog-
raphy generally and one author's critique of that problematization, see FINKELMAN, supm note 
24, at 145. 
26 See, e.g., LUTHERA. HUSTON, PATHWAY TO JUDGMENT: A STUDY OF EARL WARREN 59 (1966). 
As Huston comments: 
Distrust of the Japanese was ingrained in Warren, as in thousands of other Califor-
nians. In 1919 the California Joint Immigration Committee was formed to agitate 
against the "Yellow Peril," and Warren was a member of two organizations, the 
Natiye Sons of the Golden West and the American Legion, which sponsored the 
Committee. It was perhaps only natural, therefore, that when the United States and 
Japan went to war against each other, ''''arren became convinced that the Japanese 
residents of California, whether the native-born Nisei or elderly Japanese born in 
their native land, were the greatest potential source of sabotage. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
2; SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 15. 
28 A contemporary of Earl Warren's, Carey McWilliams was one of the few California politi-
cians to condemn internment. Thus, Schwartz' deployment of McWilliams' quote is effective in 
sening the larger anti-presentist formulation of Warren and insulating himself from the Finkel-
man-like critiques of the anti-presentist movement. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
2!1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 19, at 15 (citations omitted). 
30Id. (emphasis added). 
31 For the critique of legal formalism in fugitive slave cases, see ROBE·R't COVER, JUSTICE 
ACCl;SED: A."TI-SLAVERy AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 232-38 (1975) (describing how anti-slavery 
judges rendering pro-slavery decisions sought to reduce their cognitive dissonance by external-
izing their personal responsibility to the "inexorable march of precedent"). 
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"eras" and their "norms" are essentialized as synonymous with the his-
torian's image of majority culture, rather than understood as fluid and 
contingent constructs, and subject to contestation. Such anti-presentist 
approaches cannot, however, explain why other prominent figures, 
such as Socialist McWilliams and ACLU representative Wayne Collins, 
actively opposed internment.32 Indeed, by insisting that the reigning 
societal mores and values of a subject's era should be taken into 
account, historians may tend to elide equally constitutive perspectives 
of societal "out-groups. "33 A critical race historiography, to the contrary, 
would ensure that the context of the m.yority does not trump the 
context of the minority through the allegedly context-sensitive, anti-
presentist critique. 
The third blunting strategy posits Warren's "march toward enlight-
enment." This approach interprets past participation in injustice as the 
bridge to a more evolved awareness. For example, according to even 
critical biographers, Warren's unfortunate involvement with intern-
ment had a silver lining of consciousness-raising regarding racial jus-
tice. 34 By pointing out weaknesses in their subject, these biographers 
are able to appear objective while doing no harm to the reputation of 
their subject, instead underlining his capacity for growth, change and 
progress. 
As one illustration, upon Warren's death on July 9, 1974, Carey 
McWilliams, his Socialist critic and longtime friend, provided a tribute 
in The Nation magazine entitled, The Education of Earl Warren. McWil-
liams began by bluntly reminding the audience that there was "no hint 
of greatness in the first phase of [Warren's] career."35 According to the 
32 For Md\'illiams' position on the internment, see generally CAREY l\IcWILLIAMS, PREJU-
DICE; JAPANESE AMERICANS: SYMBOL OF R<l.CIAL INTOLERANCE (1944) [hereinafter MCWILLIAMS, 
PREJUDICE]. For ""ayne Collins' resistance through the courts, see ROGER DANIELS, CONCENTRA-
TION CAMPS: NORTH AMERICA, JAPANESE IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA DURING \\'ORLD 
\VAR II 166 (1971, rev. 1981, updated 1989) [hereinafter DAl':IELS, CAMPS]; PETER IRONS,jUSTICE 
AT WAR (1983); MICHl WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY 64--66, 215-16, 267-68 (1976) (dedicating book 
to Wayne Collins, "who did more to correct a democracy's mistake than any other person"). 
33 Historian and legal scholar Anthony R. Miles highlights 11m negative effects of the anti-
presentist move to normalize regressive actions as historically contextualized: 
I) by treating the subject's view as generally shared, it narrows our understanding 
of the full intellectual context in which the decision took place ... and 2) it suggests 
the context itself is unimportant, thus devaluing the experiences of those "'hose 
lives and history it impacted most heavily and the roles of those ,dlOse beliefs/ ac-
tions/omissions opposed those of the subject. 
Letter from Anthony R. Miles, Editor-in-Chief, Michigall journal oj Race alld Law, to Sumi Cho 
2 (Feb. 1, 1999) (on file with the Boston College Law Review). 
34 See, e.g., infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text. See also HORWITZ, sujml note 6, at 24. 
35 Carey McWilliams, The Education oj Emf Harren, NATION, at 67 (Oct. 12, 1974). 
82 40 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REl'lEW 73 [Symposium 
author, he was "perhaps the most influential advocate for mass evacu-
ation of all persons of Japanese descent."36 The article concluded, 
however, by observing the "truth about Warren "-that "he grew pro-
digiously."37 Noting that Warren eventually discarded the outlook that 
led him to join the Native Sons of the Golden West, McWilliams closes 
by paying homage to "a most remarkable American politician who grew 
to greatness. "3t! 
McWilliams' tribute made Warren a symbol of the nation's psyche 
and character. Like many Americans prior to the civil rights movement 
in the 1950s and 1960s, Earl Warren displayed bigoted views and held 
crude prejudices against people of color. Yet, to McWilliams, his great-
ness lay in his education and enlightenment: "Warren's career thus 
stands as a monument to the proposition that politicians have been 
known to grow in moral insight and social understanding to the point 
where they will respond ... to the challenge of new issues and chang-
ing times. "39 
What better personification of the American spirit and postwar 
egalitarianism than the Chief Justice, whose first case upon appoint-
ment to the bench was Brown v. Board of Education? Warren, the nativist 
politician, was the perfect foil for Warren, the enlightened Chief Jus-
tice. This juxtaposition of the two Warrens is the dominant way biog-
raphers and historians, sympathetic to Warren, portray the Chiefs 
California days, if the period is seriously examined at all. Warren is 
everyman-reflective of the best and worst that America can produce. 
While I am not denying the possibility or importance of a subject's 
moral, intellectual or political development, I do take issue with the 
"moral pass" or "clean slate" granted to subjects who engage in regres-
sive actions as long as "progress" in another, implicitly more important 
realm can be claimed as an outgrowth of the original wrong. Such a 
rationalizing approach works to make certain categories of problem-
atic behavior invisible. More importantly, for the purposes of this 
Article, a "march to enlightenment" approach obscures the broader 
political context of racially redemptive action insofar as it recognizes 
only personal enlightenment determinants of action rather than larger 
racial project imperatives. 
At the conclusion of his work, Professor White contrasts Warren's 
"racial prejudices against Orientals" with his authorship of Brown v. 
36/d. at 68. 
37 [d. 
38 [d. 
39 [d. 
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Board ofEducation.40 To White, Warren's "discovery" of the importance 
of civil rights and civil liberties in postwar America was emblematic of 
the journey of many other Americans who rethought their racial atti-
tudes in the late forties and fifties. Warren's transformation from an 
anti-Asian Native Son of the Golden West to a liberal icon for racial 
equality "was a testament to the ideological adjustments required of 
those who believed that twentieth-century American society should be 
marked by continuous progress."H In other words, internment was 
again but a necessary learning experience that would inform vVarren's 
more enlightened days on the bench. This modernist, bildungsroman-
like narrative of moral growth toward greatness is possible because, not 
in spite of, Warren's advocacy of internment. 
The Nuremberg defense, the anti-presentist approach and the 
march to enlightenment are the three dominant lenses through which 
judicial biographers construe Earl Warren's involvement with intern-
ment. As a result, his wartime civil rights/ ci\'illiberties record has been 
distorted and obscured. By obscuring the past, judicial biographers 
frustrate the emergence of new understandings of the Warren Court 
vis-a.-vis postwar race relations and equality jurisprudence. In this sense, 
these three methods may actually reflect contemporary racial projects 
within academe. As historian John Hope Franklin commented, the 
study of Reconstruction "can prodde a fairly clear notion of the prob-
lems confronting the periods in which the historians lived but not al-
ways as clear a picture of Reconstruction itself. "42 Similarly, the existing 
judicial biographies of Warren's World War II involvement with Japa-
nese Californians may-ironically for anti-presentists-tell us more 
about the political and social tenor of the biographer's life and times 
than about the subject's relationship to Japanese Californians. 
B. Internment Historians: The Forgiving Canon of Causation 
Many of the earliest historical works on internment grapple with 
the issue of causation but pay little attention to the role of California's 
then-Attorney General. 43 One early effort by a team of scholars from 
the University of California at Berkeley attempted to reconstruct the 
40 WHITE, supra note 15, at 368. 
41 /d. at 368-69. 
42john Hope Franklin, Mirror for Amflical1s: A CentuIJ of Reconstructiol1 HistOl)" ill R4.CE 
AND HISTORY: SELECTED ESSAYS, 1938-1988, at 384,397 (1989). 
43 See generally DANIELS, CAMPS, supra note 32, at 71; l\lORTO:-.l GRODZI:-:S, A..~IERICANS BE-
TRAYED: POLITICS AND JAPANESE EYAclJATIO:-.l (1949);jACOBUS TENBROEK ET AL., PREJl'D1CE, WAR 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 200-01 (1954). 
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causes of internment in the Japanese American Evacuation and Reset-
tlement Study (,JAERS").44 One part of this team, led by Jacobus 
tenBroek, was ahead of its time in rejecting the "myth of military 
necessity" as a rationale for internment.45 Nevertheless, the group 
adopted a rather extreme proximate causation requirement to assess 
Warren's responsibility for internment. 41i According to this approach, 
Warren should not be held accountable for internment absent conclu-
sive proof that he had publicly advocated internment prior to the 
issuance of Executive Order ("E.O.") 9066, the internment order is-
sued by President Roosevelt on February 19, 1942: 
California's Attorney General in 1942, Earl Warren, has been 
charged by several writers with great if not crucial influence 
in promoting evacuation. However, an examination of the 
evidence fails to sustain the many allegations against him; and 
in particular there remains no proof that Warren ever pub-
licly declared himself in favor of mass evacuation prior to 
mid-February.H 
There are at least two problems with this narrow definition of 
accountability. First, the Berkeley team uses February 19, 1942 (the 
date President Roosevelt signed the executive order) as its reference 
point for accountability. Elsewhere, however, they conclude that the 
Supreme Court was perhaps most to blame for internment because it 
failed to strike the executive orders as unconstitutional in Hirabayashi48 
and Korematsu.49 Had the Court done so, the scholars surmise, "the 
Japanese American episode would have lived in history as nothing 
worse than a military blunder. "50 But if the apportioning of blame for 
44 JAERS is perhaps patterned after the extensive (in both time and resources) Carnegie 
Foundation-funded study of Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma. See infra note 252. JAERS 
began its work in February of 1942 and worked through July of 1948, ,,~th substantial funding 
from the Vniyersity of California (approximately $36,000), the Rockefeller Foundation ($39,000) 
and the Columbia Foundation ($30,000). See TENBROEK, supra note 43, at ix. 
45 See TDIBROEK, supra note 43, at 327 (concluding that even without hindsight, the "weak-
ness of the case for military necessity was spotlighted rather than concealed by General DeWitt's 
Final Report, which is a flimsy tissue of misstatements, preposterous absurdities, patently fallacious 
reasoning, unacknowledged quotations .... "). 
46 Critics of the tenBroek effort, such as historian Roger Daniels, would later note that the 
tenBroek team did not include a professional historian among its scholars. DANIELS, CAMPS, supra 
note 32, at 71. 
47 TENBROEK, supra note 43, at 200 (citations omitted). 
4H Hirabayashi \'. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (rejecting challenge to military curfew 
yiolation in deference to wartime national security decisionmaking). 
49 Korematsuv. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding Civilian Exclusion Order #34 
as constitutional due to "military necessity"). 
,,0 TENBROEK, supra note 43, at 332. 
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internment extends to the Supreme Court for its decisions in Hira-
bayashi and Korematsu, then certainly the time frame for evaluating 
Warren's responsibility should be extended to, at the least, the date of 
the Hirabayashi decision in 1943.51 If this date is used, Warren's respon-
sibility for the internment is enhanced.52 
In addition to the narrow timeline problem, the JAERS failed to 
consider overlap between the societal and governmental units it as-
sesses to determine responsibility. That is, it does not consider that an 
actor from one unit may have influenced the attitudes and actions of 
actors in other units. The historical evidence will reveal that Warren 
was both informing, and informed by, other segments of society, the 
polity, the military and the judiciary.53 
I should make clear that my goal is not to prove that Warren was 
a leading cause of internment. I will detail Warren's internment past 
not so much to "expose" it and force a revision of the c~usal theories 
of internment, but to reflect upon why this past is down played sig-
nificantly in judicial biography and historiography and what this ob-
scured past means for understanding contemporary racial and consti-
tutional jurisprudence. I suggest one reason that Warren's individual 
record in this episode is finessed is to defend his activist Court against 
regressive political and academic forces advocating judicial restraint 
and a return to the previous era's worship of process theory.54 The use 
51 See discussion infra Part II. 
52 See discussion infra Part II. 
53 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
54 In a recent book re~iew of Morton Horwitz' The Warren Court and the Pursuit of justice, 
R.B. Bernstein characterizes C. Edward Vt'hite, Bernard Schwartz and Ed Cray as "admiring 
biographers" who have attempted to "stem the tide of denigration" aimed at Warren and the 
Warren Court by "right-wing politicians and legal scholars." R.B. Bernstein, Raise High the Faded 
Banner, H-Net Book Review, H-Law@h-net.msu.edu (Oct. 1998). Among these consen-ath'e schol-
ars, Bernstein counts Raoul Berger, Earl M. Maltz, Christopher ''''olfe, Philip Kurland, and 
Alexander Bickel for their attacks on the ''''alTen Court's judicial activism. See id. 
For a concise description of the conflict between legal process theorists and the ''''an'en 
Court, see Stephen M. Feldman, From Modernism to Postmodl'mism in American Legal Thought: 
The Significance of the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COl'RT: A RETROSPECTIH 324, 340-48 
(Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996) [hereinafter THE WARREN COURT]. For a re,iew of legal process 
theory, see Akhil Reed Amar, Lalli StOlT Hart and Wechslers Thl' Federal COIll·ts and the Federal 
System, 102 HARV. L. REv. 688, 691-92 (1989) (identif)'ing works in 1953 and 1954 as constituting 
the "golden age" of legal process scholarship); Michael Wells, Behind the Pari!)' Debate: The Decline 
of the Legal Process Tradition in the Lalli of Federal Courts, il B.U. L. REv. 609, 619-29 (1991) 
(describing the legal process school as emphasizing that "the process by which judges reach 
decisions distinguishes adjudication from other decision making and is the source of its legiti-
macy"). Some key works in this genre include Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 
92 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1978) (addressing the adjudication process); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The POlilel' 
of Congress to Limit the jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic. 66 HAR\,. L. RE,'. 1362 
(1953) (discussing the ability and right of Congress to regulate issues of jurisdiction \\ithin the 
federal courts and its tension with constitutional government); Herbert ''''echsler, Tuward Neutral 
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of biographical interventionism, however, also underwrites the prob-
lematic liberal "triumphalism" that sees the Warren Court as the final 
chapter in the civil rights struggle.55 
II. THE OTHER WARREN: CALIFORNIA'S NATIVE SON 
Morton Horwitz observes that of the Warren Court's seven liberal 
members, "six grew up in extremely poor families. "56 This, he suggests, 
might explain why the liberal band of "outsiders" had a greater affinity 
for the underdog and downtroddenY Warren's childhood in Bak-
ersfield, California may have inclined him to the Progressivism that 
formed during the first decade of the 20th century.58 Drawing strength 
from the working and middle-classes, Progressivism challenged elite 
economic and political monopolies. Its emphasis on honesty, anticor-
ruption, public versus special interests and public accountability reso-
nated with Warren's upbringing and early experiences.59 His Bakers-
field childhood, though, did not escape the anti-Asian sentiment of 
California Progressives. IiI) In California, Progressives were as decidedly 
Plinciples of Constitlltional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 15 (1959) (arguing that judges must base 
their decisions on "analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result .... "). 
,,5l\lark Tushnet cautions against celebrating the ''''arren Court's "triumphalism": 
There are lots of different ways of understanding the Supreme Court in any 
particular period. \\'hat seems to me likely to lead us wrong is the triumphalism 
about Brown. 'Vhat Brown did was to articulate this tremendous vision that nobody 
did anything about. And because it was articulated, therefore, you didn't have to 
do anything about it. 
Mark Tushnet, Transcript: Members of the nt/ITen Court in Judicial Biography, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
791, SOS (1995). John Hope Franklin also cautions against using history to bolster one's political 
perspecti\'e. See Franklin, supra note 42, at 396 (arguing that such a subordination of historiog-
raphy to the political arena "is a major reason for our not having a better general account of 
what actually occurred during Reconstruction"). 
"li HOR\\'ITZ, supra note 6, at 13. Professor Horwitz identifies the seven "outsider" liberal 
members of the Warren Court as Brennan (Roman Catholic, from a family of eight children), 
Goldberg (jewish, from a family of eight children), Fortas (jewish), Marshall (African American), 
Warren (white Protestant from poor family), Douglas (white Protestant whose father had a "low 
social position") and Black (white evangelical Protestant with an eccentric, alcoholic father). Of 
the seven liberals, Horwitz identifies all but Brennan as coming from "extremely poor families." 
Id. 
57 See id. 
58 See WHITE, supra note 15, at IS. 
59 See id. at IS-20. 
60 In Warren's hometown, for example, there were no names of Asian Californians in the 
local directory. Instead, the entry would read "Oriental" prior to listing the address. See id. at 35. 
In high school, Warren's debate team at Kern County High School regularly squared off over the 
rights of Japanese in the United States, arguing whether they should be segregated in schools or 
permitted to become citizens. See JOHN D. WEAVER, WARREN: THE MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA 
lOS (1967). 
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anti-Asian as they were anti-monopoly, equating the Japanese immi-
grant presence in their state with a form of alien tyranny.lil One Warren 
biographer observed that "Orientalist racism and 'reform' were com-
patible values for California Progressives. "fi2 
Scholars have documented California's long tradition of anti-
Asian legislation, violence and intolerance. Prior to World War II, 
discrimination against Asian Pacific Americans across ethnicities was 
legal, overt and widespread.63 Early immigrants of Asian and Pacific 
descent were considered non-white and socially undesirable. A number 
oflaws were passed to harass, restrict, stigmatize and eventually exclude 
each Asian Pacific ethnic group from the United States. Outright 
exclusion and discriminatory quotas in immigration laws,64 racial re-
strictions on naturalization rights and property ownership,65 anti-mis-
61 Progressive leader Chester Rowell's comments reflect Progressive thought on the japanese, 
albeit a more refined version. But because his comments were l'elativel)' moderate, he would 
sometimes be attacked by fellow progressives as being "pro:Jap." 
It is for the white peoples to resoh"e [the problem] and the brown peoples to accept 
the permanent physical separation of their races. But ... it is for Californians to 
treat them justly, and for Easterners to be sympathetic and japanese forebearing if 
occasionally they fail to do so. 
ROGER DANIELS, THE POLITICS OF PREJUDICE 49 n.15 (1962) [hereinafter DANIELS, POLITICS]. 
See also GEORGE E. MOWRY, THE CALIFORNIA PROGRESSIVES 154 (1951). 
62 For example, as the Progressive "organ of reform," the CALIFORNIA '\'EEKLY advocated for 
the Alien Land Law of 1909, urging the state legislature to "limit Mongolian mmership of soil to 
a space four feet by six [because] a white population and a brown population, regardless of 
nationality or ideals, can nevel" occupy the same soil together with advantage to either." WHITE, 
supra note 15, at 19 (citations omitted). 
63 For excellent historical ovel'\'iews of discrimination against Asian Pacific Americans, see 
generally SUCHENG CHAN, ASIAN AMERICANS, AN INTERPRETI\'E HISTORY (1991) [hereinafter 
CHAN, ASIAN AMERICANS]; RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY 
OF ASIAN AMERICANS (1989). In legal scholarship, see generally ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE, 
RIGHTS, AND THE AsIAN AMERICAN EXPERIANCE (1998); ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME 
COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Hyung-chan Kim ed., 1992) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT]; 
HYUNG-CHAN KIM, A LEGAL HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS, 1790-1990 (1994); CHARLES 
MCCLAIN,jR., THE SEARCH FOR EQUALITY, THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN 
NINETEETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1994). 
64 For Asian Pacific American immigration history, see generally ENTRY DENIED: EXCLUSION 
AND THE CHINESE COMMUNITY IN AMERICA, 1882-1943, (Sucheng Chan ed., 1991) [hereinafter 
ENTRY DENIED]; BILL HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION 
POLICY, 1850-1990 (1993); JOAN JENSEN, PASSAGE FROM INDIA: ASIAN INDIAN IMMIGRANTS IN 
NORTH AMERICA (1988); U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: 
CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION (1980); Chin Kim & Bok Lim Kim, Asian Immigrants in 
American Law: A Look at the Past and the Challenge n7lich Remains, 26 AM. U. L. RE\'. 373 (1977). 
65 See FRANK F. CHUMAN, THE BAMBOO PEOPLE: THE LA\\' AND JAPANESE-AlIIERICANS 38-51, 
73-89, 117-23 (1981); IAN HANEy-LOPEZ, WHITE BY LA\\,: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 
(1996); YUJI IcHIOKA, THE ISSEI: THE WORLD OF THE FIRST GENERATION JAPANESE IMMIGRANTS, 
1885-1924, at 226-43 (1988); JAMES KETTNER, THE DE\"ELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 
1608-1870 (1978); TAKAKI, supra note 63, at 203-12, 411-14; Keith Aoki, No Right to Own?: The 
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cegenation laws,'ili segregated schoolsli7 and non-protection from racial 
violenceli8 were some of the most serious legal barriers and iI~ustices 
Asian Pacific Americans faced through the middle of the twentieth 
century. This anti-Asian tradition underscored the Progressivism with 
which Warren would identify during his political career. 
Warren found a political mentor and lifelong hero in Hiram 
Johnson, the Progressives' choice for California Governor in 1910 and 
a leader in the passage of the 1913 Alien Land Law.59 In his memoirs, 
Warren associated his political views most closely to those of Johnson's 
Progressivism, shunning other labels: "I did not care to be categorized 
as either a liberal or a conservative .... I believed in the progressivism 
of Hiram Johnson, who had broken the power of predatory interests 
"70 Nowhere in his memoirs does Warren attempt to distance 
Early-Twentieth CentlllY "Alien Land Laws" As a Prelude to Internment, in this issue, at 37; Elizabeth 
Hull, Naturalization and Denaturalization, in SUPREME COURT, supra note 63, at 403; Yuji Ichioka, 
The EarZ)' japanese Immigrant Quest for Citizenship: The Background of the 1922 Ozawa Case, 4 
A~lERASIA 1 (1977); Karen Leonard, The Pah/wr Singh iVlurders: A Punjam Response to Califarnia's 
Alien Land Law, 11 AMERASIA 75 (1984);JeffH. Lesser, Always "Outsiders": Asians, Naturalization, 
and the Supreme Court, 12 AMERASIA 83 (1985-86); Dudley McGovney, The AntiJapanese Land 
Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35 CAL. L. REV. 7 (1947); Thomas Stuen, Asian A.mericans 
and Their Rights for Land Ownership, in SUPREME COURT, supra note 64, at 603. 
(iG See gellerallyJAMES LOEWEN, THE MISSISSIPPI CHINESE, BETWEEN BLACK AND WHITE (1971); 
CCLA Asian American Studies Center Staff, Anti-iHiscegenation Laws and the Filipino, in LETTERS 
IN EXILE, A.'\f INTRODUCTORY READER ON THE HISTORY OF FILIPINOS IN AMERICA Oesse Quinsaat 
et al. eds., 1976) [hereinafter LETTERS IN EXILE]. 
67 See CHUMAN, supra note 65, at 19-37; GARY Y. OKIHIRO, MARGINS AND MAINSTREAMS: 
ASIANS IN A~lERICAN HISTORY AND Ct:l.TURE 159-62 (1994). 
68 For a more detailed discussion of anti-Chinese violence, see SUCHENG CHAN, THIS BITTER-
SWEET SOIL: THE CHINESE IN CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE, 1860-1910, at 370-86 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter CHAN, BITTERSWEET SOIL]; SHIH-SHAN HENRY TSAI, CHINA AND THE OVERSEAS CHINESE IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 1868-1911, at 72-80 (1983); John Wunder, Anti-Chinese Violence in the 
American West, 1850-1910, in LAW FOR THE ELEPHANT, LAW FOR THE BEAVER: ESSAYS IN THE 
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE NORTH AlIIERICAN WEST 212 Oohn McLaren et al. eds., 1992); see also 
John Ha"akawa Torok, On the Intersectiolls of Violence, Racial Nativism, Law and White Supremacy 
(paper presented at Critical Race Themy wmkshop, 1994, on file with author). 
On other anti-Asian violence, see CHAN, ASIAN AMERICANS, supra note 63, at 52 (Asian 
Indian); ICHIOKA, supra note 65, at 251 (recording violence against Japanese issei fannworkers); 
JENSEN, supra note 64,at 53-54 (documenting anti-Asian Indian violence); HOWARD DE WITT, 
ANTI-FILIPINO l\IovnIENTS IN CALIFORNIA: A HISTORY, BIBLIOGRAPHY AND STUDY GUIDE 46-66 
(1976) (detailing anti-Filipino violence); Emory Bogardus, Anti-Filipino Race Riots, reprinted in 
LETTERS IN EXILE, supra note 65, at 51-62 (discussing anti-Filipino race riots); JelTY Kang, Note, 
Racial \'iolenee Against Asian Amelicans, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1926 (1993). 
69 See WHITE, supra note 15, at 21. Although Johnson initially resisted the anti:Japanese 
hysteria in California during an attempt to pass an earlier version of the alien land law in 1911, 
after realizing how politically damaging his defense of basic rights for Japanese immigrants was, 
he emerged as a leading spokesperson for restriction and exclusion of the Japanese for the 
remainder of his political career. See DANIELS, POLITICS, supra note 61, at 49-64, 95-100. Fm the 
language of the 1913 Alien Land Law, see 1913 Cal. Stat. 113. 
70 EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 171 (1977). 
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himself from, or even discuss,Johnson's or the Progressives' approach 
to the Japanese in California. Later, as a Senator from California, 
Johnson joined leading anti:Japanese crusader V.S. McClatchy in or-
ganizing the "Executive Committee of the Western States"-a lofty 
name for a steering committee of one senator and one representative 
each from the eleven western states, designed to guide anti:Japanese 
legislation through Congress. il Carey McWilliams noted that Johnson 
was "very anti-Oriental," and that "Warren greatly respected Johnson, 
and ... from this source ... Warren sort of had this [anti-Oriental] 
point of view. "72 
Throughout his years in California politics when he held positions 
as clerk of the California Assembly Judiciary Committee (1918-19), 
Deputy District Attorney of Alameda Count)' (1920-26), District Attor-
ney of Alameda County (1926-38), state Republican Party chair (1934-
38), Attorney General (1938-42) and finally Governor (1942-53), War-
ren was true to his party's vision of assisting the disadvantaged and the 
outsider. Like many nativist California Progressives, however, he be-
lieved that governmental largesse should be bestowed selectively-not 
universally, so as to promote an ideal vision of California that excluded 
"undesirable" persons, ideologies and cultures.n With this ideological 
background and training in mind, I will examine in greater detail three 
areas of activity from 1942-45: 1) Warren's civil defense planning as 
Attorney General; 2) his gubernatorial campaign; and 3) his role as 
Governor. 
A. The Activist Attorney General 
Scholars have identified California Attorney General Warren as 
the "single most powerful voice for the [internment] decision"i4 and 
"one of the individuals most responsible for bringing the relocation 
71 See DANIELS, CAMPS, supra note 32, at 96. 
72 Earl Warren Project, The Internment, Carey Mc\\'illiams Interview at 29, an oral history 
conducted 1970 through 1977 by Miriam F. Stein and Amelia R. Fry, Regional Oral History Office, 
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1981 [hereinafter McWilliams Interview]. 
73 See WHITE, supra note 15, at 102. \<\11ite contends that during his 1938 attorney general 
campaign, Warren moved away from a selective definition of minority rights to a more universal-
istic one, conceptualizing majoritarian government as a "protector of minority rights." But \\11ite 
concedes that while \<\'arren mav have departed from the early Progressive thinking as early as 
1938, he later departed from his conceptualization of uni\'ersalistic protection of minority rights 
in the 'Japanese relocation." See id. at 103. 
74 CHUMAN, supra note 65, at 151. Chuman concludes that "it can be taken ,dth reasonable 
certainty, that the statement of Attorney General Warren on February 21, 1942 provided the 
single most powerful voice for the ultimate decision of the United States gm'ernment to remove 
all persons of Japanese ancestry from the \\'estern Defense Command." 1d. 
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program into being. "75 Others, however, have disputed this charac-
terization, declaring that "there remains no proof that Warren ever 
publicly declared himself in favor of mass evacuation prior to mid-Feb-
ruary [1942],"71) and concluding that Warren's "minor role" has been 
overemphasized due to his later prominence.77 The following sections 
synthesize archival materials and other sources to capture a more 
comprehensive record of Warren's involvement with internment ef-
forts. 7s 
1. Redlining the Yellow Menace 
Two days after the December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor attack, Secre-
tary of the Navy Frank Knox toured the devastated site and put into 
circulation unfounded rumors that Japanese Hawaiian saboteurs were 
responsible for "the most effective fifth-column 79 work that's come out 
of this war."81J Although Knox's allegations were never verified, his 
words carried considerable weight.81 Newspapers in California sensa-
tionalized his comments with headlines that read: "Secretary of Navy 
i5 WHITE, sllpra note 15, at 74. \\11ite further notes that \Varren was able to influence 
important military and federal policymakers and from January, 1942 on, was "a persistent advo-
cate of some form of evacuation, and his skillful marshaling of arguments, some of them spurious 
and others based primarily on racial prejudice, significantly contributed to the decision to intern 
and evacuate the Japanese." Id.; see also Earl \\'arren Project, Interviewers' Introduction at xviii, 
an oral history conducted 1910 through 1977 by Miriam F. Stein and Amelia R. Fry, Regional 
Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1981 (quoting Mike 
Masaoka as saying that "probably more than any single person ... Earl Warren influenced the 
Executi\'e decision to authorize and carry out the mass military evacuation and exclusion of all 
persons of Japanese origin from all of California"). 
i6 TENBROEK, supra note 43, at 200 (arguing that Warren's [February 21, 1942) Tolan 
Committee testimony "could not have influenced De\\'itt," that \\'arren's February 7th comments 
before the Joint Immigration Committee were not made public and that there is "no evidence 
one way or the other as to what \Varren's sentiment was on February 11th when he accompanied 
Mayor Bowron of Los Angeles in, a personal call on DeWitt"). 
i7 See DANIELS, CA]\\PS, supra note 32, at 51-52 (acknowledging that Warren "did add his 
voice, but it was not yet a \'ery strong one and it is almost inconceivable that, had any other 
politician held his post, essentially the same result would not have ensued"); see also McWilliams 
Interview, supra note 72, at 29. 
7~ Internment histories and biographies onVarren tend to offer partial coverage of\\'alTen 's 
,,'artime role, often a few paragraphs or pages at most. This Article attempts to bring together 
the various secondary sources supplemented with primary research to re-examine the extent of 
the Attorney General's influence. 
79 According to Peter Irons, the term "fifth column" referring to subversive activities origi-
nates in the Spanish Civil War. One obsener allegedly commented that General Franco "had 
four military columns marching on i\fadrid and a 'fifth column' of civilian sympathizers already 
within the Capital." IRONS, supra note 32, at 2l. 
HO CWRIC, supra note 20, at 55. 
HI Roger Daniels explains Knox's comments as the result of "deep felt antiJapanese preju-
dices" and a desire to maintain the public faith in the navy by shifting blame for the attack on 
Pearl Harbor to espionage activity. See DANIELS, CAMPS, supra note 32, at 36. 
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Blames Fifth Columnists for the Raid," "Fifth Column Prepared Attack" 
and "Fifth Column Treachery Told."il2 On January 25, a committee 
chaired by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts released a report 
on the investigation into the Pearl Harbor attack.83 Like Knox, the 
Roberts report insinuated that Japanese Hawaiian spies had aided the 
Pearl Harbor attack by collecting and transmitting information on 
island military and naval installations to the Japanese Empire.84 The 
Roberts report stirred the anxious imagination of the public. Soon, no 
tale of treachery was too outrageous for public consumption. s5 More-
over, politicians urging restrictive measures against issei8G and niseis7 
on the West Coast now had an official report at their disposal.88 
On January 29, four days following the publication of the Roberts 
report, Warren met with army officers and considered their concerns: 
because it was difficult to determine whether residents of Japanese 
ancestry were alien or citizen and because it was even more difficult 
to assess their loyalty to the United States, the close proximity of these 
people to key military facilities posed a distinct security threat. s9 What 
state laws, the army officers asked Warren, were available to "break up 
this proximity?"90 Upon reflection, the Attorney General concluded 
that stricter enforcement of the state's Alien Land Law might provide 
a partial solution.91 Under the nativist-inspired Alien Land Law of 1920, 
82 C\\,RIC, supra note 20, at 56; TENBROEK, slljHa note 43, at 70. 
8~ See DANIELS, CAMPS, supra note 32, at 49-50. 
84 See CWRIC, supra note 20, at 57; DANIELS, CUIPS, supra note 32, at 49. 
8" Two \'i\'id examples of apocr\'phal stories that circulated are; 1) that the hands of Japanese 
pilots who had been shot down during the raid had Uni\'ersity of California class rings on the 
pilots' fingers and 2) that the night prior to the attack, Japanese Hawaiian sligar cane \mrkers 
had cut the cane into alTow patterns which pointed the Japanese pilots to\\'ard Pearl Harbor. See 
DANIELS, CAMPS, supra note 32, at 50. 
86 Issei is a Japanese word that refers to first-generation immigrants. See EYELYN NAKANO 
GLENN, ISSEI, NISEI, WAR BRIDE; THREE GENERATIONS OF JAPANESE AMERICAN WOMEN IN DO~IES­
TIC SERYICE 8 (1986). 
87 Nisei refers to second-generation offspring of the issei. See id. 
88 See DANIELS, CAMPS, sujJl'G note 32, at 50. 
89 Assistant Attorney General '\'arren Olney, III, references that in "the \'ery first meetings 
that we in the attorney general's office had with army officers following Pearl Harbor" they 
discussed ways to remove Japanese residents from sensitive military areas. The meeting clearly 
predated the February 2 conference Warren cOllYened to carry out the plan dedsed with army 
officials. The January 29 discussion is one of the only ones reported between Warren and "army 
officials" prior to February 2 to discuss Japanese Californians, and is thus the likely conferral 
referred to by Olney. See Warren Olney, III, Law Enforcement and Judicial Administration in the 
EarllMlrren Era, at 228, an oral history conducted 1970 through 19i7 by Miriam F. Stein and 
Amelia R. Fry, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, 
Berkeley, 1981. 
90 Id. 
91 See id. On alien land laws, their origins, content and impact on Japanese Californians, see 
generally Aoki, supra note 65. See also CHUMAI', slljJra note 65; IcHIOKA, sujJra note 65, at 226-43 
(analyzing alien land law litigation); Stuen, supra note 65, at 603. 
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property in the control of an .alien ineligible for citizenship would be 
forfeited to the state through escheat actionsY2 Warren also told Gen-
eralJohn DeWitt, commander of the Western Defense Command, that 
he favored mass evacuation of the Japanese Californians.93 On January 
30, the day after his conversation with DeWitt, Attorney General War-
ren declared that "the Japanese situation as it exists in California today 
may well be the Achilles heel of the entire civilian defense effort. 
Unless something is done, it may bring about a repetition of Pearl 
Harbor."Y4 
To facilitate the escheat actions he had discussed with General 
DeWitt, Warren convened a statewide conference of over one hundred 
district attorneys and law enforcement officials in San Francisco on 
February 2, 1942, to coordinate the campaign against Japanese Cali-
fornians% county-by-county.9I> One federal official in attendance re-
called that the Attorney General opened the meeting by cautioning 
against hysteria, "but then proceeded to outline his remarks in such a 
fashion as to encourage hysterical thinking. "97 
92 See Aoki, supra note 65, at 59. 
93 See CRAY, supra note 5, at 119 (stating that "General DeWitt reported to Washington by 
telephone on January 29 that \\'anen fmored a mass evacuation"); DANIELS, CAMPS, supra note 
32, at 51 (reporting that Warren "was in thorough agreement with his rival that the Japanese 
ought to be rell1O\"ed"); BILL SEVERN, MR. CHIEF JUSTICE: EARL WARREN 83-84 (1969) (noting 
that at a January 29 meeting with General DeWitt and U.S. Attorney General Francis Biddle, 
Warren agreed with the others that "the Japanese population should be removed from the state 
of California"). 
94LEO KATCHER, EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 142 (1967); see also BENJAMIN 
RINGER, "\\'E THE PEOPLE" AND OTHERS: DUALITY AND AMERICA'S TREATMENT OF ITs RACIAL 
!\l!NORITIES 865 (1983). 
95 As noted supra note 9, I use the term 'Japanese Californians" to refer to both the first 
generation immigrant issei Japanese in California who were not permitted to become U.S. citizens 
by virtue of the racial bar to citizenship under the Naturalization Law of 1790, and the Califor-
nia-born second generation nisei citizens. Both the issei and nisei were targeted as groups for 
internment. The term 'Japanese Californians" is less awkward than referring to the groups of 
internees as 'Japanese and Japanese Americans" or "issei and nisei." It also avoids reinforcing the 
alien-citizen distinction produced by white supremacist naturalization laws. 
!Iti See Olney, supra note 89, at 228. 
97 DANIEL, C.HIPS, supra note 32, at 62. At the meeting, \\'anen briefed the law enforcement 
officers on the insurgent dangers posed by Japanese Californians: 
[Tlhe Japanese as an entire race of people, men, women, and children alike-es-
pecially United States citizens of Japanese ancestry-rare] poised to take disloyal 
action against the United States at any moment, to move to cOlllmit acts of sabotage, 
espionage, and disloyalty upon some mysterious signal to be issued to them by the 
Japanese enemy. 
CHUMAN, supra note 65, at 150-51. Not surprisingly, one district attorney from Los Angeles 
"worked himself into such a state of hysteria" that he had to be "called to order by Mr. Warren." 
DANIELS, CA~IPS, supra note 32, at 62. Another high official was overheard saying that "he favored 
shooting on sight all Japanese residents of the state." ld. 
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It was agreed that each county official in charge of locating all 
Japanese-occupied land would forward the information to Warren's 
office, which would then share it with the anny."H The Attorney General 
executed this mission with the precision of a military operation, using 
large scale maps of each reporting county drawn to uniform scale.99 
He instructed his subordinates that "[a]ll property which is owned, 
controlled or occupied by persons of the Japanese race, whether citi-
zens or not, should be marked on the maps in red. "100 He also asked 
each county official to designate "important installations" so that prox-
imity of Japanese Californians could be easily compared.]O] 
From these maps, Warren concluded that the "distribution of the 
Japanese population appears to manifest something more than coinci-
deI1Ce. "102 He hypothesized that the Japanese Californians were "ideally 
98 See, e.g., Olney, supra note 89, at 228. 
99 See id. VI'arren followed up the meeting request ,dth a letter to the district attorneys and 
police soliciting their opinions to the following three questions: 
(I) Vlllat in your opinion is the extent of the danger, by ,,-ay of sabotage and 
fifth-column activities in your jurisdiction and in the State as a whole, arising from 
the presence of enemy aliens? 
(2) Do you believe that the danger can be adequately controlled by treating all 
enemy aliens alike, regardless of nationality, or do you believe that ,,"e should 
differentiate among them as to nationality? 
(3) What protective measures do you believe should be taken with reference to 
each nationality or with reference to enemy aliens as a ,dlOle in order to eliminate 
the danger of sabotage and fifth-column activities? 
National Defense Migration: Hearings Before the HOl/se of Representatives Select Comlll. Investigating 
Nat'/ Defense Migration, H.R. Res. 113, 77th Cong., Part 29, 10965, 10989-90 (1942) [hereinafter 
Tolan Committee Hearings] (Exhibit B-Letter from Law Enforcement Officers to Earl Warren, 
California Attorney General on the Enemy Alien Problem; Letter from Thomas '\1lelan, District 
Attorney for County of San Luis Obispo to Earl Warren, California Attorney General). 
As just one example of Warren's obsession with thoroughness on the tracking of Japanese-
owned or controlled property, VI'arren urged district attorneys to cross-check their information 
with the following local and regional officials: 
1. County Assessor 
2. City Assessor 
3. County Agricultural Commissioner 
4. Sheriff 
5. Chiefs of Police 
6. Such other sources of information as are knOlm to you to be reliable, such as 
land departments of oil companies ,dth large holdings in the oil fields, public 
utilities serving your Count)" or concerns engaged in businesses requiring them to 
be familiar with the occupants of various tracts, such as dealers in farm implements, 
fertilizers, insecticides, etc. 
Letter from Earl Warren, California Attorney General to the Honorable James B. Kavanaugh, 
District Attorney of San Bernardino Count)' 2-3 ("far. 6, 1942) [hereinafter Letter, l\[ar. 6, 1942]. 
100 Letter, Mar. 6, 1942, supra note 99, at 2. 
101 See id. at 1. 
102 Earl VI'arren, Testimony Before the House of Representatit'es Select Committee In\"esti-
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situated with reference to points of strategic importance, to carry into 
execution a tremendous program of sabotage on a mass scale should 
any considerable number of them be inclined to do so. "103 The Attor-
ney General presented his maps and conclusions in testimony before 
the House of Representatives Select Committee Investigating National 
Defense Migration ("Tolan Committee"), which convened in San Fran-
cisco on February 21 to address concerns regarding civil defense and 
Japanese Americans. IIH 
a. Warren's Tolan Committee Testimony 
There were several problems with the methods and conclusions 
forwarded by Warren to the Tolan Committee. First, the definitions of 
strategic "military installations" and "proximity" were so vague and 
overbroad that it would have been difficult to locate any significant 
cluster of residents outside an area of strategic military importance. 
Officials in Warren's office "worked by rule of thumb" and "without 
any definition" of a "military installation" and "without any defined 
limitation" of "proximity. "105 In his letter to state officials, Warren de-
fined strategic areas to include "power plants, radio stations, factories 
and industrial plants, oil and gas wells, power lines, bridges and tun-
nels, airports and the like,"106 as well as the "[c]ity hall, gas plant, 
hospital, water reservoir, water plant, ... freight yards, power substa-
tions, sewer plant, telephone exchange and war industries."lo7 Cer-
tainly, as a postwar internment commission concluded, if another im-
migrant farming group had been mapped in a similar fashion, it would 
likely have produced "an equally alarming and meaningless pattern. "108 
In addition, the methodology for measuring strategic residencies 
was inconsistent and prejudicial toward Japanese Californians. The 
Attorney General's desire to drive Japanese Californians off their lands 
biased the sampling tactics in the project. For example, Warren's 
sample concentrated only on Japanese Californian rural land holders. l09 
gating National Defense Migration at 5 (Mar. 11, 1942) (Earl WalTen Papers, Bancroft Library) 
[hereinafter ',",'alTen Testimony]; see also Tolan Committee Hearings, supm note 99, at 10974. 
1113 'v\'alTen Testimony, supra note 102, at 5. 
1114 See Tolan COlllmittee Hemings, supra note 99, at 10973-11023; see also CWRIC, supm note 
20, at 95-98. 
1U5 GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 156. 
1116 For a sample letter identifying these strategic installations, see Letter Mar. 6, 1942, supra 
note 99, at 1-2. 
107 !d. at 2. 
11)~ CWRIC, supra note 20, at 98. 
IllY See GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 156. 
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Even among rural Japanese Californians, however, many lived in non-
farm areas or on plots operated by non:Japanese that were not in-
cluded on the maps.110 Moreover, Warren's study completely ignored 
the vast majority of Japanese Californians who were non-rural dwellers. 
As a result, one scholar estimates that the redlining project captured 
at best only about one-third of the state's Japanese population, thus 
grossly distorting the empirical case for the alleged strategic residency 
conspiracy.lll 
Another bias was the sample's exclusion of "most coastal defenses 
and war industries" from the list of strategic installations. ll2 Few Japa-
nese Californians owned land in these coastal areas. Thus, the exclu-
sion of such low-residency regions from the mapping project upwardly 
biased the alleged concentration of strategic residencies observed. m 
The one coastal area where Japanese Californians owned a significant 
amount of land, Santa Barbara County, was included in Warren's re-
port. 114 
Further, Warren's study provided no comparative analysis that 
would have assessed the data concerning Japanese Californians living 
near strategic areas in light of data concerning those who did not. 115 
Indeed, those deemed to be "in the vicillity" of military installations 
were simply listed in Warren's Tolan testimony, devoid of any compara-
tive context. Moreover, there was no control group against which the 
percentage of Japanese Californians living "in the vicinity" of strategic 
installations could be measured.]]() Thus, taking the Santa Barbara 
statistics as an example, even if ten percent of the Japanese Californian 
population in the county were close to strategic installations, these 
110 See id. 
111 See id. at 157. 
1121d. 
113 See id. 
114 See discussion inji-a notes 127-28 and accompanying text. As detailed infra notes 133-34, 
Warren's uncontextualized Santa Barbara findings were highlighted and copied verbatim by 
General De\\'itt in his Final Report to President Roosevelt as a primary example of strategic 
deployment of Japanese Californian residencies. 
115The most cited example of purposeful migration of Japanese Californians involved Santa 
Barbara County, where the 1940 census revealed 2187 citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry, 
and 441 heads of household. See GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 157-58. Of the 136 land holdings 
by Japanese Californians in the county, only 46 were within 111"0 miles of strategic installations 
(excluding highways). Extrapolating an average of 4.7 persons per household, the alleged strate-
gic concentration involved approximately 216 persons, or 10% of the Japanese Californian 
population in the county. See id. In other words, 90% of Japanese Californians in Santa Barbara 
county did not live near strategic installations, yet Santa Barbara was considered the primary 
example of purposeful suspicious migration. See id. at 158. 
m See id. at 158-59. 
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figures have little significance unless they were compared to other 
groups, such as citizens and aliens of German or Italian ancestry. 117 The 
absence of such comparative frameworks from the study strongly indi-
cates that Warren and his team intended to concoct a "scientific" basis 
for the removal program. 
In addition to the methodological defects of the study, Warren's 
suggestion that Japanese Californians had conspired to live near des-
ignated strategic locations ignored the common sense understanding 
and history of land use and development. For example, the alarm 
expressed over Japanese residing near airports1l8 obscured the fact that 
the issei had made their homes in these now-sensitive locations long 
before airports existed. As a former naval intelligence captain re-
marked, "[a] lot of Japanese had been living in such areas while the 
Wright Brothers were still flying kites. "119 Warren also ignored the 
historical basis for settlement patterns around railroads. In an appen-
117 See GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 158-59. According to Grodzins, at least 10% of the Italian 
Californian population lived in "sensitive areas." See id. at 159. 
[[BFor example, '~'alTen's Exhibit A appended to his Tolan Committee testimony consisted 
of a laundry list of Japanese residency "immediately adjacent" to his designated strategic areas. 
Below, I ha\"e excerpted his mention of residencies near various airports throughout the county-
by-county appendix: 
Japs adjacent to new Livermm-e Military Airport (Alameda). 
Japs in vicinity of Oakland Airport (Alameda). 
Japs adjacent to Chico airport (Butte). 
A tremendous dispersal of Japanese throughout the Fresno area, with innumerable 
roads giving access to ... Chandler Airport, and Hammond Field Airport (Fresno). 
Japanese a<ljacent to airport at Ukiah (Mendocino). 
Japs close to Mather Field (Sacramento). 
Japs close to McClellan Field (Sacramento). 
Japs adjacent to Navy airport at Reem Field (San Diego). 
Japs in the vicinity of three Consolidated Aircraft plants (San Diego). 
Japs overlooking municipal airport (San Diego). 
Japs adjacent to Stockton Field, United States Army airport (San Joaquin). 
Japs adjacent to Belmont Airpm-t (San Mateo). 
Japs in vicinity of San Carlos airport (San Mateo). 
Japs adjacent to Stanford airport (Santa Clara). 
Moffett Field surrounded by Japs on three sides (Santa Clara). 
Number ofJaps within 2 miles of Petaluma Airport (Sonoma). 
Tolan Committee Hearings, supra note 99, at 10982-87 (testimony of Earl Wan'en, Attomey 
General of Califomia). 
119 ALLAN R. BOSWORTH, AlIIERICA'S CONCENTRATION CAMPS 77 (1967). Fm- the author's 
biographical infm-mation as a former joumalist and naval intelligence officel~ see id. at 6. FOI' 
further comment on the non-conspiratorial historical context of Japanese Califomian settlement 
pattems, see DANIELS, CAMPS, supra note 32, at 76 (noting that "[ilt was also u"ue, though Warren 
did not mention it, that the Japanese had been in most of these areas long before there Wel"e any 
aircraft factories, but this fact was easy to ignore"). Along the same lines, Captain Bosworth further 
observed that "Califomians conveniently forgot that the Issei had settled and farmed Signal Hill 
years before oil was discovered there; they forgot that the truck farms around Inglewood and 
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dix to his Tolan Committee report, Warren included references to 
Japanese Californians who resided near railroads, presumably to facili-
tate sabotage of the railways.120 It was common knowledge, however, 
that some issei immigrants from an earlier period, who had worked for 
the railroads, were paid in grants of cheap, undesirable land along the 
noisy right of way. 121 Similarly, there was nothing conspiratorial about 
Japanese Californian proximities to water conduits, given the irrigation 
demands of truck farming. 122 
In his presentation before the Tolan Committee, Warren voiced 
suspicion of the presence of Japanese Californian farming land be-
neath power lines. 123 According to Carey McWilliams, however, 
Nothing whatever was strange about it, because the power 
companies had to condemn the right of way, you see, when 
they built a big power line. Nobody else was interested in taking 
these little pinches of land. Nobody else could do anything 
with them but the Japanese. It was completely innocent. 
There was nothing sinister about it, you see. 124 
Historically, Japanese immigrants to California had been denied 
access to fertile lands. Legal and social limitations on their ability 
to hold land restricted them to marginal tracts in remote areas 
around abandoned lands, often near industrial areas or lake dams, 
Hawthorne antedated the aircraft plants or the Los Angeles Municipal Airport." BOSWORTH, 
supra, at 77; see also Brief of Japanese American Citizens League, Amicus Curiae at 21-22, 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), available in LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Philip B. Kurland & 
Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) (noting that the Tolan Committee concluded that "the main geo-
graphic pattern of Japanese population in California was pretty well fixed by 1910," and that the 
Japanese were carrying on their livelihoods long before the sites "were ever considered for 
defense installments"); Earl Warren Project, Decision and Exodus, Edward Ennis Interview at 15, 
an oral history conducted 1970 through 1977 by Miriam F. Stein and Amelia R. Fry, Regional 
Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1981 [hereinafter 
Ennis Interview) (stating that "title records in California "ill show that the Japanese occupied 
these areas long before they were considered by the government for airports or anything else"). 
120 See Tolan Committee Hearings, supra note 99, at 10982-87 (Exhibit A-Particular Points 
Where Japanese are Immediately Adjacent to Strategic Points in Counties in California). 
121 See BOSWORTH, supra note 119, at 76. 
122 See GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 156. 
123 As Carey McWilliams recollected Warren's presentation: 
[Warren) said that he thought it very significant that beneath these po,,-er lines ... 
you could find, here, there and elsewhere, the small plots of produce farming. And 
they just happened to be farmed by Japanese. You knoll', ''Very strange, isn't it, 
gentlemen, that they should be farming here." 
McWilliams Interview, supra note 72, at 29. 
1241d. For a similar conclusion, see BOSWORTH, supra note 119, at 77 (asking rhetorically, "if 
a man could afford better land, would he want to lh-e under a power line?"). 
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reservoirs, electronic transmission stations, railroad switchyards, 
etc. 125 In a cruel irony, however, the issei's eventual success in re-
claiming these unwanted areas turned their original disadvantage 
into the basis for Warren's racial conspiracy theory.126 
Warren made particularly good use of the rare instances when 
Japanese had access to desirable coastal lands, such as in Santa Barbara 
County.1n Then District Attorney for Santa Barbara County, Percy 
Heckendorf, had a mundane explanation for the pattern: issei had 
125This is the argument made by former Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark, who during 
World War II was an ambitious Department of Justice official who was advocating mass intern-
ment: 
[T]he problem, I think, was largely an economic one. Like other Orientals, the 
Japanese suffered statutory restrictions in Califol'l1ia for many years. As a conse-
quence, land was not a\'ailable to them .... 
So when they could not get land or lease it, they would try to find abandoned 
land around places where no one else would work, such as lake dams, reservoirs, 
and high installation wires, or electrical transmission stations or even in switchyards, 
outside cities and in rural areas. 
Earl \Yanen Project, Decision and Exodus, Tom Clark Interview at 3-4, an oral history conducted 
1970 through 1977 by Miriam F. Stein and Amelia R. Fry, Regional Oral History Office, The 
Bancroft Library, University of Califol'l1ia, Berkeley, 1981 [hereinafter Clark Interview]; see also 
GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 159 (obsen'ing that residential segregation operated to concentrate 
Japanese immigrants "in the less desirable industrial areas"). 
126 See Clark Interview, supra note 125, at 3-4; see also GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 159. As 
Clark explained: 
They \muld till this land-that is what's left of it. They would usually have to move 
rocks and bushes and weeds out. Before long, they would have a pretty good 
\'egetable garden. 
Then when the crop was in, people would say, "V.'ell the rascals have got the best 
gardens in the world" or "They're located below the dam, or the high tension wire 
station, or in the switchyard in order to catTy out sabotage. That's why they're 
there." But, as a matter of fact, they had been there for years and had tilled a little 
plot of ground to make both ends meet. 
Clark Inteniew, supra note 125, at 4. 
m See Tolan Committee Hewings, supra note 99, at 10111-12 (Exhibit A). In his Exhibit A to 
the Tolan Committee detailing Japanese proximity to strategic points, Santa Barbara County was 
the only county in which Warren described in paragraph form, the distribution of Japanese: 
In the city of Santa Maria the following Japanese-owned parcels are located in the 
vicinity of strategic points: 60, 61. and 63 are adjacent to the principal highway; 58, 
102, and 53 are close to a gas storage plant and pm,'er substation; 65 is next to a 
hospital; 56 is next to the water reservoir and water works; 56 and 96 are close to 
the United States airport and the latter tract is also close to a hospital. 
The Santa rvlaria oil field is practically sUtTounded by Japanese-occupied lands on 
the north side, and on parcel No. 113 there are Japanese actually living within the 
oil fields. 
Japanese lands in the vicinity of Lompoc completely cover the only entrance to 
Camp Cook where the only armored division of the Army on the coast will be shortly 
located. The road to Camp Cook passes through the city of Lompoc and all traffic 
to and from the camp must pass under the scrutiny of several Japanese occupants 
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originally settled there because it was close to the sea and the tempera-
ture was cool: the ideal environment for immigrant farmers to cultivate 
vegetables and seeds. 128 At the time, however, Warren suggested that 
the immigrants had settled near the coast to abet an eventual program 
of sabotage. 
In sum, the problems with Warren's mapping project were so 
numerous that they rendered it little more than propaganda designed 
to serve the land dispossession/removal objectives of the Attorney 
General. The vague and overbroad definition of key terms and the 
weaknesses in methodology rendered the findings of the massive re-
search project statistically insignificant. Finally, the misreading of his-
torical, economic and social contexts of land holding and settlement 
undermined the conclusions of a racial conspiracy theory that glibly 
found such patterns reflecting "more than mere coincidence."12'l 
b. The Significance of Warren '5 Mapping Project 
Commentators have downplayed the importance of Warren's 
mapping project. 130 The project, they argue, had no effect on the 
internment decision because Warren presented his Tolan Committee 
testimony two days after Roosevelt had signed E.O. 9066. Despite the 
timing of the hearings, however, Warren's office met with army officials 
prior to the Tolan hearings and had been in regular communication 
with them, during which time the Attorney General undoubtedly 
shared the preconceptions later embodied in the study's conclusions.1:l1 
on variolls tracts of land. Those Japs are also immediately adjacent to the Camp 
Cook water wells. They can, with very little difficulty, block the entrance to Camp 
Cook since the southern end of the camp is extremely mountainous and completely 
impassable and the northern end is almost the same by reason of mountains and 
barrancas with perpendicular sides, some of which are 50 and 60 feet deep. 
Warren Testimony, supra note 102, at 10985. 
128 See Earl Warren Project, The Internment, Percv HeckendorfInterviell' at 8, an oral history 
conducted 1970 through 1977 by Miriam F. Stein and Amelia R. Fry, Regional Oral History Office, 
The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1981 [hereinafter, Heckendorf Inter-
view]. 
129 See supra note 102 and accompanying text for ''''an'en's "more than mere coincidence" 
conclusion. 
1~10 See TENBRoEK, supra note 43, at 200. 
131 'Varren met with De"'itt before and after the conference he convened to gather the 
geographic evidence. See Victor Hansen, MJ Association with Eml Hllnl'l1, at 4 (19i5), all oral 
history conducted 1970 through 1977 by Miriam F. Stein and Amelia R. Fry, Regional Oral History 
Office, The Bancroft Library, Unjyersity of Cali fomi a, Berkeley, 1981 (stating that DeWitt solicited 
the support of west coast congressional representatives and governors); Olney, supra note 89, at 
228; supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. For further insight into the close working 
relationship between DeWitt and \\'arren, see infra notes 133-34, 137 and accompanying text. 
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Indeed, in drafting his Final Report132 advocating internment to Presi-
dent Roosevelt, DeWitt borrowed liberally from Warren's mapping 
project. 133 
Whether the maps provided a substantive evidentiary basis to 
justify Roosevelt's signing of E.O. 9066 may be the wrong question, or 
at least one too narrowly drawn. In fact, the mapping project was 
instrumental in at least three significant outcomes. 
First, the mapping project provided military and legal rationales 
for internment. General DeWitt adopted almost verbatim, but without 
attribution, the geographic distribution argument Warren had made 
before the Tolan Committee.134 The passages he borrowed, emphasiz-
ing the strategic deployment of Japanese Californians along the West 
Coast, formed DeWitt's main justification for the issuance of E.O. 
9066.135 In Hirabayashi v. United States,136 the project would provide a 
shadowy legal rationale for upholding the curfew order.137 There, the 
Court obsened that Japanese were concentrated in California and 
132 See FINAL REpORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST, 1942, submitted by Lt. 
Gen. J.L. DeWitt to the Chief of Staff (U.S. Dep't of War, june 5, 1943) [hereinafter FINAL 
REPORT]. 
133Warren's Tolan Committee testimony on japanese Californian strategic residencies in 
Santa Maria Valley and Santa Barbara appear almost verbatim in DeWitt's final report. Compare 
FINAL REpORT, supra note 132, at 9-10, and ""arren's Tolan Committee Testimony, supra note 
99, at 10974. 
134 GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 284-85 (revealing in side-by-side panels of text, the unattrib-
uted, verbatim adoption by DeWitt of Warren's Tolan Committee testimony on Santa Barbara 
land holding patterns of japanese Californians); see also CWRIC, supra note 20, at 98 (comparing 
FINAL REpORT, supra note 132, at 9-10 with Warren Testimony, supra note 102, at 10974); CRAY, 
supra note 5, at 123 (reporting how the maps and ''''arren's paraphrased arguments became part 
of DeWitt's justification for internment). 
135 See CWRIC, supra note 20, at 98 (concluding that Warren's Tolan Committee presenta-
tion arguments advocating internment were shared in advance with DeWitt and "became the 
central justifications presented by DeWitt for issuing the Executive Order"). 
136 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
137Irons strongly infers from the record that Warren's Tolan Committee testimony on the 
alleged subversive activities and strategic residency conspiracies among japanese Californians 
made its way into the arguments and deliberations in the Hirabayashi case through the unethically 
authored Westem States amicus brief. See IRONS, supra note 32, at 212-18. Peter Irons details the 
close working relationship between the offices of General DeWitt and the California Attorney 
General that likely resulted in Warren's study being disseminated to the Hirabayashi Court. See 
id. DeWitt's Final Report was not officially available for arguments in the Hirabayashi case, but 
Irons plausibly explains how Warren played a key role, through his connections and testimony, 
in inserting the disinfonnation of the Final Report into the Western States' amicus brief, contrary 
to legal ethics and procedure. Captain Herbert "Wenig had served from 1939 to july of 1942 as a 
key assistant to Attomey General Warren, providing his boss with the legal and factual research 
that comprised the basis for ""an"en's Tolan Committee testimony. Mter Warren was elected 
Governor, Wenig joined General DeWitt's legal staff and served informally as a liason between 
the Army and the newly-elected California Attorney General, Robert Kenny. Under this arrange-
ment, Wenig supervised and wrote the Western States' brief without disclosing his status to the 
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Washington-two states significantly responsible for aircraft produc-
tion and shipbuilding. 138 In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas 
emphasized the "real" threat of Japanese invasion of the West Coast by 
referencing the presence of "many thousands of aliens and citizens of 
Japanese ancestry in or near to the key points along the coast line."l~(J 
This presence, Douglas noted, had aroused "special concern" among 
"those charged with the defense of the country."140 
Second, Warren's mapping project influenced important mem-
bers of the media. The mapping project so impacted renowned news-
paperman Walter Lippmann that it formed the basis for Lippmann's 
influential February 12 syndicated column on the military necessity of 
internment. 141 Former District Attorney Heckendorf recalled a meet-
ing in Montecito that he attended with then-Assistant Attorney General 
Tom Clark, Warren and Lippmann. Mter Warren presented one of the 
maps highlighting Japanese proximity to various installations, Hecken-
dorf noted that "Mr. Lippmann showed great interest in the map and 
the significant things that were shown on it. "142 In a letter to Warren, 
Heckendorf wrote that he had no doubt that "the presidential order 
[E.O. 9066] stems back to the article written by Lippmann following 
the talk by you [Warren]. "143 Historians ha\'e noted the wide reach of 
Justice Department or Supreme Court. As a party to the lawsuit. the United States (including the 
War Department of which DeWitt's office was a part) should not have had any role in preparing 
an amicus brief. See id. at 212-13. 
138 See id. at 95-96 (finding that evidence provides a reasonable belief of a threat to war 
production by sabotage and espionage due to concentration of Japanese in California and 
Washington-two key states for aircraft production and shipbuilding). 
n9 [d. at 105 (Douglas, j., concurring). 
140 [d. 
141 In his column. Lippmann wrote in part: 
[T] he Pacific Coast is in imminent danger of a combined attack from "'ithin and 
from without. ... It is [true) ... that since the outbreak of the Japanese war there 
has been no important sabotage on Pacific Coast. From ,,'hat we knoll' about the 
fifth column in Europe, this is not, as some have liked to think, a sign that there is 
nothing to be feared. It is ... some part of it may at any moment be a battlefield. 
Nobody's constitutional rights include the rights to reside and do business on a 
battlefield. And nobody ought to be on a battlefield who has no good reason for 
being there. 
BOSWORTH, supra note 119, at 60-61 (quoting Lippmann's Feb. 12, 1942 article in the New l'lJdl 
Herald Trilmne). Note the adoption by Lippmann of two of the arguments generated by Warren: 
1) the "no sabotage is evidence of sabotage" line of analysis discussed infra note 181; and 2) the 
geographic distribution/strategic installations analysis reflected in Lippmann's understanding of 
the Pacific Coast as battlefield/combat zone. 
142 Heckendorf Interview, supra note 128, at 5. 
143 [d. at i. Although there is no date gi\'en by Heckendorf for the dinner at ,,·hich these 
conversations with Lippmann took place, from context it seems clear that they preceded 
Lippmann's February 12, 1942, column. 
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the Lippmann column as influencing other journalists,144 military and 
governmental officialsH5 and even President Roosevelt.146 
Third, the intensive research and documentation led to a dramatic 
proliferation of escheat actions under the Alien Land Law. Touted as 
"one of the biggest land grabs"H7 in California, accelerated enforce-
ment of the anti-Asian statute resulted in seventy-three out of the 
seventy-six escheat actions between 1912-1946 being targeted atJapa-
nese Californians. Btl Eighty percent of the seventy-three escheat pro-
ceedings were initiated after the Pearl Harbor attack while Warren was 
either Attorney General or Governor. 149 
According to his second-in-command, Warren used his discretion 
to enforce the largely symbolic Alien Land Law150 even beyond the 
scope suggested by army officials. Mter escheat proceedings for lands 
adjacent to military installations were completed, the Attorney Gen-
eral's office expanded the program to general enforcement of the 
Alien Land Law, "with the resulting escheat of large land areas without 
144 Columnist Westbmok Pegler translated Lippmann's words for those who may have missed 
the reference to Japanese Californians: 
Do you get what he says? This is a high-grade fellow with a heavy sense of respon-
sibility .... The Japanese in California should be under armed guard to the last 
man and woman right now-and to hell with habeas corpus until the danger is 
O\"er .... If it isn't true, we can take it out on Lippmann, but on his reputation I 
will bet it is all true. 
DANIELS, CAMPS, supra note 32, at 68 (quoting Pegler's February 15, 1942 column that ran in 
the Washington Post among other newspapers). 
145Id. Lippmann's and Pegler's columns were circulated among the top Army brass in 
Washington. In the War Department, Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall forwarded 
Lippmann's column to Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, who passed it on to Assistant Secretary 
of War, John J. McCloy. See id. 
146 See id. Daniels suggests that Lippmann's column carried substantial weight in President 
Roosevelt's decision to issue E.O. 9066. See id. at 67-68 (stating that Lippmann's February 12, 
1942 column was "much more influential" on the President than lobbying efforts of New Dealers 
urging a more democratic approach to Japanese Americans). 
IH Larry Tajili characterized the escheat actions as "one of the biggest land grabs in history 
... in California." AUDRIE GIRDNER & ANNE LOFTIS, THE GREAT BETRAYAL: THE EVACUATION OF 
THEJAPANESE-A!\IERICANS DURING WORLD WAR II 429 (1969) (citing Larry Tajiri, Pacific Citizen, 
Feb. 2, 1946). The mlue of 5135 farms owned by Japanese Californians was estimated at $66 
million in 1940. See id. 
148 See CHUMAN, supra note 65, at 202. 
149 See id. at 201-02; RINGER, supra note 94 at 910. 
150The Alien Land Law passed by California in 1913 was largely symbolic because of its 
ineffecth"eness, non-enforcement and resistance thereto by Japanese immigrants to California. 
See genemlly Aoki, supra note 65, at 37. Pmfessor Aoki notes that the 1913 Alien Land Law was 
easy to sidestep by placing land in trusts and guardianship in the names of the U.S.-born children, 
relath"es or friends of the issei, by forming land-holding corporations, or by entering into a sel·ies 
of three-year lease contracts. See id. at 56. But the Alien Land Law of 1920 was amended to 
foreclose guardianships, trusteeships, leases and sharecropping. Despite the loopholes in the 1913 
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regard to whether they were or were not near military or other impor-
tant installations. "151 Moreover, Warren knew that district attorneys 
around the state were interested in purchasing these lands made valu-
able by the isseLI52 Under the guise of national security, the Attorney 
General's office aggressively filed an unprecedented twenty escheat 
actions in 1942 alone. 153 
Even if, as tenBroek argues, Warren's mapping project did not 
"cause" President Roosevelt to sign E.O. 9066, Warren's role in in-
fluencing the order must be reassessed. Not only was his mapping 
project the basis for the vigorous enforcement of the Alien Land Laws, 
but it also impacted the writings of influential journalists and the 
Supreme Court. 1M In sum, the mapping project played a far greater 
role than has been previously suggested III internment histories and 
Warren biographies. 
2. Advocating Internment 
Between February 7 and February 19, 1942, when the order was 
issued, Warren continued to press for restrictive measures againstJapa-
nese Californians. On February 7, he appeared before the California 
Joint Immigration Committee ("CJIC"), the successor organization to 
the Japanese Exclusion League, the group responsible for pushing 
through Congress the nativist, quota-based Immigration Law of 1924.155 
law, relatively few escheat actions were brought by the California Attorney General between 1913 
and 1920, nor were violations vigorously pursued between 1920-1940. See id. at 59. Nevertheless, 
despite the low number of escheat actions initiated, the 1920 law had a far more significant 
deterrent impact than the 1913 law, asJapanese-owned acreage declined "relatively dramatically" 
after 1920 according to Professor Aoki. See id. 
151 Olney, supra note 89, at 229. , 
152 See, e.g., Letter from Tom Scott, District Attorney for Kern County, to Earl ""arren, 
California Attorney General (Mar. 26, 1942) (Earl Warren Papers, Bancroft Library) (noting 
interest of Bakersfield attorney, ",'.E. James, who suggested that purchasing lands under escheat 
proceedings would be "rather valuable in post war times ... and it might be possible to even get 
$25,000 or more now for this forty-two acre tract"). Similarly, ""an'en's successor as Attorney 
General Robert Kenny reluctantly inherited the escheatment actions and was "constantly re-
minded of his duty to carry out the law by persons who stood to profit from the forced sale of 
Japanese-owned land acting through local district attorneys." GIRDNER & LOFTIS, supra note 147, 
at 429. 
153 See CHUMAN, supra note 65, at 201. 
154 Daniels suggests that the Lippmann article carried substantial weight with the President. 
See supra note 146. Oral histories with Warren's contemporaries also affirm the significance 
celebrated columnist Walter Lippmann attached to the Attorney General's research of Japanese 
Californian land occupancies. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text. On the Supreme 
Court's embrace of Warren's strategic residencies analysis, see supra notes 138-40 and accompa-
nying text. 
155 See DANIELS, POLITICS, supm note 61, at 105 (explaining how the Japanese Exclusion 
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Sensing an opportunity presented by the war, one CJIC officer bluntly 
stated, "This is our time to get things done that we have been trying 
to get done for a quarter of a century."I:>!j Before this receptive audi-
ence, Warren suggested that the military could remove "any or all 
Japanese" from combat zones. 157 He also cast suspicion on Japanese 
Californians by asserting that Japanese had not supplied information 
to law enforcement officials regarding sabotage by other Japanese even 
though this contradicted his statements, made just five days earlier, to 
over one hundred law enforcement officers. ISS 
On February 11, Warren, along with Los Angeles Mayor Fletcher 
Bowron and Department of Justice lawyer Tom Clark, met with General 
DeWitt. Warren's defenders have argued that there is "no evidence one 
way or the other as to what Warren's sentiment was on February 11."159 
At least one scholar, however, suggests that the lack of a record on 
Warren's position at the meeting was by design. IGU As Katcher relates 
Bowron's recollections, "Before we met [with DeWitt], Warren, Clark 
and I got together and it was decided that I speak for the three of us 
on the situation."I!)1 Mayor Bowron would later testify before the Dies 
Special Committee on Un-American Activities regarding the political 
pressure the trio brought to bear on General DeWitt's decision making: 
I may say that I was quite active in getting the Japanese out 
of Los Angeles and its environs. I held various conferences 
with Tom Clark ... together with ... then Attorney General, 
now Governor Warren [;] we held a long conference with 
General DeWitt relative to the situation, and I hope we were 
somewhat helpful in General DeWitt making his decision. 162 
On February 14, three days following the meeting with Bowron, 
Clark and Warren, General DeWitt forwarded his Final Recommen-
League had dissolved after the success of 1924c, and how the same groups and individuals behind 
the League formed the CJIC, including the l\'ath"e Sons of the Golden 'A'est, the American League, 
the American Federation of Labor, the Grange and V.S. :'vIcClatchy). 
156 RINGER, supra note 94, at 859. 
Ic,i\\'HITE, supra note 15, at 72 (quoting Warren from February 7,1942 meeting of the ejIC). 
158 See id. at 71-72. At the February 7, 1942 statewide conference of sheriffs and district 
attorneys, \Yarren answered a question on whether any Japanese had provided information about 
possible fifth colullln activities by other Japanese in California. He replied that "five or six 
[California sheriffs and district attorneys] ... said some individuals had dropped in to give them 
some information." Id. at 71; see also GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 97-98 (comparing minutes 
from February 2, 1942 and February 7, 1942 meetings at which Warren gave contradictory 
statements on Japanese Californians' cooperativeness on information gathering). 
159 TENBROEK, supra note 43, at 20l. 
160 See KATCHER, supra note 94, at 144. 
161 !d.; see also CHUMAN, supra note 65, at 150. 
162;\lc\\'ILLIAl\IS, PREJUDICE, supra note 32, at 116 (emphasis in the original). 
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dations to the President, advocating mass internment of "all persons 
of Japanese ancestry.''J()~ In the words of internment historian Peter 
Irons, "West Coast politicians, especially California ... Attorney 
General Earl Warren, had influenced General DeWitt to press for 
the evacuation and internment of Japanese Americans in 1942."IIH 
In sum, by the time Roosevelt signed E.O. 9066 on February 19, 
1942, Warren had organized a methodologically flawed research pro-
ject to map disloyalty. He also had worked closely with key actors in 
the military, Congress, local and state politics and the media, pressing 
steadily, and often behind the scenes, for drastic action against Japa-
nese Californians. Having established this clear record on "civil de-
fense," Warren set his sights on higher office-the California gover-
norship. In an attempt to distinguish his record from that of the 
incumbent governor, his campaign would boast of his treatment of 
Japanese Californians. 
B. The Bid for Governor 
1. Crafting the Campaign 
Mter Warren's initial protestations,165 he eventually agreed to run 
for Governor, citing incumbent Governor Culbert Olson's response to 
Pearl Harbor as his main motivation. !liG Incensed that Governor Olson's 
civil defense plan included no role for the Attorney General, Warren 
set out to "instruct and organize the public offices of the State in the 
technique of fifth column, sabotage, and modern warfare" so that the 
state's civil defense would be prepared "whenever the ine\·itable oc-
curred."167 Warren, the Republican challenger, announced his candi-
dacy on April 10, 1942. According to one biographer, his campaign 
was "corny," "old-fashioned flag waving. "168 Capitalizing on wartime 
163 See BOSWORTH, supra note 119, at 65 (reporting on General DeWitt's Final Recommen-
dations promoting the removal of 'Japanese and other subversive persons" from the West Coast); 
WHITE, supra note 15, at 72. 
164IRONS, supra note 32, at 268. 
165 See KATCHER, supra note 94, at 158. Following the February 11 meeting with Los Angeles 
Mayor Bowron and Tom Clark, Warren had dinner \lith BO\l1'On at the members-only Bohemian 
Club in San Francisco. At the dinner, the two politicians negotiated O\'er which of them would 
be the Republican challenger for Governor. Bowron rejected Warren's solicitations, stating his 
intent to fulfill his campaign promise to finish his term of office. "I'm not a candidate," BO\\1'on 
protested. "You're the man to nlll against [Governor) Olson." /d. 
W6 See Notes for TIME Interview 1 (undated), Earl Warren Papers, California State Archh'es, 
File 3640:535 (Earl Warren-1942 Gubernatorial Campaign: Press, Misc.) [hereinafter TIME Inter-
view] (declaring that he "would not be a candidate today if the present state administration had 
shown any capacity for leadership in this problem either before or after Pearl Harbor"). 
167 [d. 
168 See KATCHER, supra note 94, at 161. These campaign themes were designed by \\'arren. 
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fears and anxieties, full page campaign ads proclaimed "This is War!" 
and "Nero Fiddled and Rome Burned, It must not happen here."lG9 
America's war with Japan and the West Coast's war against Japa-
nese Californians provided Warren with the compelling bipartisan 
appeal that would sweep him into office-no small feat for a Republi-
can candidate in a state with a Democratic majority.170 Under the lofty 
theme of "leadership-not politics," the campaign played heavily on 
the anti:Japanese sentiment that pervaded the state. 171 Warren used the 
Japanese wartime threat to reach across traditional Republican-Demo-
cratic party lines. "I believe that you recognized, as did I, that with the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, party differences became relatively unimpor-
tant."m Like the statewide Republican party platform for the election, 
Warren's campaign conflated enemy Japanese with Japanese Califor-
nians, decrying the Japanese threat and trumpeting Warren's role in 
interning Japanese Californians. m In this sense, "patriotism" was the 
key distinction between the two candidates17L-a patriotism that was 
As Murray Chotiner, campaign manager to Richard Nixon commented, 'A'arren "remained his 
own campaign manager" who "set the tone and philosoph)' of his campaign" and "made, or 
approved, every major decision." ld. at 164. 
169 Ad\'ertisement from unidentified newspaper (undated), Earl Warren Papers, California 
State Archives, File 3640:482 (Earl Warren, 1942: Gubernatorial Campaign, Newspapers). 
liO At the time of the 1942 election, registered Democrats outnumbered Republicans by more 
than one million in the state of California. ~Ioreover, President Roosevelt's overwhelming popu-
larity convincingly carried the state for the Democrats for the third time in 1940. See KATCHER, 
supra note 94, at 157. 
IiI ""arren It~a\'eled extensively with his master of ceremonies and sometime "hatchet man," 
actor Leo Carillo. Carillo consistently "opened" for Warren's campaign appearances. The actor 
conflated enem),Japanese with Japanese Californians b), forwarding the unifying campaign theme 
of the Japanese threat in one breath and trumpeting 'A'arren's role in interning Japanese 
Californians in the next. See id. at 162 (noting Carillo's role in "returning to the theme of danger 
from the Japanese and praising Warren for having been responsible for their evacuation"). 
li2 ld. at 161. 
li~lCalifornia's Republican Party that year would develop its platform around the theme of 
leadership during crisis, with a special emphasis on the yellow threat from within and without. 
The platform read in part: 
In distant lands our boys are facing the Yellow Horde that seeks to overrun and 
trample civilization and liberty where\'er it exists, At home we are threatened with 
enemies from within as well as from without. For the first time in the history of our 
Golden State, California finds itself in the front tranches [sic] of a combat zone. 
Platforlll of the Republican Part)' of the State of California 1 (adopted Sept. 17, 1942), Earl Warren 
Papers, California State Archives, File 3640:535 (Earl Warren-1942 Gubernatorial Campaign: 
Press, Misc.) [hereinafter Party Platforlll]. It is highly unlikely that Warren did not endorse the 
state Republican platform as the top candidate of the ticket and former state Republican party 
chair. 
174 Katcher notes that 'A'an'en's conflicts with Governor Olson redounded to the challenger's 
benefit~ 
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racially-loaded and defined by the Attorney General's acth'e part in 
internment. 
Warren's campaign contrasted his "constructive leadership" with 
Governor Olson's "mismanagement" and "bungling" response to Pearl 
Harbor.175 Warren's role in initiating the mapping project became a 
central example of his patriotic leadership, and he boasted of the 
project's foresight and critical evidence-gathering role in effecting 
internment. 176 His campaign literature emphasized how in February of 
1942, while Governor Olson was receiving "delegations of Japs at Sac-
ramento" and intimating that "evacuation was unnecessary, "I i7 Warren 
"saw the menace when it was only a shadow on the horizon" and "went 
to work quietly and did something about it,"178 by "supplying Federal 
authorities with factual data necessary for the prompt evacuation of 
the Japanese from California. "179 
Throughout his campaign, Warren played up the fears of the 
enemy lurking within. "[TJ he fact that we have as yet experienced no 
sabotage," he reasoned before an audience of Kiwanis International, 
"is merely evidence that the saboteurs are under discipline and are 
merely awaiting the zero hour when they should strike. "180 
Warren was the originator of the "no sabotage as proof of impend-
ing sabotage" line of argument that he first articulated at the February 
2, 1942 meeting of state law enforcement officials.181 This bizarre argu-
It was on this issue of "patriotism" that Warren took his public positions .... 
[I]n his conflicts with the Gm'ernor, he had shmm strength, determination, 
American Legion patriotism, and reasonableness. There had been no quarrel over 
the Japanese evacuation, but here v"arren had been active, while Olson had been 
quiescent. 
All this tended to Warren's political benefit. His "image" had grown while Olson's 
had diminished. 
KATCHER, supra note 94, at 157. 
175 See, e.g., Campaign Pamphlet: California Indicts Governor Olson: The Truth about Califor-
nia's Home Defense (undated), Earl Warren Papers, California State Archh'es, File 3640:457 (Earl 
Warren, 1942: Gubernatorial Campaign, Issues) [hereinafter Campaign Pamphlet: California 
Indicts Governor Olson] (pamphlet indicting Olson "for his visionless, obstructh'e, bungling record 
of politics and mismanagement in all matters pertaining to the defense of our State and nation 
both before and after Pearl Harbor," and praising 'Warren for his "constructh'e leadership"). 
17(; See infi71 notes 177-79 and accompanying text. 
177 Campaign Ad: Before and Aft(!l' Pea/'l Harbor (undated), Earl Warren Papers, California 
State Archives, File 3640:457 (Earl Warren, 1942: Gubernatorial Campaign, Issues) [hereinafter 
Campaign Ad: Before and After Pearl Hmbor]. 
178 Campaign Pamphlet: California Indicts Governor Olson, supra note 175. 
179 Campaign Ad: Before and Aft(!l' Pearl HarbOl; supra note 177. 
180 Warren Tells of Sabotage Peril Facing Pacific Coast, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1942, Earl Warren 
Papers, California State Archives, File 3640:491 (Earl Warren, 1942: Gubernatorial Campaign, 
Newspapers) [hereinafter Warren Tells of Sabotage Pelilj. 
181 See GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 402 (tracing the origins of the concerted sabotage thesis 
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ment was widely adopted by politicians, journalists, and military and 
government officials urging internment. 182 The candidate reinforced 
his "zero hour" conspiracy theory by sharing the results of his research: 
that one-third of Japanese Californians were aliens living in proximity 
to military installations and vital war industries. ls3 Moreover, Warren 
used the state's proximity to Japan to stress that enemy saboteurs might 
land on the West Coast at any time, even after internment. 184 On one 
occasion, Warren dramatically read from a 1940 book published in 
back to the February 2, 1942 meeting and its "chief exponent," Earl Warren). At the February 
2, 1942 meeting, Warren laid out his thesis: 
It seems to me that it is quite significant that in this great state of ours we have had 
no fifth-column activities and no sabotage reported. It looks very much to me as 
though it is a studied effort not to have any until the zero hour arrives .... That 
was the history of Pearl Harbor. I can't help believing that the same thing is planned 
for us in California. It would be inconsistent with everything the Axis has ever done, 
if it was not planned for us in California. 
/d. at 94 (excerpting v\'arren's comments from February 2, 1942 meeting). 
I~~ See Tolan Committee Hemings, supra note 99, at 11011-12. In his testimony, Warren 
continued to disseminate his conspiracy theory: 
Unfortunately, howe,'er, many of our people and some of our authorities ... are 
of the opinion that because we have had no sabotage and no fifth column activities 
in this State since the beginning of the war, that means that none have been 
planned for us. But I take the view that that is the most ominous sign in our whole 
situation. It com'inces me more than perhaps any other factor that the sabotage 
that we are to get, the fifth column activities that we are to get, are timed just like 
Pearl Harbor ,vas timed and just like the invasion of [Europe l. 
Our day of reckoning is bound to come .... '''11en, nobody knows, of course, but 
we are approaching an imlsible deadline. 
GRODZINS, sllpra note 43, at 402 (citing Warren's Tolan Committee testimony). 
lH3 See GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 402 (stating that the argument was deployed by Congress-
man Tolan, the mayors of Portland, Seattle and Los Angeles, newspaper columnists and editorial 
writers, correspondents of Attorney General Biddle, "and not least of all, by General DeWitt in 
his recommendation for mass evacuation"); see also VH1mm Tells of Spy Fears, L.A. TIMES,July 25, 
1942, Earl Warren Papers, California State Archi,'es, File 3640:476 (Earl Warren, 1942: Guberna-
torial Campaign, ;\!ewspaper, General) (reporting Vl'arren's comments at the Los Angeles Lawyers 
Club that he is "positive" of Japan's targeting of California because the state houses "huge aircraft 
plants, great shipyards, and numerous other vital war industries"); Warren Tells of State Fifth 
Colullllt Dangel; L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1942, Earl Warren Papers, California State Archh'es, File 
3640:476 (Earl Warren, 1942: Gubernatorial Campaign, Newspaper, General); Clem Whitaker & 
Leone Baxter, Warrenjor-Gollemor Press Release, Oct. 27, 1942, Earl Warren Papers, California 
State Archh'es, File 3640:537 (Earl Warren, 1942: Gubernatorial Campaign, Press Releases» 
[hereinafter October 27 Warrenjor-Gollernor Press Releasel (warning that "California is in graver 
danger than any state in the Union" because it is the "number one war industry state of the 
nation"). 
184 See Warren Tells of Spy Fears, supra note 183 (warning that California is at more risk for 
sabotage than any other state in the Union because 'Japan has her eyes first on this State" and 
"there is nothing she wouldn't do to destroy the vast war preparations under way here today"); 
see also Warren Tells of Sabotage Pelil Facillg Pacific Coast, supra note 180 (outlining dangers of 
Pacific Coast sabotage: "To my mind, the fact that we have as yet experienced no sabotage is 
merely e'ldence that the saboteurs are under discipline and are merely awaiting the zero hour 
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Tokyo by a Japanese naval intelligence officer that described how 
Japanese Angelenos in the San Pedro fishing area could be used to 
perform acts of sabotage. 18S Warren did not disclose to his audience 
that the book was a work of fiction. 186 
Perhaps the most effective ploy of the Warren campaign was its 
portrayal of Governor Olson as a sort of 'White Jap" or 'Jap lover. "ISi 
According to his campaign literature, while Warren was working hard 
to round up Japanese Americans, Governor Olson was entertaining 
Japanese delegations in the state capitol. lRS While Warren was fully 
prepared "to uphold the right of the military to take [] action against 
[West Coast] Japanese," Olson was ridiculed for believing, at least 
initially, that internment was not necessary. IS" While the incumbent 
Governor's indecisiveness constituted a threat to the West Coast's se-
curity interests, the challenger firmly advocated interm~ent of Japa-
nese Californians, and worked to "shut the door" on the concentration 
camps by submitting amicus curiae briefs in Hirabayashi and Korematsu. 
"Earl Warren was fully prepared," one of his campaign pieces stated, 
"to take a leading part in the legal battle to uphold the right of the 
military to take such action against the Japanese as might be required 
by military necessity on the Pacific Coast."190 
During the campaign, Warren's media strategists, Clem 'Whitaker 
and Leone Baxter, seized upon Olson's proposal to alleviate the farm 
labor shortage by releasing internees to harvest crops under armed 
guards. In Baxter's July 7, 1942 memo to Whitaker, she reveals that 
when they should strike, which would probably coincide with an air attack on our California 
coast"). 
185 See Warren Tells of Sabotage Peril, supra note 180, at I, 14. Warren read excerpts from the 
book detailing how Japanese Angelenos could be used to "signal an air force, to furnish infor-
mation, spread rumors, demoralize noncombatants, use secret radios for instructions to spies, 
and perform acts of sabotage." /d. at 14. 
186 See KATCHER, supra note 94, at 148 (reporting on the Kiwanis reading and commenting 
that the fact that the book was a fictional work was "much later disclosed"). 
187The Native Sons of the Golden West were particularly fond of the strategy of 'Jap 100'er" 
baiting. In their monthly publication, The CrizzlJ Bem; articles routinely im'eighed against "white-
Jap co-conspirators" or "white Jap admi.'ers and hirelings." See TENBROEK, supra note 43, at 48. 
Individuals urging restraint against Japanese Californians were denounced in public appeals to 
racism and homophobia as 'Jap-Iovers" and the "kiss-a:Jap-a-Day boys." See MCWILLIAMS, PREJU-
DICE, supra note 32, at 263 (quoting American legion head before a 1939 Japanese American 
Citizens League meeting). 
188 See Campaign Ad: Before and After Pearl Harbor, supra note 177; Memorandum from W.T. 
Sweigert re: Earl Warren and California in Wartime at 12, July 27, 1942, Earl Warren Papers, 
California State Archives, File 3640:5336 (Earl Warren, 1942: Gubernatorial Campaign, Platform) 
[hereinafter July 27 Sweigert Memo). 
189July 27 Sweigert Memo, supra note 188, at 12, 15. 
190Id. at 15. 
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"Olson wantsJaps put to work on farms" by bringing back '''deserving' 
enemy aliens in farming and fishing industries. "1~1 In response, Baxter 
suggested that the American Legion and naturalized American citizens 
attack Olson's plan along non-partisan lines and circulated a draft 
press release to that effect on July 13, 1942.192 Within days, numerous 
news stories appeared across the state with headlines such as "Olson 
Assailed forJap Plan: Use of Orientals for Farm Labor Called 'Unthink-
able,'" and "Olson Called War Failure."193 
Newspapers often quoted verbatim from the campaign's press 
release, invoking the views of outraged naturalized citizens from the 
press release to denounce 0lson194 and closing their stories with a 
blatant endorsement of Warren's candidacy.195 Warren used the inci-
dent to highlight the Governor's inability to lead in time of crisis, and 
dismissed the notion of using Japanese Californians as farm labor-
even under armed guard-as ludicrous: 
I~n Memorandum from Leone Baxter to Clem V,11itaker, July 7, 1942, Earl Warren Papers, 
California State Archives, F3640: 425 (Earl Warren, 1942: Gubernatorial Campaign, County files, 
County Organization, San Francisco). 
1~)2 SeeWarren-for-Governor Press Release,July 13, 1942, Earl Warren Papers, California State 
Archives, File 3640:536 (Earl Warren, 1942: Gubernatorial Campaign, Press Release) [hereinafter 
July 13 lVarrenjOlcGollernor Press Release). ("Andronicos [the Greek organization leader on a 
Warren campaign committee) thinks both American Legion and naturalized American citizens 
should attack Olson et ai., on non-political lines, claiming the post-war expose will show the alien 
enemy property juggling more scandalous than last time."). 
19:\ Olson Assailed fOl]ap Plan, OAKLAND TRIB., July 13, 1942, Earl Warren Papers, California 
State Archhes, File 3640:445 (Earl Warren, 1942: Gubernatorial Campaign-Issues, Agriculture); 
Olson Called War Failure, L.A. TIMES,July 15, 1942, Earl Warren Papers, California State Archives, 
File 3640:445 (Earl Warren, 1942: Gubernatorial Campaign-Issues, Agriculture). 
1~14 The OAKLAND TRIBUNE, for example, reprinted six of the seven paragraphs of the Warren 
press release verbatim, quoting at length Orange County publisher and citrus grower Justin 
Creamer, whose criticisms of the Governor read in part: 
EYeryone--excepting Governor Olson, apparently-knows that part of the Japa-
nese scheme to destroy California and use our beloved State as an invasion point 
for the conquest of this Nation was the implantation and development of a fifth 
column among our population. This fifth column spread its roots until there were 
Japs li\'ing and working in our most vital areas.Japs overlooked harbor installations, 
Ih'ed near strategic power stations and war plants. 
Olson Assailed forjap Plan, supra note 193. Compare with July 13 Warrenjor-GollerrtOl' Press Release, 
supra note 192. 
1~15 Compare July 13 Wa1'1'enjorcGollernor Press Release, supra note 192 (concluding with sen-
tence, "[e]ver), thinking citizen must realize the time has come for constructive, war-time leader-
ship of the type Earl Warren stands for"), with Olson Assailed for jap Plan, supra note 193 
(concluding that "[e)very thinking citizen must realize the time has come for constructive, 
war-time leadership of the type Earl \Vanen stands for"). See also Olson Called War Failure, supra 
note 193 (article ending with statement by Democratic leader Rex Hardy declaring that he is 
"going to support Atty. Gen. Earl Warren for Governor" who has "always demonstrated that he 
is of the caliber badly needed at a time like this"), 
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The public was not impressed by this [proposal] of the Gov-
ernor. When the evacuation of the Japanese was first an-
nounced, the people of California heartily approved it as a 
necessary war measure. Nothing has changed their minds 
since, and the specious argument of the Governor that the 
Japs could be guarded by troops while hanesting crops was 
not impressive. They would still be where they might commit 
sabotage or turn into a fifth column in the event of an enemy 
raid upon the coast or an attempt at invasion. If all that is 
needed is to put a guard over them, there would have been 
no reason for evacuation. A cordon of troops could have been 
thrown around every Japanese district in the State, but the 
Japs would still have been in our midst to endanger the safety 
of our people in the even t of enemy action. 1% 
III 
Mter it was reported that some internees were "energetically seek-
ing absentee ballots" for the 1942 elections, editorials implied that 
Governor Olson was catering to Japanese Californian voters: 
"[I]sn't it a fair inference that the Governor was seeking, by an 
empty gesture, to line up the Jap vote in his favor?" one editorial 
queried. 197 
Such editorials, carrying sensational titles such as "Olson and the 
Jap Vote" and calculated to defame Olson's political and racial stand-
ing as a "loyal" (white) Californian, were possible because he had been 
less aggressive than his opponent in capitalizing upon the popular, 
anti-Japanese Californian sentiment in an election year. 198 These same 
editorials simultaneously characterized interned Japanese American 
citizens as an ongoing racial threat in light of their interest in exercis-
ing their right to vote. 199 Warren's ability to speak to the fears and 
paranoia of California's wartime voters in the language of long-stand-
ing anti-Asian racism amounted to a winning campaign strategy. 
2. Warren's Leadership in Supremacist Organizations 
California's most influential v\TWII-era political organizations were 
founded with the specific purpose of excluding and disenfranchising 
Asian immigrants to California.20o Earl Warren not only solicited the 
196Earl Warren Campaign Speech 30-31 (undated), Earl Warren Papers, California State 
Archives, File 3640:5336 (Earl Warren, 1942 (Gubernatorial Campaign, Platform». 
197 Olson and the jap Fate, L.A. Tl~IES, Aug. 19, 1942, Earl Warren Papers, California State 
Archives, File 3640:536 (Earl Warren, 1942: Gubernatorial Campaign, Press Releases). 
198 See id. 
199 See id. 
200At its first national convention in Minneapolis in 1919, the American Legion passed 
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support of such groups, but had close ties to two of the most vitriolic 
anti-Asian hate groups in the state-the American Legion and the 
Native Sons (and Daughters) of the Golden West. These two organiza-
tions were each influential in their own right. In combination, however, 
they provided the foundation for the most effective anti:Japanese coa-
lition in California's history, the Japanese Exclusion League, which 
would later become the more benign-sounding California Joint Immi-
gration Committee.20l 
A relationship of mutual support existed between the American 
Legion, the Native Sons and Warren the gubernatorial candidate. 
Warren helped the groups make their case against Japanese Califor-
nians, and the organizations enthusiastically supported him for gover-
nor. Accordingly, Warren's gubernatorial campaign took full advantage 
of his insider status with these core supremacist organizations. 
a. The American Legion 
Even before the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and the 
United States, American Legionnaires contemplated internment of 
Japanese Californians residing on the West Coast. In a 1939 article 
appearing in The Saturday Evening Post, the head of the American 
Legion's National Defense Committee was quoted as saying to a 1939 
Japanese American Citizens League audience that "[i]f we ever have 
war with Japan and I have anything to say about it, the first thing I'll 
do will be to intern everyone of you. "202 As early as January 5, 1942, 
the California Legion War Council passed a resolution noting the 
pattern of Japanese Californian residencies near "strategic locations" 
resolutions proposing that the 1907 Gentleman's Agreement with Japan be abrogated, that the 
Japanese be excluded from immigrating and that an amendment to the Fourteenth Amendment 
be added to revoke birthright citizenship unless both parents are eligible to citizenship. See 
DANIELS, POLITICS, supra note 61, at 86. The Native Sons of the Golden West formed in 1875 on 
a campaign to contain the "yellow peril." See Earl Warren Project, The In tern men t, Dillon Myer 
Inten'iew at 9, an oral history conducted 1970 through 1977 by Miriam F. Stein and Amelia R. 
Fry, Regional Oral History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1981. 
201 Formed in October 1923, the CJIC plotted the winning strategy for absolute exclusion of 
Japanese immigrants under the Immigration Act of 1924. See supra note 155 and accompanying 
text; see also GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 1O-1l0. But see DANIELS, POLITICS, supra note 61, at 
97-99 (maintaining that the Japanese Exclusion League was the primar'y moving force behind 
the 1924 Act). Perhaps the overlapping nature of the two groups explains the seeming historical 
contradictions. Grodzins points out that the CJIC assumed the office, records and funds of the 
Japanese Exclnsion Leagne in August of 1924. See GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 11. The Committee 
continued its work to maintain "white California" even after its exclusionist victory, and remained 
intact through the Depression to lobby for internment during World War II. See GRODZINS, supra 
note 43, at 11. 
202 RINGER, supra note 94, at 850 (quoting American Legion leader from September 30,1939, 
Saturday Evening Post article entitled "Between Two Flags"). 
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and demanding that "all such enemy aliens be placed in concentration 
camps and that the land and/or property owned ... by such aliens be 
placed under government supenision .... "2(J3 The Legion later de-
fined enemy aliens and nationals as 'Japanese, both aliens and Ameri-
can citizens.''204 
The American Legion national leadership took a formal position 
on internment on January 19, 1942, unanimously adopting a resolu-
tion demanding "immediate action by the Government in evacuating 
and interning all enemy aliens and nationals in combat zones, such as 
the Pacific Coast."205 By early March 1942, after Warren's Tolan Com-
mittee testimony, the California Legion released its survey declaring 
Japanese Californians to be a "menace to the safety of our country," 
on the basis of the more than 200,000 aliens and citizens living near 
railroads, aqueducts, power and oil lines and defense factories.2(Jr, 
At the time, Asians were the only racial group prohibited from 
gaining citizenship under the naturalization statutes' whiteness re-
quirement and Supreme Court precedent excluding Asians from 
whiteness. 207 The Legion's "one hundred percent Americanism" creed 
was therefore a facially-neutral but racially-loaded slogan. Using this 
same theme, Warren delivered one of his most important campaign 
addresses at the California Legion's cOlwention in front of 40,000 
delegates.208 In his speech, Warren identified himself as a proud Legion 
member209 and credited the Legion's Americanism Committee for the 
removal of Japanese Californians from coastal areas.210 Warren urged 
203GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 39 (quoting from the resolution). 
204 [d. 
205 [d. 
206 [d. (citing San Francisco Examiner article dated March 6, 1942). 
207The Naturalization Law of 1790 required whiteness as a prerequisite for naturalization 
eligibility. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch.3, 1 Stat. 103 (providing for naturalization of only a "free 
white person"). This racial requirement was amended after the Civil War to include persons of 
African descent. See Naturalization Act of 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254 (extending naturalization 
to "aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent"). Racial restrictions were not lifted 
completely until the passage of the "McCarran-Walter Act" of 1952. See Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 311, 66 Stat. 163, 239 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1422) (prO\'iding that 
the "right of a person to become a naturalized citizen of the United States shall not be denied 
or abridged because of race or sex .... "). Although primarily an immigration statute, the Chinese 
Exclusion Act not only prohibited Chinese from immigrating to the United States, but also barred 
persons of Chinese descent from naturalization eligibility. See Act of May 6,1882, eh. 126, § 14, 
22 Stat. 61 (repealed 1943); see generall)' supra note 64. 
208 See American Legion Convention B,ings 40,000 l't>ts to L.A., S.F. Nm's, Aug. 17, 1942, (Earl 
Warren Papers, California State Archives, File 3640:481, Earl Warren, 1942 (Gubernatorial Cam-
paign, Newspaper». 
209 Earl Warren, Address at Los Angeles American Legion 2 (Aug. 17, 1942) (transcript Earl 
Warren Papers, California State Archh'es, File 3640:457, Earl Warren, 1942 (Gubernatorial Cam-
paign, Issues» [hereinafter Address at American Legion]. 
210 See Legion Leader Sco/'es Apathy, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1942, at 6. 
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the organization to continue its "militant patriotism" "until the lastJap 
warship is destroyed." He also supported a pending Legion resolution 
to keep Japanese aliens out of California "for all time."~ll Departing 
from his prepared remarks, Warren weighed in on the resolution: "I 
say to you now that they must not come back to our State-we must 
keep them away from California so long as the flag of Nippon is flying 
over the Philippines."~l~ 
In contrast to Warren's warm reception, Legion members attacked 
Governor Olson for criticizing the Legion's anti-subversive activities. 2I3 
Newspapers reported enthusiastic ovations for Warren at his Legion 
address alongside a companion article that contained a stinging cri-
tique of Olson's record, "Before and Mter Pearl Harbor," by former 
American Legion national commander Thomas Riordan. 214 Though it 
appeared under Riordan's byline, the companion "article" was master-
minded by Assistant Attorney General W.T. Sweigert, a campaign ad-
viser to Warren.m 
m Legion Hears Warren, OAKLA:-ID POST ENQUIRER, Aug. 17, 1942, at F; see American Legion 
COl/ventioll, supra note 208. 
212 LegioJ! Leader Scored Apathy, supra note 210. For text of his formal remarks, see Address 
at American Legion, supra note 209. 
213 See Governor's Race: Ex-Legion Chief Blasts Olson's Record on State War PTeparedness, S.F. 
CHRONICLE, Aug. 18, 1942, at 20 (Earl Warren Papers, California State Archives, File 3640:481, 
Earl Warren, 1942 (Gubernatorial Campaign, Newspaper)) [hereinafter Governor's Rare]. 
214 See, e.g., id. (reprinting full text of Warren campaign's "Before/ Mter Pearl Harbor" ad as 
Riordan's criticisms of Olson); Legion Assails Lag ill Defense, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1942 (Earl 
Warren Papers, California State Archives, File 3640:481, Earl Warren, 1942 (Gubernatorial Cam-
paign, Newspaper» (reporting that Legion delegates "gave an ovation that shook the rafters to 
their fellow member, Attorney General Earl Warren"); Olson Recard Denounced !Jy Legion Aide, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1942 (Earl Warren Papers, California State Archives, File 3640:481, Earl 
Warren, 1942 (Gubernatorial Campaign, Newspaper» (cO\'ering denunciation of Olson by for-
mer Californian American Legion State Commander Thomas Riordan). 
215 See :\Iemorandum from W.T. Sweigert to Helen R. MacGregor (July 30, 1942) (forwarding 
memorandum regarding "Earl Warren and California in "'artime" "to the General ... subject to 
his comments and suggestions") (Earl Warren Papers, California State Archives, File 3640:457, 
Earl Warren, 1942 (Gubernatorial Campaign, Issues». For an example of the unattributed 
\'erbatim use of the July 27 Sweigert Memo for Legionnaire Riordan's public critique of Olson, 
compare Governor's Race, supra note 213, at 20 ("Olson received delegations of Japs at Sacra-
mento and intimating in the press that 'he had his own plans' for dealing with the Japanese 
situation-a plan to the rather vague effect that evacuation was unnecessary and that the situation 
could be soh'ed by having the loyal Japs report on the activities of the disloyal Japs!") with J lily 
27 S,,'eigen Memo, supra note 188 (quoting Riordan as saying that "Olson was receiving delega-
tions of Japanese at Sacramento and intimating in the press that he had 'his own plans' for dealing 
with the Japanese, a plan to the rather vague effect that a removal of the Japanese was not 
necessary and that the situation could be soh'ed by having the loyal Japanese report on the 
su!)\ersi\'e or fifth column activities of the disloyal Japanese"). 
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b. Native Sons of the Golden West 
With their mission to preserve California as the "White Man's 
Paradise" that God had intended, the Native Sons of the Golden West 
("NSGW") were rivaled only by the American Legion in their exclu-
sionary campaign against Californians of Japanese ancestry.21G In the 
inaugural 1907 monthly issue of The Grizzly Bear, the NSGW's official 
publication, an article entitled The Asiatic Peril trumpeted the dangers 
faced by "white civilization in California" due to the "peaceful invasion" 
of Japanese to their state.217 Expulsion of the issei from California and 
their exclusion from the United States were the unifYing themes of 
NSGW. 
The attack on Pearl Harbor provided NSGW with "bragging 
rights" as to the correctness and foresight of their decades of anti:Japa-
nese propaganda. In a bid for greater political respect and promi-
nence, the deputy grand president and editor of The Grizzly Bear 
gloated in the first post-Pearl Harbor issue that "[h]ad the [Native 
Sons'] warnings been heeded ... the treacherousJaps probably would 
not have attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7,1941, and this country 
would not today be at war with Japan. "218 
During a successful bid for Alameda County District Attorney in 
1926, Warren joined the NSGW, an organization his biographers read-
ily concede was "anti-Orientalist. "2](1 Eschewing campaign contributions 
and partisan support, they explain, Warren needed to supplement his 
base by cultivating alternative sources of support from fraternal, civic 
and patriotic groups like the Native Sons and the American Legion, 
among others.22o From 1926 until late middle-age, Earl Warren main-
tained an esteemed status within the NSGW.221 
216 See TENBROEK, supra note 43, at 46. At no convention did the American Legion fail to 
adopt an anti:Japanese measure. See GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 12. Moreover, "the Native Sons 
took second place to no other organization in the number of resolutions passed [famring 
internment] or in the vehemence with which they were expressed." /d. at 49. 
217 See TENBROEK, supra note 43, at 46-47. Although the NSGW formed in 1875, the first 
issue of The Grizzly BeaT\\"as published in 1907. Daniels notes that in almost e\'ery subsequent 
issue following the first, The Grizzly Bearcontained at least one article attacking the Japanese. See 
DANIELS, POLITICS, supra note 61, at 85. 
218GRODZINS, supm note 43, at 48. The article reviewed the long history of anti:Japanese 
agitation on the part of the Native Sons. See id. 
219 See CRAY, supra note 5, at 51 (noting that '\'alTen "added memberships in fraternal 
societies and the anti-Oriental Nath'e Sons of the Golden West, and took acth'e roles \lith the 
Masons and the American Legion" during the 1926 District Attorney campaign); WHITE, supra 
note 15, at 31 (stating that Warren joined "se\'erallodges" including the "anti-Orientalist Native 
Sons of the Golden West" in 1926). 
220 See WHITE, supra note 15, at 31 (explaining Warren's NSGW membership in part as a 
campaign strategy that cultiwted support from ch'ic groups and the press to compensate for his 
refusal of campaign contributions and partisan support). 
221 See McWilliams, supra note 35, at 68. 
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The Native Sons' wartime agenda mirrored Earl Warren's agenda 
as Attorney General. For example, a February 1942 Grizzly Bear edito-
rial entitled, "Save California," argued that the 'Japs must be dispos-
sessed of every foot of California land they now hold, and the land 
must be escheated to the state! "222 Fortunately for the NSGW, the state's 
Attorney General was already working on exactly such a plan through 
his mapping project. Like Warren, the NSGW advocated not only that 
aliens and citizens of Japanese ancestry be interned, they further agi-
tated that persons of Japanese ancestry be "permanently routed from 
these shores .... "223 
The organization stayed in close contact with the Attorney Gen-
eral regarding its activities. For example, after the Board of Grand 
Officers of the Native Sons urged removal of "all Japanese," whether 
citizen or alien, on February 14, 1942, they sent the resolution and 
accompanying press release to Assistant Attorney General Warren Ol-
ney on March 24, 1942.224 In May, the Grand Parlor (NSGW headquar-
ters) adopted an even more extreme measure calling for a lawsuit to 
challenge the birthright citizenship of Japanese American nisei and a 
constitutional amendment to exclude persons of Japanese ancestry 
from U.S. citizenship.225 This resolution was promptly forwarded to the 
Attorney General's office in early June. 22li Within days, Warren's office 
responded to the NSGW mailing and replied that he would be "glad" 
to serve on the "Americanization Committee" of the NSGW.227 
Unlike Justice Hugo Black, whose membership in the Ku Klux 
Klan repeatedly surfaced during his years on the bench,228 Warren's 
222 GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 48. 
223Id. at 49. 
224 See CO\'er Sheet from Native Sons of the Golden West to Warren Olney (Mar. 24, 1942) 
(Earl Warren Papers, California State Archives, File 3640:17885, Earl Warren, 1931-42 (Personal 
Papers, ]\.'ati\'e Sons of the Golden West». For the description of the officers' resolution, see 
TENBROEK, supra note 43, at 195. 
225Native Sons of the Golden West, Grand Parlor Resolution (june 1, 1942) (Earl Warren 
Papers, California State Archives, File 3640:17885, Earl Warren, 1931-42 (Personal Papers, Native 
Sons of the Golden "Vest». 
226 See Letter from Charles \\'. johnson, Secretary of Attorney General Earl Warren, to john 
T. Regan, Grand Secretary, ]\.'SGW (june 10, 1942) (Earl Warren Papers, California State Archives, 
File 3640:17885, Earl Warren, 1931-42 (Personal Papers, Native Sons of the Golden West» 
(confirming receipt of NSGW resolution on citizenship of japanese born in the United States 
that "will be called to his attention upon his return"). 
22; See Letter from Charles W. johnson, Secretary of Attorney General Earl Warren, to john 
T. Regan, Grand Secretary, NSGW (june 12, 1942) (Earl Warren Papers, California State Archives, 
File 3640:17885, Earl Warren, 1931-42 (Personal Papers, Native Sons of the Golden West». 
22~ See, e.g., john P. Frank, Hugo L. Black, in THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT 1789-1987: THEIR LIVES AND l\IAJOR OPINIONS 2321, 2326 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. 
Israel eds., 1980) (reporting that Black dropped out of the Ku Klux Klan to run for Senate before 
being appointed to the United States Supreme Court). 
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membership in supremacist organizations has largely escaped serious 
notice by judicial biographers and historians. Biographers who have 
addressed Warren's involvement with supremacist groups have tended 
to sanitize it by eliminating, downplaying or explaining away his affili-
ations. Ed Cray, for example, asserts that though 'Warren the politi-
cian" belonged to both the American Legion and the Native Sons of 
the Golden West, "he said nothing to indicate he agreed with them 
that 'the Yellow Peril' was here and going to take over."229 
Contrary to Cray's assertion, Warren's affiliation with the Native 
Sons was more than a marriage of political convenience, for the Attor-
ney General's campaign files reflect that he knew and approved of the 
hostile measures forwarded by the NSGW. "Warren the politician," 
more than a mere '~oiner," was a true believer, as evidenced by his 
wartime agenda against Japanese Californians and its cO!llpatibility, if 
not coordination, with the activities of nativist organizations. Warren's 
anti-Asian activist record while Attorney General cannot be explained 
away using the Hugo Black narrative, i.e., that he joined a racist 
organization because to do otherwise would have amounted to political 
suicide.230 Warren provided leadership, prestige and legitimacy to two 
229CRAY, supra note 5, at 115. As proof of Warren's lack of racial rancor, Cray excerpts part 
of a speech before the Associated Farmers cOlwention in December of 1940, in which Warren 
"cautioned against bigotry": 
It should be remembered that practically all aliens haye come to this country 
because they like our land and our institutions better than those from whence they 
came. They have attached themseh'es to the life of this country in a manner that 
they would hate to change and the vast majority of them will, if gh'en a chance, 
remain the same good neighbors that they ha\'e been in the past regardless of what 
difficulties our nation may have with the country of their birth. History prm'es this 
to be true .... We must see to it that no race prejudices de\'e1op and that there are 
no petty persecutions of law-abiding people. 
ld. at 115-16. 
There are at least two responses to Clay'S use of the Associated Farmers text. First, Warren 
was full of contradictions, internal inconsistencies and denials throughout his "yellow peril" years 
as the attorney general. He could forward the most outlandish conspiracy theories and crude 
racial stereotypes and advocate tirelessly for internment while he simultaneously declared as 
unconstitutional a state statute that would suspend from employment all state ch'il sen'ice 
employees of Japanese ancestry. GRODZINS, supra note 43, at 124, 127. Grodzins captured War-
ren's contradictions when he referred to the Attorney General's actions as characterized "on one 
side, by a scrupulous regard for the legal status of resident Japanese, and on the other, by a 
determination to foster the evacuation by eyer)' possible la\\ful means." ld. at 127. Second, Warren 
may have held the Associated Farmers in low esteem. Unlike the highel~brow, businessman base 
of the American Legion and NSGW of which he curried favor, there is eYidence that Warren's 
contemporaries considered the Associated Farmers to be "a bunch of bandits" "on the \\Tong side 
of everything." Earl Warren Project, Decision and Exodus, James Rowe Inten'iew at 24, an oral 
history conducted 1970 through 1977 by Miriam F. Stein and Amelia R. Fry, Regional History 
Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1981. 
230 See McWilliams Interview, supra note 72, at 29 (characterizing '~'arren's im'oh'ement with 
the NSGW as "very active"). 
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of the most extreme, racist organizations in California history, organi-
zations that engineered the anti-Asian movement and supported a 
plethora of anti-Asian restrictions and exclusions. 
C. Epilogue: Governor Warren Goes to Sacramento 
Warren's hostility toward Japanese Californians did not end with 
his election as governor. If anything, the passage of time and the 
security of his office strengthened Warren's animosity toward those 
interned. In mid-1943, he referred to them as "150,000 potential aiders 
and abetters of this kind of [sabotage] warfare," all of whom "have 
been indoctrinated with the imperial designs and have had them 
coupled with Shintoism-the religion of the race."231 Internment, the 
Governor argued "saved our state from terrible disorders and sabo-
tage."~32 He yehemently opposed proposals to return "loyal" Japanese 
to California, calling it a "body blow" to national security.233 "If the Japs 
are released," he reasoned, "no one will be able to tell a saboteur from 
any other Jap."234 
While denouncing Japanese Californians with his crude set of 
stereotypes, Warren simultaneously claimed to maintain a sense of 
fairness. "This is not a personal view," he explained. "Have you ever 
heard an Army or Navy man advocate release of these Japs? Have you 
ever heard anyone connected with the FBI indicate such action would 
be consistent with the national security?"235 Even while he was declaring 
his opposition to having 'Japs back in California during this war if 
there is any lawful means of preventing it," he added that "[t]his isn't 
an appeal to race hatred." Rather, he suggested, "[i) t is an appeal for 
safety. "2:~li 
Even toward the end of the war, vVarren could not distinguish 
between Japanese American citizens and Japanese from Japan.237 In a 
1944 speech before the Newspapers Publishers Association on the 
'Japanese Problem," Warren suggested that return of the Japanese 
Californians would hinge upon the number of casualties suffered by 
Japan. "When, if ever, these Japanese are to be permitted to return to 
California is not a question we can decide now. There will have to be 
~31 GO\·ernor Earl Warren, Address at the 35th Annual Meeting of Governors Conference 5 
aune 21, 1943) (transcript, Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress, cont. 788 "As Governor, 
General, May-Dec. 1943" folder) [hereinafter Governors Conference Address]. 
232CRAY, supra note 5, at 157; KATCHER, supra note 93, at 148. 
233 See Governors Conference Address, supra note 231, at 5-6. 
2341d. at 6. 
235 ld. at 5-6. 
~3G ld. at 6. 
2:17 See also discussion supra notes 171, 211-12 and accompanying text. 
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many more lives lost far out across the Pacific before the question is 
germane. "238 This position was particularly ironic in light of the extraor-
dinary high casualty rates suffered by the nisei soldier 442nd regimen-
tal combat team recruited from the internment camps that distin-
guished itself as one of the war's most decorated units. 239 Only when 
the War Department declared that Japanese Californians would be 
released from the camps at the end of 19442~o did Warren fall into line 
by pledging his support for the peaceful and safe return of the intern-
ees. 241 
III. RACIAL REDEMPTION 
A. Redemption's Promise 
Webster's defines "redemption" as an act that releases one from 
blame or debt. 242 In the term's religious sense, one is freed from the 
consequences of sin through repentance for an offense or injury. For 
western Judeo-Christian cultures, redemption is a sacred remedy for 
those who have sinned. With proper acknowledgment and atonement 
for one's transgressions, anyone can return to proper society with a 
"clean slate" and a "second chance."2~:1 
238Governor Earl Warren, Speech before the Newspaper Publishers Association (undated) 
(transcript, in Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress, cont. 789 "As Governor, General, 1944" 
folder) [hereinafter Newspaper Publishers Speech). 
239 SeeC\VRIC, supra note 20, at 258-59 (recording the 300% casualty rate of the 442nd nisei 
battalion, and its status as "one of the war's most decorated combat teams, recei\'ing seven 
Presidential Distinguished Unit Citations and 18,143 individual decorations-including one Con-
gressional Medal of Honor, 47 Distinguished Senice Crosses, 350 Silver Stars, 810 Bronze Stars 
and more than 3,600 Purple Hearts"). 
240 This announcement was the result of the unanimous Supreme Court decision in the Elldo 
case, decided on December 18, 1944. See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (holding that 
Executive Order 9066 and its ratifying Act of March 21, 1942 do not authorize detention of 
petitionel~internee by the War Relocation Authority). 
241 See CRAY, supra note 5, at 158-59 (acknowledging that Warren began to "back away from 
exclusion"); DANIELS, CAMPS, supra note 32, at 158 (noting that "Governor Earl Warren, who as 
late as November 1944 was publicly warning against letting Japanese Americans return because 
of 'the dangers to the war effort from [possible) civil disturbances,' immediately urged the people 
of California to support the Army decision"). 
242Webster's Dictionary defines "redeem" in part as follows: 
1 a: to buy back: REPURCHASE ... 2: to free from "'hat distresses or harms: as ... 
c: to release from blame or debt: CLEAR d: to free from the consequences of sin 
... 5 a: to free from lien by payment of an amount secured thereby ... 6 a: to 
atone for: EXPIATE b (1): to offset the bad effect of (2) to make \\'Ortlndlile .... 
MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 9i9 (10th ed. 1994). 
243 Indeed, if one reads the media coverage of President Clinton's admission of an "improper 
relationship" with Monica Lewinsky following his grand jury testimony, the primary criticism 
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It is possible that Earl Warren sought a religious sort of redemp-
tion for the injuries he inflicted upon Japanese Californians during 
the war. Significant evidence suggests that his actions weighed heavily 
on his conscience and may support speculation that his stellar civil 
rights record on the bench was tied to the "sins" of his past.244 While a 
religious-like redemption may have motivated the Chief Justice, I will 
deploy a more legalistic notion of redemption in an attempt to capture 
the meaning of Warren's civil rights jurisprudence-its significance as 
racial redemption. 
My theory of racial redemption, presented here in an early stage 
of development, offers a general framework within which to place a 
series of legal precedents and through which to understand legal 
history. Beyond its application to Earl Warren and the Warren Court, 
racial redemption theory is available for a wide range of purposes, 
including: analyzing contemporary post-civil rights politics in an era of 
race-coding; understanding the phenomenon of pitting one subordi-
nated group against another in a process I refer to as "racial broker-
ing;" explaining the increasing use of people of color as spokespersons 
or "racial mascots" for racially regressive policies and reconciling the 
increasing equality discourse with the decreasing yield in material 
resources to redress inequality. 
In a legal property sense, redemption refers to the freeing of 
property from mortgage by paying the debt for which the property 
stood as security.245 Whiteness, as Professor Cheryl Harris has shown, 
reyoh·ed around his failure to adequately acknowledge his wrongdoing and to apologize for it. 
TIlliS, redemption was withheld (by the media and political pundits at least) prompting a series 
of further acts of con tri tion by the Presiden t. See Laurie Goodstein, Clinton Chooses Ministerial 
Team to be His Spititual Advisors, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 15, 1998, at A5 (describing 
Clinton's choice of ministers to "help him resist what one of the ministers calls 'the temptations 
that have conquered' the president in the past"); Steve Dubin, Acts of Contlition or Just an Act?, 
PORTLAl'>D OREGONIAN, Sept. 13, 1998, at 01 (detailing Clinton's actions since the break of the 
Lewinsky story in January 1998 and stating that "[0] n the morning he was publicly undressed by 
the unveiling of independent counsel Kenneth Starr's repon, Clinton played the sinner in 
genuine need of forgiveness"); H71ite House Frenetic After Report's Release, GREENSBORO NEWS & 
REC., Sept. 12, 1998, at A4 (stating that Clinton tried to rebut the Starr report by a teary plea for 
redemption at a prayer breakfast); l\[elissa Healy, First Lady Publicly Forgives Spouse, DENVER POST, 
Aug. 19, 1998, at Al (looking at Hillary Clinton's public ovation of forgiveness as the key to Bill 
Clinton's political redemption); Arianna Huffington, For Clinton, Repentance, Then Redemption, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 13, 1998, at B7 (arguing, in a pre-Starr report editorial, that Clinton was 
shutting off the road to redemption by playing the perfectionist). 
2H See infra Part IV.B. 
245 Black's Law Dictionary defines "redeem" as follows: 
To buy back. To free property or article from mortgage or pledge by paying the 
debt for which it stood as security. To repurchase in a literal sense; as, to redeem 
one's land from a tax-sale. It implies the existence of a debt and means to rid 
property of that incumbrance. 
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has constituted a form of property recognized in law.246 In Plessy v. 
Ferguson, for example, the Court acknowledged that if Plessy were 
white, he would have an action for damages against the railway com-
pany for his wrongful exclusion from the "white car": 
If he be a white man and assigned to a colored coach, he may 
have his action for damages against the company for being 
deprived of his so-called property. Upon the other hand, if 
he be a colored man and be so assigned, he has been de-
prived of no property, since he is not lawfully entitled to the 
reputation of being a white man.24i 
In the Plessy era, the property value of whiteness was maintained 
under a legal system and social order based on the logic of white 
supremacy.24R But in a post-civil rights era in which open forms of 
white supremacy have been legally prohibited and socially discred-
ited, the property value of whiteness, to the exten t it is understood 
to retain a supremacist content, has been "mortgaged" and dimin-
ished.249 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 884 (6th ed. 1991). 
246 See Cheryl Harris, lVlziteness as Property, 106 HAR\·. L. REv. 1709 (1993). Harris's "urk 
builds upon insights expressed by Derrick Bell in an earlier work, Xerces and the Affirmative Action 
Mystique, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1595, 1602, 1608 (1989) (discussing the "propeny interests of 
identifiable whites"). 
247Harris, supra note 246, at 1749 (citing Plessy y. Ferguson, 164 U.S. 537, 549 (1896». 
24R My working definition of white supremacy is a set of reinforcing and synergistic beliefs 
and institutional practices and policies consistent with superiority based on white racial identity 
or inferiorization of non-white racial identity, and reflected in societal group power relations. See 
Sumi Cho, Multiple Consciousness and the Dirwrsity Dilemma, 68 U. COLO. L. REX. 1035, 1036 & 
n.6 (1997). Cf GEORGE FREDRICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN 
AND SOUTH AFRICAN HISTORY xi (1981) (defining white supremacy as the "attitudes, ideologies, 
and policies associated with the rise of blatant forms of white or European dominance oyer 
'nonwhite' populations"-a domination achieyed by making race or color a qualification for 
equal participation in civil society); Frances Lee Ansley, Stining the Ashes: Race, Class and the 
Future of Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. RE\,. 993, 1024 & n.129 (1989) (referring to 
white supremacy as a "political, economic and cultural system in which "'hites O\'endlelmingly 
control power and material resources, conscious and unconscious ideas of "'hite superiority and 
entitlement are widespread, and relations of Idlite dominance and non-white subordination are 
daily reenacted across a broad array of institutions and social settings"). For a concise summary 
of definitions of white supremacy, see Margaret Montoya, Of "Subtle Prejudices, " IHlite Supremacy, 
and Affirmative Action: A Repl)' to Paul Butler, 68 U. COLO. L. RE\'. 891, 900-03 (1997) (summa-
rizing definitions forwarded by George Fredrickson, Winthrop Jordan, Ronald Takaki and Tomas 
Almaguer) . 
249 In a recent book, Shelby Steele obsenes the impact of the ciyil rights mO\'ement on the 
meaning and status of whiteness and the need for racial redemption: 
Ironically, it was the idea of equality that brought stigma to ,,·hites. In the ch'il rights 
era, when white America finally accepted a legal equality that would extend to 
different races, it also accepted an idea that shamed it. For three centuries "'hite 
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Logically, however, whites have a vested interest in retaining ad-
vantageous racial hierarchies, structures and cultures-the property 
value of whiteness-and may be expected to defend political and 
material advantages over peoples of color.250 Inherent in this property 
interest, though, lies a tension between the knowledge of white suprem-
acy's moral decrepitude and the desire to enjoy the fruits of that tainted 
tree. A racial redemption of sorts is needed to restore the property 
interest in whiteness to its full pre:Jim Crow value under post:Jim Crow 
norms and to reconcile the fundamental tension at the heart of the 
current u.s. racial socio-economy. 
Racial redemption is the process by which whiteness can be re-
stored to its full material value by removing the encumbrances that the 
legacy of racism has placed upon it. Such a process reconciles the 
knowledge/ desire tension by denouncing supremacy while permitting 
its continued operation. Specifically, there are three identifiable fea-
tures that characterize the process of racial redemption: 1) the repu-
diation of old forms of white supremacy; 2) the burial of historical 
memories of racial subordination; and 3) the transformation of white 
supremacy into more sustainable forms. 
The repudiation of America's supremacist past may take various 
forms, such as the declaration of racial apologies or racial equality 
"covenants." A number of historical events merged in the mid-twenti-
eth century to force the repudiation of white supremacist regimes, only 
two of which I will address. First, the discovery of the Nazi death camps 
was an epiphanal moment for the United States and began the final 
demise of the pseudo-scientific, biologically-based philosophy of white 
supremacy.251 The Holocaust held a mirror to white Americans' violent 
America had used race to defeat equality. It had indulged in self-serving notions of 
white supremacy, had transgressed the highest principles of the democracy, and 
had enforced inequality on others while possessing the ideas to know better .... 
America's new commitment to equality in the civil rights era brought with it an 
accountability for all this .... In a sense the new embrace of equality floated the 
nation's racial shame, unanchored it, so that it rose to the surface of American life 
as a truth that the nation would have to answer for. 
SHELBY STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED: THE SECOND BETRAYAL OF BLACK FREEDOM IN AMERICA 
118-19 (1998). I agree with Steele when he asserts that three centuries of white supremacy have 
created a need to redeem whiteness in the post-civil rights era. In fact, this need also explains 
why consen'atives of color receive such a positive hearing among many whites. 
250 See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1381 (1988). 
251 See KLUGER, supra note 1, at 690 (noting that postwar public opinion on U.S. race relations 
had undergone a "profound change" due to the "awful consequences of racial prejudice revealed 
by the Nazi regime" that caused a "revulsion against the kind of racial feeling that had led to the 
Japanese-American relocation cases during the Second World War"). 
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exclusion and disfranchisement of people of color, particularly Black 
Americans in the South. In addition, the 1944 publication, An Ameri-
can Dilemma, removed the intellectual cover enjoyed by scientific ra-
cism.252 In his thousand page work, Gunnar Myrdal argued that Amer-
ica's race problem was attributable not to the biological inferiority of 
the minority group, but to the irrational prejudices of members of the 
majority group.253 The Holocaust, the public spectacle of the Nurem-
berg trials and the influence of An American Dilemma made it impos-
sible to sustain old forms of white supremacy as a public rationale for 
the racial caste system in postwar America.2:i4 
The burial feature of racial redemption makes use of censorship, 
historical amnesia, selective recall, euphemizing and revisionist histo-
ricizing in achieving its ends. This process obscures individual, institu-
tional and cultural complicities with the old forms of white supremacy 
that would otherwise have left "blood on the hands" of those who 
participated in the repudiated regime, and even damaged the moral 
currency of those who passively benefited from it. In one sense, burial 
provides closure after a grieving period, granting permission to "move 
on" from the legacy of America's racist past. Such burials may manifest 
themselves as outright denials, glaring omissions, silences, absences 
and counter-factual or decontextualized assertions. Burial obscures the 
full extent to which white privilege has been consolidated and lever-
aged into material gain. 255 
The third, and most important, feature of racial redemption in-
volves the simultaneous transformation and reassertion of white su-
252 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DHIOC-
RACY (1944) (documenting methodically how irrational prejudice on the part of the white 
majority is primarily responsible for the racial inequality of Blacks). 
25~ See id. at 100. Myrdal obsen"es that the inferiority of the Negro "is the white man's own 
indubitable sensing of it .... " Id. He claims though, that such beliefs were declining because 
"[p]eople want to be rational, to be honest and well informed." Id. at 109. 
2,,4 For other reasons, see Derrick Bell, Brmnl v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convelc 
gence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 524-25 (1990) (identifYing three points of white self-interest 
that animated the Brown decision: 1) to improve international credibility with the Third World 
in the contestation for unaligned nation-states; 2) to blunt social unrest among African Americans 
returning from World '\'ar II to face discrimination and physical ,"iolence; and 3) to promote 
further industrialization in the South). See also GERALD HORNE, BLACK AND RED: W.E.B. Du BOIS 
AND THE AFRo-AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE COLD WAR, 1944-63, at 227 (1986) (obsening that 
the timing of the Brown decision during "a concerted governmental campaign against interna-
tional and domestic communism is one of the most overlooked aspects of the decision "); Mary 
Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. RE,". 61 (1988) (supplementing Bell's 
first point of white self-interest with historical e\"idence). 
255For an approach in direct opposition to "burial" of white privilege, see generallv, 
STEPHANIE WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE RE'"EALED: HoI\' INn SIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 
(1996). 
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premacy. The process of racial redemption retires an outmoded form 
of white supremacy while introducing a new, more resilient form. What 
has been billed as revolutionary racial change in the repudiation phase 
reveals itself as a "mere change in the form of investment" in white 
supremacy.256 Burial of racial historical context makes it analytically 
difficult for the public to evaluate comparatively the evolving form of 
subordination. Pre-Brown, white supremacy manifested itself in the 
system of segregation supported by an ideology of biological determi-
nism. Post-Brown, white supremacy continued in the new form of 
formal legal equality abutted by the ideology of colorblind fundamen-
talism. 
Through the stages of repudiation, burial and transformation, the 
racial redemption process effects, and depends upon, a retrieval of 
innocent whiteness. This retrieval decouples whiteness from the stigma 
of white supremacy by imagining a kinder, gentler whiteness-one that 
would never be seen cloaked in white sheets and hoods, one that has 
not benefited from centuries of a racial caste system, one that has not 
been constructed through belief in inherent biological differences 
between people of color and whites and one that has not been toleran t 
of outright violence and malign neglect. For Warren individually, the 
Supreme Court as an institution and the nation as a whole, the decou-
pling of whiteness from white supremacy occurred through Brown and 
its companion cases that invalidated the principle of separate-but-equal 
and the practice of segregation.257 The jurisprudence that began with 
Brown has had the effect of restoring white innocence and relegitimat-
ing the state and its institutions through the embrace of colorblind 
ideology.25~ 
The following sections analyze Warren's post-internment actions 
and the Warren Court's racial jurisprudence through the lens of racial 
redemption. I suggest the centrality of Brown et al. as a moment in 
25'iThe "mere change in the form of investment" phrase comes from Lone Woifv. Hitchcock, 
in which the federal government claimed that the doctrine of "plenary power" permitted it to 
abrogate treaties with Native nations unilaterally and without consent. In order to justify a "taking" 
of Kiowa and Comanche lands absent consent or compensation, and in contravention to the 1867 
Treaty of Medicine Lodge, the Court characterized the lands as "surplus" and the taking as a 
"mere change in the form of investment of Indian tribal property," since Indians are considered 
"wards of the government." Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903). Reva Siegel offers 
a related term, "preservation-through-transformation," to refer to the changing, yet ongoing 
nature of subordination through the Equal Protection Clause and antidiscrimination law more 
generally. See Reva Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and P1ivacy, 105 YALE 
LJ. 2117, 2178-87 (1996) [hereinafter "The Rule of Love']' 
257 See infra discussion Parts III.B, III.C.I-2. 
208 See infra discussion Part III.C.3. 
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individual and institutional redemption processes, both of which in-
volve the retrieval of racial innocence in the postwar era. 
B. Warren s Search for Redemption 
Earl Warren, I believe, exjJerienced a transformation when, during 
World War II, he realized how mistaken he had been-that instead 
of leading the effort to deny Japanese Americans their rights as 
citizens, he should have been difending those rights. As a result, I 
believe, Warren experienced a deep personal awakening that was 
not unlike that experienced nearly two hundred years earlier by a 
man named John Newton, who became so revolted by his life as a 
slave ships captain, that he repented, became a minister in the 
Church of England, and authored the great Protestant hymn 
''A mazing Grace. "259 
What was the nature of Warren's search for redemption? Was it, 
as his biographers suggest, a sincere attempt to acknowledge fully his 
past wrongdoing? Or was it an attempt to restore his reputation and 
the transparency and innocence of his racial identity? 
The first feature of racial redemption requires an admission of 
racial wrongdoing or a declaration of racial "rightdoing" to sever pub-
licly one's relationship with white supremacy. In Warren's case, one 
may observe both of these moves occurring. In his posthumously 
published memoirs, Warren issued a "racial apology" for his wartime 
transgressions against Japanese Americans. 2GO Similarly, Brown, which 
Warren engineered and authored, reads like an unburdening that is 
designed in part to purge the guilt over white supremacy. 
Just three years before his death, Warren purportedly shared with 
his former law clerk the "unusual admission"2Gl that only one issue dog-
ged his conscience-"theJapanese evacuation of1942."2G2Although he 
refused to issue a public apology during his lifetime, Warren admitted 
in his memoirs: 
I have since deeply regretted the removal order and my own 
testimony advocating it, because it was not in keeping with 
2S9Tyrone Brown, Clerking for the Chief justice, ill THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 
276, 281 (Bernard Schwanz ed., 1996). 
260 See infra note 263 and accompanying text. 
261 CRAY, supra note 5, at 520 (noting that the comments to Ira Michael Heyman represented 
"an unusual admission"). 
262 Id.; see also SCHWARTZ, Sll/)1(I note 19, at 17 (stating that 'farren admitted to fOrInerJustice 
Ardlllr Goldberg in a conversation on the internment, "You kno,,', in retrospect, that's one of the 
worst things I ever did"). 
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our American concept of freedom and the rights of citizens. 
It demonstrates the cruelty of war when fear, get-tough mili-
tary psychology, propaganda, and racial antagonism combine 
with one's responsibility for public security to produce such 
acts.263 
In a recent monograph, Morton Horwitz acknowledges Warren's 
apology and suggests that his guilt over the internment is one possible 
explanation for the Chief justice's effectiveness at procuring a unani-
mous opinion in Brown.264 Warren, Professor Horwitz observes, framed 
Brown as a "moral challenge to America" about its "unkept promises" 
to Mrican Americans.265 Warren himself was challenged by the "defin-
ing moment of his life"-the incarceration of over 120,000 Japanese 
Americans in concentration camps-in which "racist stereotypes had 
substituted for evidence. "266 
Some of Warren's contemporaries have similarly suggested that he 
sought to redeem his wartime behavior through his leadership on the 
bench. Dillon Myer, director of the War Relocation Authority during 
World War II, said that he believed "[Warren] became the great liberal 
judge in atonement in part for what he did on the evacuation."267 
Similarly, Bill Hosokawa of the Japanese American Citizens League 
('JACL") surmised that, upon appointment to the Supreme Court, 
Warren "seemed to become aware of the grievous injustice [toward 
Japanese Americans] he had helped perpetuate,"268 and observed that 
"[s]ome believed that Warren's realization of the grievous wrong he 
had done the Japanese Americans caused him to search his soul, and 
that resulted in the enlightened view he adopted on human rights 
lnatters. "269 
263WARREN, supra note 70, at 149. 
264 See HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 24-25 (identifying two possible explanations for Warren's 
success at forging a unanimolls decision in Brown as deriving from: (1) his personal experience 
with internment that enabled him to pose the question as a "moral challenge to America" about 
its unkept [racial] promises; and (2) his political savvy developed in California politics "to create 
as extensive a legal and moral consensus as possible"). 
265Id. at 24. 
266Id. According to the Horwitz's account, "Warren movingly remembered witnessing the 
terrified faces of Japanese American children being removed from their homes and expressed 
regret for his part in the deportations." [d. 
267 Earl "'arren Project, Dillon Myel/James Rowe Interview, at 11, an oral history conducted 
1970 through 1977 by Miriam F. Stein and Amelia R. Fry, Regional Oral History Office, The 
Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1981. 
~68BILL HOSOKAWA, THIRTY-F.I\'E YEARS IN THE FRYING PAN 34 (1978). 
269Id. at 271; see also GIRDNER & LOFTIS, supra note 147, at 460 (reporting on how Governor 
Warren's appointment of a Japanese American judge, John Aiso, in Los Angeles was interpreted 
as atonement for \\'an"en's role in internment); Brown, supra note 259, at 281 (claiming that 
\Varren became "a priest at the altar of equal justice" because of his experience with Japanese 
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Through his admission of regret and his liberal leadership on the 
bench, Warren likely sought to distance himselffrom the time he spent 
purging the Golden State of its "yellow menace." Striking segregationist 
arrangements in one per curiam order after another,2io his pro-civil 
rights decisions appear as the product of an almost obsessional desire 
to separate himself from his former supremacist views. As his law clerk 
Tyrone Brown would later write: "In my year on the Court, [Chief 
Justice Warren] seemed to have embarked on a course to distinguish 
out of existence the Hirabayashi decision in which the Court had 
validated the Japanese exclusions."271 
Warren's efforts to bury his wartime transgressions are best re-
flected in his exchange ofletters with biographer John Wea\'er. Weaver 
requested the Chief Justice's permission to reprint portions of a letter 
that captured Warren's wartime attitude towards Japanese Americans. 
In the letter, Warren addressed the balancing of civil defense and 
constitutional principles: 
Either we take the protective measures that we know in our 
hearts are necessary to insure the safety of our country or we 
abandon them as being in conflict with some principle of law. 
We cannot do both in this situation, and our Supreme Court 
unanimously recognized this fact recently in sustaining the 
curfew regulations on those of Japanese ancestry. It arrh'ed 
at its conclusion reluctantly as we all do in such situations. 
Nevertheless it was firm and unanimous in its conclusion that 
because of the peculiar situation of those of Japanese extrac-
tion, a distinction could, under the Constitution be made.272 
Asking Weaver to omit this evidence of advocacy against Japanese 
Americans, Warren wrote "I would particularly not care to see my 
letter to Alfred J. Lundberg published at this time, because the 
subject under discussion is not only controversial but is highly 
emotional, and I know there are those who would like to stir up the 
controversy at this time."273 
exclusion, after which the Chief Justice yowed "ne\'er again to neglect to consult the compass 
inside him"). 
270 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
271 Brown, supra note 259, at 281 (the author reflecting upon his year as Chief Justice's lall' 
clerk in 1968), 
272 Letter from Earl Warren, California Gm'ernor, to Alfred J. Lundberg, at 3 (July 16, 1943) 
(ayailable in Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress, l\lanuscripts Didsion, Cont. 6). 
273 Letter from Earl Warren, Chief Justice, to John D. "'eayer, at 1 (Feb, 3, 1967) (a\'ailable 
in Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscripts Di\'ision) [hereinafter Warren letter, 
Feb. 3, 1967]. In a seeming non-sequitur, Warren further explained that "[tlhe relationship of 
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Warren, elaborating on his wartime posture, explained that, 
"[w]hen these people were returned to California after the War, I 
mobilized all the forces in the State to welcome them and even to 
prosecute successfully those who violated their rights. "274 In perhaps 
the most ironic paragraph, the same former California Attorney Gen-
eral who had aggressively initiated escheat actions against issei and 
nisei claimed that under his supervision, the state "carefully hus-
banded" the financial matters of those interned, and "as far as [he 
could] remember," "repaid [the owners] in full."275 Further, Warren 
noted that immediately after the war, and "with [his] approval," the 
state legislature set aside judgments for violations of the Alien Land 
Law, many of which Warren had initiated as Attorney General. 276 
Weaver complied with the Chief Justice's wishes.277 
Warren's refusal to accept full responsibility for his internment 
advocacy, combined with his success in convincing biographers to 
the Japanese nationals and the Japanese Americans has been so splendid since the War that I 
would not now like to see the matter reopened." Id. 
274 Id. 
275Id. But see Earl Warren Project, The Internment, Robert Cozzens Interview 41, an oral 
history conducted 1970 through 1977 by Miriam F. Stein and Amelia R. Fry, Regional Oral History 
Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1981 [hel'einafter Cozzens Intel'-
view] (recalling that during Warren's term as Governor, business licenses of Japanese Californians 
were rescinded and resold "for lots of money"); discussion infra Part II.A.1. on Warren's escheat 
action campaign against the Japanese Californians. 
Rebutting Warren's claim that internees were "repaid in full, " see CWRIC, supra note 20, 
at 117-33 (detailing economic loss of internees and inadequacy of post-internment federal claims 
acts to compensate for such losses); GIRDNER & LOFrIs, supra note 147, at 428-38 (reviewing 
property losses of internees due to predatory interests and insufficiency of the postwar claims 
processes); DILLON MYER, UPROOTED AMERICANS 245-56 (1971) (recording ineffecth'eness of 
government programs to safeguard internee property). See also LESLIE T. HATAMIYA, RiGHTING 
A WRONG: JAPANESE AMERICANS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT OF 1988, at 174 
(1993) (discussing class-action Hohri lawsuit for governmental unjust taking of internees' "real 
and personal property, commercial interests, livelihood, reputation, liberty, and other property 
rights" and state failure to adequately compensate for losses). 
276Warren letter, Feb. 3, 1967, supra note 273, at 1. 
277 Perhaps because of his admiration for \Varren, the Supreme Court, or the Bmwn decision, 
or perhaps out of a pragmatic concern for continued access to the subject of his forthcoming 
book, \Vem'er readily agreed to "'arren's request. ""eaver published his biography later that yeal'. 
See WEAVER, supra note 60. "I quite understand your feelings and will make no use of [the 
Lundberg) letter," the author assured Warren. The biographer shared with Warren his method-
ology to ensure an accurate and fair version of events, which included making all the editorial 
changes requested by two of Warren's sons, a trusted law clerk, and personal secretary during 
the war years. "I share your admiration for the Japanese-Americans who have contributed so much 
to the growth and culture of California," Weaver deferred. "I have dealt with this subject in a 
chapter which should be a source of pride to them and will not, I hope, be instrumental in 
causing you or the Court any embarrassment." Letter from John D. Weaver to Earl Warren, Chief 
Justice (Feb. 8, 1967) (Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division, Articles 
Holiday: 1964-68 folder). 
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self-censor their comments on his anti:Japanese sentiment as Attorney 
General and Governor of California, illustrate the burial function at 
work. The result is orchestrated historical amnesia surrounding the 
extent of Warren's complicity with white supremacy. As reflected by his 
handling of Weaver, Warren went to his grave having avoided a frank 
and full acknowledgment of his leading role in internment, choosing 
instead a strategy of disclaiming personal involvement, deracializing 
the biases of his decisionmaking and diminishing constitutional objec-
tions to the internment. 
The apology published in Warren's memoirs downplays his lead-
ership role in the project. It recharacterizes his part in the February 
2, 1942 mapping efforts through the "reverse Nuremberg" defense: 
"Mter a conference with the law officers, who agreed unanimously, I 
testified for a proposal which was not to intern in concentration camps 
all Japanese, but to require them to move from what was designated 
as the theater of operations .... "278 As contextualized by Warren, his 
actions as the highest ranking law officer for the State of California 
were conditioned by an obligatory heeding of the wishes of his subor-
dinates, notwithstanding his responsibility for organizing and guiding 
the meeting. 
Warren further diminishes his personal involvement by placing 
the internment decision within the context of one segment of the 
anti-Asian movement in California. He claims that anti-Asian sentiment 
"stemmed largely from some of our fanning communities. "279 As for 
his own biases, the former Native Son and American Legionnaire 
asserted, "I have always believed that I had no prejudice against the 
Japanese as such except that directly spawned by Pearl Harbor and its 
aftermath. "280 
In addition, Warren offered non-racial justifications for his war-
time actions. His words and actions provide key insights not only into 
his desire for redemption, but also into the nature of the redemption 
he sought. In 1972, just before his death, Warren said, "I feel that 
everybody who had anything to do with the relocation of the Japanese 
after it was all over, had something of a guilty conscience about it, and 
wanted to show that it wasn't a racial thing as much as it was a defense 
matter."281 Indeed, the redemption Warren sought entailed neither 
278 WARREN, supm note 70, at 148. 
279ld. at 147-48. 
280ld. at 149. 
28) Earl Warren Project, The Internment, Earl Warren Inten'iell' at 329 Uune 22, 1972), an 
oral history conducted 1970 through 1977 by l\liriam F. Stein and Amelia R. Fry, Regional Oral 
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contntlOn nor any serious attempt at reparation for his individual 
wrongdoing.282 Rather, he primarily wanted to clear his name by main-
taining, as he did in his 1943 Governors Address, that his obligation 
to bar Japanese Californians from returning to California was not "an 
appeal to race hatred," but "an appeal for safety."283 
Non-racial security justifications for wartime transgressions reap-
pear in Warren's memoirs. Of the five pages he devotes to World War 
II, three and one-half review the defense matters posed by the bombing 
of Pearl Harbor, Japan's successive victories during the war and the 
security hazards allegedly posed by saboteurs of Japanese ancestry.2114 
In the brief passage cited above, Warren expresses deep regret for his 
wartime role, but with qualifications:285 "It was wrong to act so impul-
sively, without positive evidence of disloyalty, even though we felt we had 
a good motive in the security of our state."~8u The racialized nature of 
"national security" is not addressed.287 His role is contextualized by 
maintaining that "[t]he atmosphere was so charged with anti:Japanese 
feeling that I do not recall a single public officer responsible for the 
security of the state who testified against a relocation proposal."288 By 
playing the national security "trump card" over constitutionally-guar-
anteed civil rights and liberties, Warren attempts to deflect racial guilt 
even as he issues his apology. His steadfast claim that his actions were 
not "racial" reflects his desire to conceal and deny the white suprema-
cist regime within which his actions as Attorney General and Governor 
originated. 
Nowhere in his expression of regret does the former Chief Justice 
mention the constitutional rights violated by the internment order. By 
omitting discussion of constitutional violations, the apology leaves un-
History Office, The Bancroft Library, University of California, BeI-keley; see also WHITE, supra 
note 15, at 76. 
282 See discussion infra on his refusal to apologize to Japanese Americans during his lifetime, 
notes 298-300 and accompanying text. 
283Governors' Conference Address, supra note 231, at 6. 
284 See WARREN, supra note 70, at 144-50. 
285 The last half-page details two actions he took to pass legislation to protect the employment 
rights of Japanese Californians during the internment, and to remove the powers of the U.S. 
Attorney General to impound suspected subversives during peacetime. See id. at 149-50. 
286Id. at 149 (emphasis added). 
287 For this analysis of the role of race in national security law, see generally Gil Gott, A Tale 
of New Precedents: japanese AmeJican Intanment as Foreign Affairs Law, in this issue, at 179. Nor 
does \\'an-en discuss how a significant piece of his "evidence" at the Tolan Committee headngs 
was the fact that no sabotage had occurred, i.e., "negative evidence" as positive proof of disloyalty. 
See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of negative evidence as positive 
proof. 
288 WARREN, supra note 70, at 148. 
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challenged the formal sanctioning of white· supremacy that occurred 
through the extremely deferential process of judicial review that cul-
minated in the Supreme Court's internment decisions. As Bill Hosok-
awa pointed out, "[h]e ignores the issues that were raised by the 
Yasui289 and Hirabayashi290 lawsuits that challenged the military's selec-
tive curfew order against chilians in the absence of martial law, and 
the Korematsu291 and Endd2-92 cases that challenged the legality of the 
evacuation and continued incarceration. "293 Instead, he primarily re-
fers to his own emotional response. "Whenever I thought of the inno-
cent little children who were torn from home, school friends, and 
congenial surroundings, I was conscience-stricken. "294 
Warren's avoidance oflegal analysis in his memoirs preserves the 
rationalization of internment he offered in a 1962 law review article. 
There, he defends the Court's decisions in Hirabayashi and Korematsu: 
Where the circumstances are such that the Court must accept 
uncritically the Government's description of the magnitude 
of the military need, actions may be permitted that restrict 
individual liberty in a grievous manner. Consequently, if judi-
cial review is to constitute a meaningful restraint upon unwar-
ranted encroachments upon freedom in the name of military 
necessity, situations in which the judiciary refrains from ex-
amining the merit of the claim of necessity must be kept to 
an absolute minimum.2n5 
Twenty years after the internment order and nine years after Brown, 
the Chief Justice suggested that the same result would ensue if he 
were presiding over the case in 1962. Warren's invocation of "free-
dom" and "military necessity" rationalized the Court's de minimis 
review of the military'S case for internment, while obscuring the 
documented racial hysteria and stereotypes that pervaded the mili-
tary's flawed assessment of "necessity."2% Under such an "absolute 
minimum" standard of review, Warren uncritically reproduces the 
289Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943) (challenging curfew order as unconstitutional). 
290 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (challenging curfew order and delegation 
of Congress·s legislative power to military officials as unconstitutional). 
291 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (challenging exclusion order as uncon-
stitutional) . 
292Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (challenging detention order as unconstitutional). 
293HosOKAWA, supra note 268, at 273. 
294WARREN, supra note 70, at 149. 
295 Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Afilitm)", 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 193 (1962). 
2961d. 
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legal structure of internment's injustice, perhaps even countenanc-
ing its future recurrence. 297 
Insofar as he refused to apologize directly to Japanese Americans, 
Warren also failed to make amends with the Japanese American com-
munity for the injuries he inflicted. As a JACL member observed, 
"[m]any nisei would have liked to hear Warren say he was sorry, but 
he refused to speak out in public."298 He repeatedly resisted attempts 
by nisei activists to elicit a retraction of his statement impugning the 
loyalty of Japanese citizens and aliens.299 A straightforward and sincere 
apology might have aided the racial healing of issei and nisei victims,30o 
many of whom carried the guilt, shame and injustice of internment to 
their death. Former internees would have to wait another decade for 
vindication-beginning in 1984 with the vacating of the Korematsu 
conviction and other coram nobis cases,30] and in 1988 with a formal 
apology302 and Congressional grant of $20,000 in reparations for each 
surviving internee.303 
29i Id. 
29tiHosOKAWA, supra note 268, at 2il. 
299 See WEGLYN, supra note 32, at 299 n.8 (mentioning Edison Uno's eight-year struggle to 
extract a retraction from \\'arren). 
31)0 See ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-
CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 232 (1999) (detailing how racial apologies, accompanied by "affirmative 
redress of justice grievances and the rearticulation and restructuring of current relations," are 
part of a larger process that may link interracial justice, healing, and reconciliation). 
:301 An obscure procedural mechanism available in cases involving the suppression of evi-
dellCe-petitions for writ of error coram nobis--was used by sansei (third-generation) japanese 
American attorn~ys who reopened the Korematsu, Hirabayashi and Yasui cases, overturning the 
convictions based upon evidence that the government suppressed critical evidence in the original 
internment challenges. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 198i) (upholding 
district court's vacating of exclusion conviction, but overturning affirmation of curfew convic-
tion); Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (vacating conviction for 
violation of the exclusion order bm upholding com"iction for curfew violation); Korematsu v. 
United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (vacating conviction for violation of the 
exclusion order). Minoru Yasui's case was heard in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Oregon where the court vacated Yasui's conviction without hearing evidence or making findings 
on the prosecutorial misconduct claim. \\11ile appealing the order, Yasui passed away. See 
HATAMIYA, supra note 2i5, at 165-80; Lorraine K. Bannai & Dale Minami, Internment Dwing 
World nar II and Litigations, ill ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT i55, ii8 (Hyung-
Chan Kim ed., 1992). For thorough treatments of the coram nobis cases, see generally PETER 
IRONS, JUSTICE DELAYED (1989); Eric K. Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited-Carrecting the Injustice 
of Extraordinary Government Excess and Lax Judicial Revilml; Time far a Better Accommodation of 
National Secll/ity Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1986) [hereinafter 
Yamamoto, Korematsu Revisited]. 
302 President Ronald Reagan signed H.R. 442, The Civil Liberties Act of 1988, on August 10, 
1988. Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (Aug. 10, 1988) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1989(a» 
(providing in part, an apology for the "grave injustice" inflicted upon "both citizens and perma-
nent resident aliens of japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and internment of 
ci,iiians during World War II"). 
303 Civil Liberties Act, Pub. L. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1989(b-4». But 
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From an internee's perspective, therefore, the expression of regret 
in Warren's memoirs was little more than an "awkward, mawkish ad-
mission "304 that occupied less space than his reminiscences on his role 
in closing down gambling ships off the Santa Monica coast.:105 As Pro-
fessor Eric Yamamoto observes, such insincere "pseudo apologies" oc-
cur when the apologizer "fails to participate in a joint analysis of the 
conditions of conflict and underlying grievances, to accept appropriate 
responsibility for it~uries inflicted, and to discharge that responsibility 
through action. "306 In such cases, the apology amounts to 'Just talk. "307 
Warren's mostly private expressions of regret have become public 
through the biographical record. Warren's apology, in other words, 
was not intended as a public reparation or remedy to those he injured, 
but as a personal pitch for racial redemption and a formal distanc-
ing of himself from his earlier days as a nativist politician. By not 
apologizing to Japanese Americans directly, Warren perhaps unwit-
tingly indulged (again) his feeling of supremacy over them, thereby 
maintaining the same hierarchical structural relationship he perpetu-
ated during the war. He would set the terms of interaction, including 
that of apology, and would avoid subjecting himself to criticisms or 
dialogue. Thus, the racial apology for internment, in and of itself, 
represents a moment in the reconstruction of racial hierarchy akin to 
the transformation of white supremacy described below.308 
Furthermore, by reprising wartime rationales for internment in 
his apology, Warren draws on the unrestrained arrogance of trans-
formed whiteness in a manner that does further violence to the in-
terned community.3og By rationalizing his race-based decisionmaking 
see Chris K. Iijima, Reparations and the "Model Afinorit)''' Ideolog)' of Acquiescence: The Necessit)' to 
Refuse the Return to Original Humiliation, in this issue, at 410 [hereinafter Racial Repamtions) 
(questioning the tranformati\'e potential of the gm'ernmental apology gh'en its roots in rewarding 
Japanese American acquiescence to political accommodation to internment); Natsu Taylor Saito, 
Personaljustice StitlDenied: International Law and the U.S. Internment of japanese Peruvians during 
World War II, in this issue, at 276 (maintaining that the U.S. Mochizuki settlement with Japanese 
Peru\'ians it kidnapped, interned and deported offers little in the way of reconciliation and 
justice); Eric Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: japanese AmeJican Redress and African American 
Claims, in this issue, at 496 (pointing out the ironic aftermath of Japanese American redress and 
reparations: "Since past government sin had been absol\'ed, Asian Americans were once again 
permissible targets for the government and mainstream America"). 
304 HOSOKAWA, supra note 268, at 273-74. 
305Warren de\'otes six pages to his successful purge of gambling ships and one paragraph to 
the "apology." See WARREN, supm note 70, at 132-37, 149. 
306YAMAMOTO, supra note 300, at 195. 
307Id. 
308 See infra Part III.C.3; see also YAMAMOTO, supra note 300, at 171 (I'ecognizing how "incom-
plete or insincere acknowledgments," "empty apologies" and "words without institutional restruc-
turing and attitudinal changes" mask, rather than acknowledge continuing oppression). 
309 For this use of violence in a discursh'e context, see Robert 1\'1. Co\'er, l 'iolence and the ~Vord, 
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in terms of wartime defense and security needs, Warren claims racial 
innocence in a way that sacrifices the integrity of the process by which 
he engages the injustices of the past. His refusal to acknowledge the 
legal wrongs inflicted by internment leaves intact the "military neces-
sity" myth adopted by Hirabayashi and Korematsu, and rhetorically 
reimposes the injury of internment. As apologies go, Warren's mea 
culpa is woefully deficient,310 but as a component of racial redemption 
it skillfully restores Warren's own racial integrity and makes possible 
his reassertion of personal supremacy over the victims and events of 
the past. The apology, an act of repudiation, burial and transformation, 
uncritically re-staged by Warren's biographers,311 is of a piece with the 
in NARRATlYE, VIOLENCE, A:-.fD THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 203 (Martha Minow, et 
al. eds., 1992) (arguing that "legal interpreth'e acts signal and occasion the imposition ohiolence 
upon others"). 
310 Sociologist Nicholas Tamchis characterizes an apology as "a special kind of enacted story 
whose remedial potential, unlike that of an account stems from the acceptance by the aggrieved 
party of [a contrite] admission of iniquity and defenselessness." NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: 
A SOCIOLOGY OF ApOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 8 (1991); see also HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL 
HEALING, CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN BLACKS & WHITES 100 (1995) (maintaining that 
racial healing requires "candidly confronting the past, expressing genuine regret, carefully ap-
praising the present in light of the past, agreeing to repair that which can be repaired, accepting 
joint responsibility for the future, and refusing to be derailed by setbacks and short-term failure"); 
Y.nLHloTo, supra note 300, at 195-96 (revealing how the exploitative deployment of the language 
of apology unaccompanied by changes in the apologizer's underlying belief system becomes a 
self-serving pursuit). '\'an'en's unilateral apology clearly falls short of Tavuchis's, Dalton's, and 
Yamamoto's standards for tranformative apology and healing. 
There has been a significant amount of recent literature on reconciliation and healing. As 
Professor Yamamoto points out, however, most of these works are "uni-disciplinary" in the field 
of theology, and draw examples primarily from outside of the United States. None of the works, 
he notes, address interracial conflicts. SeeYAMAMoTO supra note 300, at 34. For the reconciliation 
literature cited by Professor Yamamoto, see generally JOHN DAWSON, HEALING AMERICA'S 
WOU:-.fDS (1995); GEIKO MULLER-FAHRENHOLZ, THE ART OF FORGIVENESS (1997); DONALD 
SHRI\'ER, fu'l ETHIC FOR ENEMIES: FORGIVENESS IN POLITICS (1995); ROBERT SCHREITER, RECON-
CILIATION: I\l!SSIO:-.f A:-.fD MINISTRY IN A CHANGING SOCIAL ORDER (1992); THE RECONCILIATION 
OF PEOPLES: CHALLENGE TO THE CHURCHES (Gregory Baum & Harold Wells, eds., 1997); SPENCER 
PERKINS & HAROLD RICE, MORE THAN EQUALS: R ... CIAL HEALING FOR THE SAKE OF THE GOSPEL 
(1993); see also ANDREW SUNG PARK, RACIAL CONFLICT & HEALING: AN ASIAN AMERICAN THEO-
LOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1996). 
311 For similar apprehensions about superficial apologies and gestures toward racial healing, 
see DALTON, supra note 310, at 97-98 (discussing the public invocation of the language of healing 
absent true engagement and "pure, unadulterated struggle" necessary to bring about transfor-
mative healing); IUima, supra note 303, at 410 (troubling the "accommodationist" basis of the 
1988 redress and reparations bill); Saito, supra note 303, at 278 (critiquing the U.S. Afochizuki 
settlement with Japanese Peruvians it kidnapped, interned and deported insofar as the settlement 
agreement offers "no recognition br the United States that it violated international law at the 
time of internment, and no U.S. recognition of the resulting harm suffered" for the past fifty 
years, and that the offer entails no additional expenditure by the government); Eric K. Yamamoto, 
Friend, or Foe or Something Else: Social Aleanings of Redress and Reparations, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. 
& POL'y 223 (1992) (cautioning that reparations may provide merely "illusio;ls of change" that 
perpetuate the same structures that perpetuated the original injury). 
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broader institutional and social racial redemption process to which I 
now turn. 
C. The Postwar Court's Redemption Through Brown 
Constitutional scholar Mark Tushnet challenges us to transcend 
the triumphalism surrounding the popular understanding of Brown v. 
Board of Education and the Warren Court. "[T]he task ought to be," 
Tushnet suggests, "to explain how Brown validated rather than dis-
turbed the status quo, how the Court's rights jurisprudence of the 
1960s and early 1970s was a stabilizing rather than a destablizing 
force."312 This challenge is addressed by understanding the Warren 
Court through the framework of racial redemption. 
1. Repudiation: Brown as Racial Covenant 
The United States has been able to move from the past into the 
present because of the Court. In 1933, the Court refused to do so 
and lost stature. The Warren Court did not make the same mis-
take. 313 
The same general dynamic of repudiation evident in Warren's ra-
cial apology appears in the Court's move to end judicial complicity with 
supremacist Jim Crow segregation. As Professor Derrick Bell points 
out, the post-Reconstruction Court ignored the clear intentions of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and condoned 
every transgression on the bodies of Black people, including murder.314 
Deploying legal doctrines such as "no private constitutional rights,"315 
312Tushnet, supra note 55, at 808. 
313KATCHER, supra note 94, at 476. 
314 DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 91 (1987). 
315 SeeJames v. BO\\111all, 190 U.S. 127, 136 (1903) (denuding Fifteenth Amendment offorce 
by concluding that Section 5507 of the Revised Statutes was unconstitutional as the amendment 
does not contemplate "wrongful individual acts"); Chil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) 
(finding that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 has no authority in the Constitution insofar as "the 
wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any [state] authority, is simply a prh'ate wrong" 
and does not give rise to a civil rights violation); United States \'. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883) 
(upholding challenge by indicted white members of lynch mob who beat four African American 
prisoners and killed one of them on the grounds that Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 "is directed 
exclush'ely against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the State" and 
is therefore unwarranted by the Fourteenth Amendment); Virginia \'. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 
(1880) (ruling that exclusion of African Americans from juries does not \'iolate the Fourteenth 
Amendment by construing such exclusion as the "action of primte indhiduals" and not state 
action); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875) (arresting judgment and dismissing 
charges against white defendants including state officials for massacre of African Americans on 
the basis that the Fourteenth Amendment does not "add anything to the rights which one citizen 
has under the Constitution against another"). 
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"separation of powers,"316 "civil versus social rights,"317 "equal applica-
tion"3Hl and "'states' rights'-oriented federalism,"319 the Court refused 
to protect the civil rights, and indeed lives, of people of color. 
This regressive reputation was familiar to members of the Warren 
Court. In his memoirs Warren displayed such an understanding of the 
Court's racial history. 
"Vhen the Democrats in the Tilden-Hayes affair traded the 
presidency to the Republicans for the muting of the newly 
acquired rights of the black people who had so recently been 
316 See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 47'5, 488 (1903) (refusing to enroll onto voting lists prospective 
African American 'oter denied registration on the basis that such "relief from a great political 
wrong ... by the people of a state and the state itself, mllst be given by them or by the legislative 
and political department of the government of the United States"); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 
488 (1878) (striking as unconstitutional a state statute requiring equal rights and privileges on 
public conveyances on the grounds that such legislation "does encroach upon the exclusive power 
of Congress"). 
m See Plessy, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (upholding state segregation statute by arguing that 
Fourteenth Amendment "could not have been intended to ... enforce social, as distinguished 
from political [ci,"il], equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to 
either"); Strauder v. 'Nest Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879) (affirming the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's purpose as "securing to a race recently emancipated ... all the civil rights that the superior 
race enjoy"); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25 (distinguishing between constitutional protection 
of the "essential [civil] rights of life, liberty, and property" compared to "mere [social] discrimi-
nations on account of race or color," such as those discriminations in the "enjoyment of accom-
modations in inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement"); see also Reva Siegel, Why 
Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. 
L. REV. 1111, 1119-28 (1997) (detailing the pre-Brown history of the Supreme Court delineation 
between constitutionally protected "civil" and "political" rights versus unprotected "social" rights). 
31~ See Giles, 189 U.S. at 486-87 (rationalizing non-relief in "grandfather clause" voting rights 
case by stating that "[i]f a white man came here on the same general allegations, admitting his 
sympathy with the plan, but alleging some special prejudice that had kept him off the list, we 
hardly should think it necessary to meet him with a reasoned answer"); Williams v. State of 
Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 222 (1898) (upholding state constitution and laws excluding African 
Americans from jury service through use of criteria with disparate racial impact on basis that 
such exclusions "reach weak and ,icious white men as well as weak and vicious black men"); Pace 
'", State of Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1882) (finding no constitutional violation in antimis-
cegenation statute since "[t]he punishment of each offending person, whether white or black, is 
the same"). 
m See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S, at II (striking the Civil Rights Act of 1875 prohibiting 
segregation in public accommodations and comeyances on the basis that "legislative power 
conferred upon Congress ... does not invest ... power to legislate upon subjects which are within 
the domain of state legislation"); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 United States 36,78 (1 Wall.) (1872) 
(arguing that recognition of the federal gO\"ernment's concurrent jurisdiction for the "privileges 
and immunities of citizenship" under the Fourteenth Amendment would "fetter and degrade the 
State gO\ernments by subjecting them to the control of Congress" as well as "radically change[] 
the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other"); Blyew v. 
United States, 80 U.S. 581 (I Wall.) (1872) (denying federal jurisdiction under Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 for murder of an African American family by whites despite state law prohibiting testimony 
by African Americans unless they were parties to the case), 
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enfranchised, the Supreme Court then, in keeping with the 
national mood, in one case after another, beginning with 
Slaughter House cases and the Civil Rights cases, limited the 
rights of blacks until finally the case of Plessy v. Ferguson held 
that the states could by statute separate blacks from whites in 
public transportation providing the accommodations were 
equaf.320 
137 
Against the background of this disreputable past, the Warren Court 
attempted to restore the institution's legitimacy and stature on 
racial matters amidst rapidly shifting postwar racial norms. 
Brown 1321 definitively rejects the racial inferiorization of Mrican 
Americans through segregation. "To separate [children] from others 
of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates 
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community," Warren 
wrote for the Brown I Court.322 In conference with his Supreme Court 
brethren, Warren straightforwardly asserted that the basis for segrega-
tion and the principle of separate-but-equal "could be justified only by 
belief in the inferiority of the Negro. "~23 In his memoirs, he made clear 
his view of Brown's role in repudiating racism, stating that "Brown 
lashed at three centuries of slavery and its remnants based on the white 
supremacy theory .... "324 
The Brown I decision reflects the Court's conscious shift from 
white supremacist biological determinism to a Myrdalian prejudice 
model as the dominant racial ideology.325 As discussed above, Myrdal's 
An American Dilemma326 undermined the widespread belief among 
whites that racial inequality was based on the genetic inferiority of 
Mrican Americans.327 According to Myrdal, it was the irrational preju-
dice of white individuals that led to racial discrimination. Since the 
restrictive covenant cases of the 1940s, the NAACP had subjected the 
320 WARREN, supra note 70, at 293. 
321 The 1954 case declaring that segregation has no place in education is known as the "Bmwn 
f' decision. See Brown v. Board of Educ. (Bmwn l), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
322 Broum /, 347 U.S. at 494. 
323 KLUGER, supra note I, at 679-80; see also CRAY, supm note 5, at 281. 
324V.'ARREN, supra note 69, at 306. 
325 See G. Edward White, Earl Milrren 's Influence, in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND 
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 41, 43 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993) (asserting that "[olne of the moral 
principles at stake in Bronm . .. was the continued \'iability of racial supremacist theories"). 
326 MYRDAL, supra note 252. 
327 See DAVID W. SOUTHERN, GUNNAR MYRDAL AND BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS: THE USE AND 
ABUSE OF AN AMERICAN DILEMMA, 1944-1969, at 101-25 (1987) (noting how Myrdal's work was 
most influential on Americans from 1945-53); see also supm notes 252-54 and accompanying 
text. 
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Court to a "steady diet of Myrdal" in its amicus briefs.328 In Brown s 
controversial footnote 11, the Court ultimately embraced the analysis 
of the hefty text as "modern authority" for the deleterious effects of 
segregation.'129 
Thirteen years later, after judicially recognizing and combating 
the racist creation of a "feeling of inferiority," the Court directly con-
fronted the power of "white supremacy. "331J Massive Southern resistance 
to the Brown edict of desegregation had prepared the Warren Court 
to take on Southern honor and culture where racial matters were 
concerned.:l3J In Loving v. Virginia,332 the Chief Justice authored an 
opinion striking the Virginia anti-miscegenation law as being violative 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that opinion, Warren made clear 
his declaration of racial egalitarianism: 
There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose indepen-
dent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this 
classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial 
marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the ra-
cial classifications must stand on their own justification, as 
measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.333 
By lashing out at white supremacy-tentatively in Brown in 1954, 
and explicitly in Loving in 1967-the Warren Court announced a 
jurisprudence in which the norms and values of racial egalitarianism 
would be righteously proclaimed and the judicial complicity of the past 
rejected. Combined with the civil rights legislation passed during the 
Johnson administration, the Warren Court's racial jurisprudence es-
sentially constituted a "Second Reconstruction." The Warren Court 
hoped to distinguish itself from previous Courts that had assisted and 
defined Black disfranchisement in the aftermath of the First Recon-
struction. Indeed, this repudiatory posture that distanced the Court 
from biologically based white supremacy is prominent in the popular 
understanding of the Court's significance. 
3~~SOUTHERN. supra note 327, at 145. 
:329 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494-95 n.ll. Following the string cite of shorter works 01' passages 
on racial prejudice and discrimination, the Court nods to Myrdal's authoritativeness by closing 
the cite with "And see generally Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944)." Id. For the significance 
of AN AMERICAN DILEMMA to the Court from 1944-54, see SOUTHERN, supra note 327, at 127-50. 
330 See infra notes 332-33 and accompanying text. 
:m See infra notes 365-71 and accompanying text. 
:332 318 U.s. 1 (1967). 
:m LOlling, 388 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added). 
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2. Burial: Revisioning Postwar America 
Nowhere in the decision did the words "segregation" or "desegrega-
tion" appear.334 
139 
While the full significance of Brown's capacity to "disappear" 
America's racial sins would be realized through the Burger and Rehn-
quist Courts, particularly in their affirmative action jurisprudence,~l:l5 
even Brown 1's engagemen t of the most extreme forms of American 
apartheid demonstrates the burial function of racial redemption 
through the techniques of silence, euphemism and contradiction. In 
Brown I, Warren faced the task of reconciling Plessy's "separate-but-
equal" precedent with the Court's declaration that segregation had no 
place in education. In Plessy, the Court had dismissed the plaintiff's 
complaint as fictive and based on the "assumption that the enforced 
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of 
inferiority. "336 According to the Plessy Court, if there was any sense of 
inferiority flowing from segregation, it was "solely because the colored 
race [chose] to put that construction upon it."337 
Rather than directly challenge the Fuller Court's disingenuous-
ness, Warren evaded it "in such an economical and uncontentious way 
that the basic dishonesty of Plessy was ... dismissed as simply no longer 
fashionable thinking. "33R Writing for the Court, Warren declared that 
"[w]hatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at 
the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [in Brown that segregation 
produces inferiority] is amply supported by modern authority. "339 By 
refusing to censure the Plessy Court, however, the Warren Court ob-
scured judicial complicity in maintaining the material interest in white-
ness. Moreover, by failing to expose Plessy's supremacist logic, Brown I 
invited Southern resistance, for critics could argue that the decision 
"had been based not on solid reasoning or legal precedent but on 
psychological evidence. "340 In exchange for a unanimous verdict, the 
~34KLUGER, supra note I, at 744 (describing Brown II, decreeing the implementation order 
for Brown I). 
335 See infra Part III.C.3.; Part IV.C.I. 
~% Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. 
~37 Id. 
~38KLuGER, supra note I, at 705. 
339 Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494.n.ll (listing social science sources as modern authority). For a 
discussion of the controversy over footnote II, see DAns & GRAHAM, supra note 1, at 121-25 
(Sullullarizing criticisms to the Bmwl1 Court's use of social science data); SOUTHERN, slljJra note 
327, at 172-75, 187-224 (recording political and academic objections to the !\[ndal reference in 
Brown I). 
340KLuGER, supra note I, at 723. 
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Court preserved the integrity of the South's racial honor.341 In so doing, 
the Court left concealed the racist ideology and structures behind the 
South's segregationist policies. 
Pro-segregation advocates appearing before the Brown I Court 
emphasized their pious motives and irreproachable racial history.342 
Arguing for the state of Texas, Attorney General Ben Shepperd pro-
claimed that" [t] here is no discrimination on the part of the State of 
Texas in administering its public school system, only separation of the 
races."343 He continued that "Texas loves its Negro people and Texas 
will solve their problems its own way. "344 On behalf of South Carolina, 
the venerated John W. Davis lectured the Court on the non-racist 
nature of segregation: 
You say that [segregation is the product of] racism. Well, it is 
not racism. Recognize that for sixty centuries and more hu-
manity has been discussing questions of race and race ten-
sion, not racism .... 
Let me say this for the State of South Carolina ... It is 
confident of its good faith and intention to produce equality 
for all of its children of whatever race or color. It is convinced 
that the happiness, the progress and the welfare of these 
children is best promoted in segregated schools, and it thinks 
it is a thousand pities that by this controversy there should be 
urged the return to an experiment which gives not more 
promise of success today than when it was written into their 
Constitution during what I call the tragic era.345 
The Court responded to these advocates' insistence on the absence 
of racism, with a "howling silence," thereby leaving intact the segre-
gationists' implicit claim of white innocence.346 As Professor Thomas 
Ross points out, the impact of this glaring omission had significant 
repercussions on the viability of an effective remedy: "Had the 
Court in Brown I spoken of the racism that motivated the segrega-
tion laws, the delay in Brown II would have been more difficult to 
justify. ":147 
341 See id. Kluger, Justice jackson's law clerk at the time of Brown, said Warren's opinion 
convinced Jackson not to write a concurring opinion because Warren's "took the sting off the 
decision, it wasn't accusatory." Id. at 697. 
34~ See illji"a Part IV.C.3. 
'\4,\ See Thomas Ross, The Rhetorical TapesllY of Race: H7lite Innocence and Black Abstraction, 
32 W,I. & ;\L-\RY L. REv. 1,21 (1990) [hereinafter Rhetorical TapesttYl. 
3441d. at 22. 
3451d. at 22-23. 
:H(j Id. at 24-25. 
347 Id. at 26. 
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The Court's burial of segregation's impact and nature continued 
in Brown Il348 Defenders of segregation made oral arguments so ag-
gressively that observers believed Warren might issue a contempt cita-
tion. 349 In Warren's view, the pro-segregationists' unwillingness to com-
ply with the Court's Brown I decree amounted to "heresy."3'iO Yet, the 
Chief Justice, writing for the Court in Brown I/, described the presen-
tations as "informative and helpful" in considering the "complexities" 
of transitioning to a public education system free of racial discrimina-
tion.3:') Further, Warren rewarded the heretic and supremacist stance 
of the respondents by euphemizing segregationists' resistance to Brown 
as receptiveness: "The presentations also demonstrated that substantial 
steps to eliminate racial discrimination in public schools have already 
been taken, not only in some of the communities in which these cases 
arose, but in some of the states appearing as amici curiae, and in other 
states as well. "352 
Consistent with its "restraint" regarding Plessy and the segregation-
ist defiance in the Brown I record, the Brown II Court, finding no 
"racial malice," announced that the timetable for implementation of 
Brown I' s desegregation edict would be that of "all deliberate speed. "353 
Brown II's oxymoronic standard would predictably encourage South-
ern resistance and permit segregated schooling to continue.:154 The 
34~ The 1955 case to implement desegregation "'ith "all deliberate speed" is knOlIl1 as the 
"Brown If' decision. See Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown Il), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
349 KLUGER, supra note 1, at 731. 
3,,1) For example, the Chief Justice interrogated Emory Rogers representing South Carolina 
who declared his state's intention to evade the law: 
Chief Justice Warren: Is there any basis upon which we can assume that there will 
be an immediate attempt to comply ,,;th the decree of this Court? 
Rogers: Mr. Chief Justice, I would say that ,,'e would present our problem, as I 
understand it, if the decree is sent out-that we would present our problem to the 
District Court, and we are in the Fourth Circuit .... I feel "'e can expect the couns 
in the Fourth Circuit and the people of that district to work out something in 
accordance ,dth your decree. 
Chief Justice Warren: But you are not willing to say here that there would be an 
honest attempt to conform to this decree, if we did leave it to the District Court? 
Rogers: No, I am not. Let us get the word "honest" out of there. 
Chief Justice ''''arren: No, leave it in. 
Rogers: No, because I would have to tell you that right now ,,'e would not conform-
we would not send our white children to the Negro schools. 
Chief Justice ''\'arren: Thank you. 
KLUGER, supra note 1, at 732. According to Kluger, this exchange from Warren's view, "was close 
to heresy." Id. 
3!,>l Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299. 
352Id. 
353Id. at 301. 
354 On Southern resistance to desegregation, see inFa notes 365-71 and accompanying text; 
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burial of the past (and ongoing) operation of racial subordination 
rationalized the "all deliberate speed" guideline and transformed the 
already-compromised promise of equality in Brown 1 into the clear 
betrayal of Brown 11355 
Perhaps the Court's generosity toward Southern segregationists 
stemmed from the restoration of racial honor that seems to have 
occurred rather instantaneously. In Bolling v. Sharpe, decided the same 
day as Brown 1, the Chief Justice, writing for the Court, asserted that 
"[c]lassifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with par-
ticular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence con-
stitutionally suspect. "356 Warren's declaration of racial classifications as 
"contrary to our traditions" seems incongruous when Brown had just 
overturned Jim Crow's racial classifications that had survived over 50 
years of the Supreme Court's "scrutiny." What's more, Warren cites to 
Hirabayashi and Korematsu as precedent for Bollings special duty to 
see also Ross, Rhetorical Tapestly, supra note 343, at 26 (noting that "the implicit backdrop of white 
innocence [left intact in Brown l] made the delay in implementation intellectually and socially 
tolerable") . 
3:,5 Brown I declared one form of white supremacy--de jure segregation-to be unconstitu-
tional. 347 V.S. at 495. But this declaration did not set out to eliminate societal, de facto racial 
discrimination. See Harris, supra note 246, at 1753 (obsening that Brown I dismantled one form 
of whiteness as property-jim Crow schools-while allowing more subtle forms to reemerge by 
leaving intact the de jure/de facto discrimination distinction in the Equal Protection Clause). Thus, 
Brown ushered in the era of formal, but not substantive equality that saw the perpetuation of 
racial inequality. This shift did not much disturb white pri\ilege and supremacy, but merely 
transformed it into a more palatable postwar form, as discussed infra Part III.C.3. 
Looking beyond the realm of Black-white relations, we can see further evidence of ironic 
burial during the Wan-en Court era. As Professor joseph Singer has argued, no analysis of the 
\\'arren Court's racial jurisprudence would be complete without an examination of the cases 
involving Nati\-e Americans. See generall)', joseph Singer, in this issue, at 171. Sandwiched between 
BlOwn I and Brown II, the Court decided Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States in February, 1955. 
348 V.S. 272 (1955). By reading Tee-Hit-Ton, one may gauge the full meaning of Brown 1's promise 
of racial equality. In Tee-Hit-Ton, the Court found that a band of the Tlingit nation in Alaska had 
no aboriginal title to lands they had occupied "from time immemorial" as Congress did not 
recognize any treaty rights granting such title. Id. at 274, 277. In order to reach this conclusion, 
the Court misapplied internationally settled legal doctrines of discovery and conquest. Id. at 280, 
285, 289-90. 
The Court made clear, however, that "[g]enerous provision has been willingly made to allow 
tribes to recover for wrongs, as a matter of grace, not because of legal liability." Id. at 281. Its 
opinion did not "uphold harshness as against tenderness toward the Indians, but leaves with 
Congress, where it belongs, the policy of Indian gratuities for termination of Indian occupancy 
of Government-owned land, rather than making compensation for its value a rigid constitutional 
principle." Id. at 291. 
Notwithstanding the "march to enlightenment" modernist character of emerging judicial 
doctrines of Brown, the Court is caught in a perfonnative contradiction even as it announces its 
new redemptive tenets of law. Tee-Hit-Ton amply demonstrates how the Wan-en Court was willing 
and able to maintain and transform the legal workings of white supremacy post-Brown. 
3:'(;347 V.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
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scrutinize racial classifications, implying cO'unter-factually that those 
cases had actually involved some kind of meaningful scrutiny.357 
The internment cases are similarly deployed in Loving v. Virginia, 
another unanimous Warren opinion.35R Again, Warren buries the sig-
nificance of the internment precedents~59 as he uses them to script the 
reconstruction of the Court's racial reputation: 
Over the years, this Court has repudiated "(d)istinctions be-
tween citizens solely because of their ancestry" as being "odi-
ous to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the 
doctrine of equality." Hira&yashi v. United States (citation omit-
ted). At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands 
that racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal stat-
utes, be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny" Korematsu v. 
United States (citation omitted) .... 360 
Applying relatively heightened judicial review of racial classifica-
tions, though, does distinguish the Warren Court from its openly 
complicit predecessors. The development of strict scrutiny analysis 
was used by the postwar judiciary to attack segregation-era forms 
of de jure racial discrimination. But by invoking a separate, seem-
ingly more rigorous process for race cases, the Warren and postwar 
Courts restored the judiciary'S "clean slate" on racial matters in a 
manner that both repudiated and buried the sins of the past. 
3. Transformation: Restoring Whiteness through Post-Civil Rights 
Doctrines of Supremacy 
My father came to this country when he was a teenager. Not only 
had he never profited from the sweat of any black man's brow, I 
don't think he had ever seen a black man . ... [T]o compare [his] 
racial debt . . . with that of those who plied the slave trade, and 
who maintained a formal caste system for many years thereafter, is 
to confuse a mountain with a molehill. 361 
357 See id. at 499 n.3. 
~58388 U.S. at 11 (1967). 
359 See Dean Masaru Hashimoto, The Legac)" of Korematsll v. United States: A Dangerolls 
Narrative Retold, 4 UCLA As. PAC. AM. LJ. 72 (1996). Professor Hashimoto refers to this facial 
use of internment cases as demanding a "strict scrutiny standard" in Loving v. l'irginia as 
"hyperbole" since the COllrt clearly did not adopt a "most rigid scrutiny" in either Hiraba)'ashi or 
Korematsu. 
360 Loving, 388 U.S. at II. 
361 Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Curl': ''In O,der to Get B!,)'ond Racism, He ,HlISt First Take 
Account of Race, " 1979 WASH. U. L.Q.147, 152 (1979). 
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This section explores the ways in which the earlier jurisprudence 
of the Brown era leads to the later transformation of white supremacy 
that occurs during the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. The most impor-
tant linkage involves the restoration of innocent whiteness,3li2 which 
underwrites such neoconservative judicial standbys as the permuted 
strict scrutiny standard of review as a judicial device for protecting 
majority interests,~li~l the rejection of societal or systemic discrimination 
as a basis for affirmative action,:l'H and the rhetoric of colorblindness. 
I will sketch briefly the historical understanding of post-Brown racial 
jurisprudence that is underwritten by the theory of racial redemption 
I am developing in this Article. 
The Warren Court rejected and sought to bury the dominant 
racial paradigm of biological determinism and its related practice of 
de jure segregation, and, in doing so, inaugurated the process of insti-
tutional racial redemption. The Court was frustrated in this endeavor, 
however, by concerted efforts of Southern segregationists to evade 
compliance with Brown. 3G5 The initial refusal of the South, and later 
the North, to transition to a kinder, gentler form of racial subordina-
tion under Brown's new principles meant that the hegemonic "preser-
vation-through-transformation":l66 project of the civil rights era would 
be delayed. The Southern Manifesto,367 the Parker doctrine,3li8 "pupil 
:lG~ See infra notes 408-15 and accompanying text. 
3(;3 See infra notes 389-96 and accompanying text. 
36. See infra notes 397-407 and accompanying text. 
:Ju5 C. Vann Woodward recorded 106 tactics southern states used to evade the Brown decision. 
See C. \~O\NN WOqDWARD, THE STRANGE C.-\'REER OF JIM CROW 162 (1974). Due to this resistance, 
only 1.2% of African American children attended desegregated southern schools ten years after 
Brown I was decided. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 52 (1991). 
:lUG See Siegel, "The Rule of Love, " supra note 256, at 2178-87. 
36; Issued in the spring of 1956, the Southern Manifesto declared the Brown decision to be 
"a clear abuse of judicial power" that substituted the Justices' "personal political and social ideas 
for the established law of the land." Accordingly, 10 1 Congressmen from the eleven states 
comprising the old Confederacy pledged "to use all lawful means to bring about a reversal of this 
decision which is contrary to the Constitution." KLUGER, supra note 1, at 752. 
3li~ On remand from the Supreme Court following Brown, the Eastern District Court of South 
Carolina, in a panel induding Judge John Parker, set the standard for judicial evash'eness of the 
Brown edict in Briggs v. Elliott, declaring in a per curium opinion that the Constitution "does not 
require integration," but "merely forbids discrimination." 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) 
(claiming that Browl! "does not forbid such segregation as occurs as the t'esult of voluntary action. 
It merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce segregation"). This form of judicial 
resistance inspired many other southern judges and courts to defy Brown and became known as 
the "Parker doctrine." On the "Parker Doctrine," see \<\'allace D. Loh, In Quest of Brown's Promise: 
Social Research and Social '{dues in School Desegregation, (reviewing ELEANOR WOLF, TRIAL AND 
ERROR: THE DETROIT SCHOOL SEGREGATION (1981»,58 WASH. L. REv. 129, 135 (1982) (arguing 
that the Parker Doctrine served as a legal justification for tokenism: "this so-called Parker 
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placement" programs,369 "freedom-of-choice" plans3io and other tac-
tics371 demonstrated the ingenuity of those intent on preserving white 
supremacy's old forms and habits. Accordingly, it was the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts that completed the redemptive process initiated in 
the Warren era, in part by limiting the reach of Brown and its progeny 
to de jure and apartheid-like forms of discrimination.3i2 Discriminating 
actors and institutions eventually shifted away from these repudiated 
overt social and legislative forms of racial subjugation, initiating the 
post-Brown transformation of white supremacy. 
Despite fears that it would "turn back the clock" on Warren Court 
gains, the Burger Court,3i3 perhaps still vaguely haunted by judicial 
complicity with white supremacy, tread carefully around established 
precedent. In fact, early Burger Court decisions in Swann,3i4 Keyes 3i5 
Doctrine-that integration and desegregation are descriptive of two different concepts-served 
to deflect the mandate of Brown short of outright defiance"); Craig Leonard Jackson, Herbert 
High School and the Brown After1llath-Good Intentions and TlVubled PoliC)', 21 T. MARSHALL L. 
REv. 45,77 (1996) (characterizing the Parker Doctrine as a means to evade the BlVlIIl1 decision). 
369 Pupil placement programs were facially neutral but "strongly segregath'e in practice" and 
therefore amounted to stalling tactics permitted by the Warren Court. Kluger explains that such 
plans were abided because they offered the South a bad faith delay and the Court cursory 
compliance of its order. See KLUGER, supra note 1, at 752 (commenting that "[tJokenism was the 
order of the times, and just enough of it sened to insulate most of the South from the Court's 
wrath."). 
370 Also known as "local option" or "open enrollment" plans, these tactics purported to offer 
students "freedom of choice" in selecting their schools, regardless of residence. Under such 
desegregation schemes, few African Americans "chose" to send their children to previously 
all-white schools due to the threat of"iolence orjob loss. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Chief 
Judge Haynsworth acknowledged the lack of "freedom" in such a plan: 
There followed ... numerous acts of "iolence and threats directed against Negro 
members of the community, particularly those requesting transfers of their children 
into formerly all-white schools. Shots were fired into houses, oil was poured into 
wells, and some of the Negro leaders were subjected to a barrage of threatening 
telephone calls. Violence was widely reported in the local press, and an implicit 
threat was carried home to everyone by publication of the names of Negro appli-
cants for transfer. 
Coppedge v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 394 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1968), eXceltJted in DERRICK 
BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 554 (1992) [hereinafter, BELL, RACE, R~CISMJ. 
The Supreme Court disapprO\'ed of such plans for desegregation in GI't!en 11. Count)' School 
Board of New Kent County. 391 U.S. 430, 440 (1968) (holding that "in desegregating a dual system 
a plan utilizing freedom of choice is not an end in itself'). 
371 For a fuller description of the various modes of southern resistance to desegregation, see 
BELL, RACE, RACISM, supra note 370, at 547-51. 
372 See infra notes 380-415 and accompanying text. 
373 The Burger Court lasted from 1969 to 1986. 
374 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I (1971) (upholding busing as a 
means to achieve school desegregation in a district with a history of de jure segregation). 
375Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, Delwer, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (upholding busing as a 
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and Griggs 376 expanded civil rights gains. These decisions gave civil 
rights advocates hope that not only would racial progress continue, but 
also that legal remediation would take on a deeper understanding 
of discrimination-one that transcended the Myrdalian pr~judice 
model.3i7 For a brief period from 1969-73, the Court favored a more 
systemic understanding of racial oppression that acknowledged the 
impact of societal discrimination and the state's obligation to rem-
d 378 e y. 
This shift reflected the political tenor of the times, as the tactics 
of the civil rights movement changed from non-violent protest and 
integration to "Black Power" and Black nationalism.379 Once these 
movements reached their zenith in the early 1970s, the Court aban-
doned its flirtation with the "institutionalized racism" model of racial 
inequality and reverted back to Myrdal in Milliken v. Bradley in 1974,380 
remedy for de facto segregation and finding that an intent to segregate provided an inference 
that de jure segregation is system-wide). . 
376Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (establishing disparate impact form of 
employment discrimination to challenge facially neutral employment practices that have an 
adverse impact on protected groups under Title VII). 
3ii On the Myrdalian prejudice model, see supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text. For 
an example of such a transcendence, see Montoya, supra note 248, at 896-907 (analyzing how 
the current Court's conceptualization of affirmative action reflects the prejudice model, while 
Professor Butler's proposals for the criminal justice system reflect the white supremacy model). 
378 Alan Freeman refers to this period as within the "era of contradiction" in which federal 
courts manifest a simultaneous operation of a perpetrator perspective indifferent to results, and 
a victim perspecth'e emphasizing "consequences" rather than "motivation." Alan Freeman, An-
tidisClimillation Law from 1954 to 1989: Uncertainty, Contradiction, Rationalization, Denia~ in THE 
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 293-97 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) [hereinafter 
AntidisClimination Law]. 
379 For this shift's histOlical context and a description of Black Powel; Black nationalism and 
Black radicalism and their distinctions from civil rights and intergrationism, see MICHAEL 
GOLDFIELD, THE COLOR OF POLITICS: RACE AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 292 
(1997) (identifYing the radicalized Black organizations dh'erging from the civil rights movement 
as including "The Black Panther Party, the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, the African 
National People's Congress, the Revolutionary Action Movement, and large numbers of groups 
loosely affiliated with the African Liberation Support Committee"); MANNING MARABLE, RACE, 
REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945-1990, at 
86-148 (1991) (chronicling the eras of Black Power and Black Rebellion in the late-1960s to the 
mid-1970s); Gary Peller, Race-Consciousness, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY, KEy WRITINGS THAT 
FORMED THE MOVEMENT 127, 135-38, 145-50 (Kimberh~ Crenshaw et at. eds., 1995) (sunumu'izing 
the Black Nationalist critique of integration ism and providing the historical context for the rise 
of Black Nationalism). For an original text on Black Power, see generally KWAME TOURE (formerly 
knmm as Stokely Carmichael) & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIB-
ERATION IN AMERICA (1967). For Ol-iginal documents from the Black Power (Student Non-Violent 
Coordinating Committee) and Black Panther Party, see generally CHARLES V. HAMILTON, THE 
BLACK EXPERIE!,;CE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 191-243 (1973). 
3~(J AIWikel! l, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that an interdistrict busing remedy between 
Detroit and suburban areas could not be ordered absent proof that each district affected has 
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Washington v. Davis in 1976,381 and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housingin 1977.382 Through these cases, the Court ushered in ajuris-
prudence that imposed on plaintiffs strict requirements for proving 
causation and intent.383 The Burger Court would begin, and the Rehn-
quist Court would continue, to apply principles that restricted racial 
remedies as they redeemed whiteness. 384 
By the time William Rehnquist was installed as Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court in 1986, the Reagan administration had redefined the 
most compelling civil rights violations as those resulting from affinna-
tive action policies that discriminated against innocent white victims.3R5 
Consistent with this redefinition, the Court narrowed the acceptable 
range of race-conscious remedial efforts, shrewdly seizing upon earlier 
Warren-era discourse. This narrowing, effected through use of three 
mechanisms, began with Wygant 386 and continued through Adarand38i 
(and its Fifth Circuit cousin Hopwood) .388 These three mechanisms were 
the doctrine of strict scrutiny, the distinction between "identifiable" 
versus societal discrimination and an a priori principle of colorblind-
ness. In using these three facially-neutral mechanisms that privileged 
been a substantial cause of interdistrict segregation or that district lines haye been intentionally 
drawn on the basis of race). 
381 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring a shmdng of discriminatory intent for facially-neutral 
governmental actions regarding employment that ha"e a racially disparate impact under an equal 
protection claim). 
382 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (requiring a showing of discriminatory intent for facially-neutral 
governmental action regarding zoning that has a racially disparate impact under an equal 
protection claim). 
383 See Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 378, at 297-300 (explaining early Burger 
cases requiring intent and causation as reflective of the individualized "perpetrator" approach to 
antidiscrimination law). 
384 See infi'{l notes 385-415 and accompanying text. 
385 See OMI & WINANT, supra note lO, at 135 (analyzing how "under the guise of creating a 
truly colOl~blind society, [Reagan] administration officials sought to define and eliminate the new 
racism against whites); THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL ,,;th MARY EDSALL, CHAIN REACTIOX: THE IMPACT 
OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 187 (1992) (chronicling the Reagan assault 
on civil rights as reward to lower-income white citizens who ,"oted Republican). 
3R6Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1985) (stating that "societal discrimi-
nation, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy .... No 
one doubts that there has been serious racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for 
imposing discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people, societal discrimination 
is insufficient and over-expansh·e"). 
387 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. Y. Pen a, 515 U.S. 200, 218-27 (1995) (stating that Court's 
cases from Baklle to Croson lead to the conclusion that a person has the right to demand that all 
government racial classifications subjecting a person to unequal treatment be justified under the 
strictest scrutiny). 
388 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (announcing that "we agree with the 
plaintiffs that any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of achie,;ng 
a diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
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white interests at the expense of people of color, courts relied on the 
figure of innocent whiteness as the ultima ratio of racial constitution-
alism, while they discursively constituted that innocence through a 
process of reiteration. The result has been the unique post-civil rights 
era form of redeemed whiteness. 
Whereas strict scrutiny was initially used by the Warren Court as 
a means to ferret out invidious intent, the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts deploy strict scrutiny in favor of whites by expanding racially-
suspect classes to include racial classifications generally.389 This move 
was closely connected to the redemption of whiteness. Once whites 
could be cast as innocent victims of affirmative action policies,3(lO in-
creased judicial protection of white people's interests through height-
ened judicial review could be pursued audaciously.391 
The identifiable versus societal discrimination doctrine,392 which 
asserts that institutionalized racism (practiced primarily against people 
3~9Adarand Constructors. Inc. v. Pena, 313 U.S. 200, 223-37 (1995) (holding that all racial 
classifications, whether imposed by federal, state, or local governments, must be analyzed by a 
redewing court under strict scrutiny and refusing to distinguish between classifications promoting 
racial caste and those attempting to eliminate it); City of Richmond v.j.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 
469, 493 (1989) (concluding that strict scrutiny is warranted for benign racial classifications 
because "there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and 
what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial 
politics"); see also Adarand, 513 U.S. at 243 (Ste\'ens, j., dissenting) (criticizing the majority'S 
inability to discern "between a No Trespassing sign and a welcome mat"). Justice Stevens elabo-
rated on the im'idious/benign distinction: "Invidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, 
subjugating a disfavored group to enhance or maintain the power of the majority. Remedial 
race-based preferences reflect the opposite impulse: A desire to foster equality in society." Id. at 
243. 
For a critique of the application of strict scrutiny review to affirmative action, see generally 
Neil Gotanda, A Ctitique of "Our Constitution is Colo/eBlind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1,46--68 (1991); 
Michael L. Manuel, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Is St/ict Scrutiny Fatal in Fact fm' Govern-
mental Affirmative Action Programs? 31 NEW ENG. L. REv. 973 (1997); Cedric Merlin Powell, 
Blinded By Color: The Ne-w Equal Protection, The Second Deconstruction, and Affirmative Inaction, 
51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 191, 260-71 (1997); Michael Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative 
Action and the Elusive 1Vfeaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729 (1989); Jed 
Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE LJ. 427 (1997); Leland Ware, A Remedy for the ''Extreme 
Case:" The Stat1lS of Affirmative Action After Croson, 35 Mo. L. REv. 631 (1990); Leland Ware, 
Tales from the C/)'Pt: Does Strict Scrutiny Sound the Death Knell for Affirmative Action in Higher 
Education? 23 j.C. & U.L. 43 (1996). 
391) See McLaughlin v. Florida, 370 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (holding the most rigid scrutiny to 
be appropriate for racial classifications that are constitutionally suspect); Laving, 388 U.S. at 11 
(requiring a showing of compelling governmental interest to uphold racial classifications). 
391 For the inscription of innocent white \'ictimhood in affirmative action cases prompting 
heightened scrutiny, see infra notes 401 & 407 and accompanying text. 
:19~Writing for the Croson majority, Justice O'Connor described the finding for \Vendy Wy-
gant, a white ,\"Oman in 1l}'fSant lI. Jackson BOald of Education: 'Justice Powell, writing for the 
plurality, again drew the distinction between 'societal discrimination' which is an inadequate basis 
for race-conscious classifications, and the type of identified disC/imination that can support and 
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of color) is not legally remediable, does not per se deny the existence 
of racism.393 It merely holds injuries of the deeply-rooted systemic sort 
to be "too amorphous"394 to be countenanced legally.393 Without an 
actual wrongdoer (individually, whites are innocent), the recognition 
of societal discrimination is without legal consequence, displaced ana-
lytically by the "faced" figures of innocent white individuals. 
Like the vagaries of the marketplace, societal discrimination is 
beyond constitutional logic and legal sanction. It is just another cost 
of doing business in America. Instead, only non-structural, "identi-
fiable" i~uries (especially those of whites in affirmative action cases) 
are deemed "intrusive" enough to warrant legal redress and judicial 
favor. 396 Here the repudiatory and burial stages combine with the figure 
of white innocence to effect the crucial transformational binarism of 
societal versus identifiable discrimination. 
While the Warren Court embraced the concept of colorblindness 
as a repudiatory principle with which to battle color-conscious segre-
gationist legal regimes,397 subsequent courts ha\'e used Brown's strategic 
define the scope of race-based relief." Croson, 488 U.S. at 49i (discussing Il)gallf) (emphasis 
added). 
393 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 499 (admitting that "there is no doubt that the SOIT\' history of 
both private and public discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities 
for black entrepreneurs"); Wygant, 4i6 U.S. at 278 n.3. 
394 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 496-97 (discussing Baillie) (noting that 'Justice POI"ell contrasted 
the focused goal of remedying wrongs \\'Orked by specific instances of racial discrimination with 
'the remedying of the effects of societal discrimination,' an amorphous concept of i1tiury that 
may be ageless in its reach into the pas!."). The Court also stated that "[a] generalized assertion 
that there has been past discrimination in an entire industry prm'ides no guidance for a legislatiye 
body to determine the precise scope of the i1tiury it seeks to remedy." Id. at 498. Croson continues: 
"Congress has made national findings that there has been societal discrimination in a host of 
fields. If all a state or local government need do is find a congressional report on the subject to 
enact a set-aside program, the constraints of the Equal Protection Clause will, in effect, haye been 
rendered a nullity. Id. at 504; see also H)gant, 476 U.S. at 276. 
395 See supra note 386 (discussing n)gant); see also CroSOIl, 488 U.S. at 499 (admitting that 
"[w] hile there is no doubt that the sorry history of both priyate and public discrimination in this 
country had contributed to a lack of opportunities for black entreprenaurs, this obsen-ation, 
standing alone, cannot justifY a rigid racial quota in the awarding of public contracts in Rich-
mond, Virginia"); Croson, 488 U.S. at 503 (concluding that "[t]o accept Richmond's claim that 
past societal discrimination alone can serye as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to 
open the door to competing claims for remedial relief for eyerr disadyantaged group"); H;gant, 
476 U.S. at 274 (stating that "[tlhis Court has neyer held that societal discrimination alone is 
sufficient to justifY a racial classification). 
396 See H)gant, 476 U.S. at 283 (determining that layoffs impose the entire burden of 
achieving racial equality on particular indiyiduals, often resulting in serious disruption of their 
lives, imposing a burden that is "too in trusiYe") ; id. at 283 (after finding that affirmati\'e action 
layoffs are too in trusive to "particular indiyiduals," the Court im'alidated the plan under the 
"narrow tailoring" prong of strict scrutiny, "as the means to accomplish eyen a yalid purpose 
cannot satisfY the demands of the Equal Protection Clause"). See id. 
397 Brown s "central lesson" became the mantra of colorblindness. The BlOwn decision does 
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colorblind stance to transform repudiated/buried white privilege into 
a viable post-civil rights regime. 398 The Rehnquist Court hypothesized 
that the Fourteenth Amendment created colorblind "personal rights," 
as opposed to race-conscious group rights. 399 Because affirmative action 
policies were race-based remedies that relied on group-based racial 
classifications, the Rehnquist Court concluded that they violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment's edict of colorblind, individualized equal 
protection established through Brown. 
Moreover, the Court's colorblind interpretation of white suprem-
acy's victims and beneficiaries transformed the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's understanding of equality from an "anticaste principle" to an 
"antidifferentiation principle."40o Once affirmative action was shown to 
burden whites, the colorblind Court used strict scrutiny to protect 
them from the invidious intent of affirmative action-to reverse the 
effects of white privilege by treating its victims "differentially. "401 
not announce a clear constitutional principle embracing colorblindness, though some have 
argued that the per curiam decisions following Brown compels such a reading. See Andreas Auer, 
Public School Desegregation and the Color-Blind Constitution, 27 Sw. LJ. 454, 4:;8-9 (1973); Charles 
Lawrence, The Big Lie: Colorblindness and the Taboo Against Honest Talk About Race, in WE WON'T 
Go BACK: ~IAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 67 (Charles Lawrence & Mad Matsuda 
eds., 1997); Wechsler, supra note 54, at 32. But see Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": 
H7lite Race Consciousness and the Retirement ofDisCliminatotJ Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 1007-08 
(1993) (detailing contemporary commentators on Brown who failed to find a colorblind ness 
rationale). In Browl! I, the problem was segregation's sorting of school-age children "solely on 
the basis of race." Brown I, 347 U.S. at 488, 493, 494 (discussing segregation's dictates that deny 
admission of Negro children "according to race," "solely on the basis of race," and "solely because 
of race," respectiyely). Accordingly, the remedy devised in Brown II called for school districts "to 
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis." Brown II, 
349 U.S. at 300-01 (emphasis added). 
398 See infra notes 399-415 and accompanying text. 
399This liberal-indiyidualist understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment considers any 
race-based classification to be immediately suspect, effectively inhibiting the implementation of 
class-wide relief for race-based injuries. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (maintaining that "[a]s this 
Court has noted in the past, the rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment 
are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights.") 
(quoting Shelley Y. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,22 (1948». Croson continues: "To whatever racial group 
these [white] citizens belong, their "personal rights" to be treated with equal dignity and respect 
are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of public decision-
making." lei.; see also Adarand Constructors y. Peiia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (arguing the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment principles "protect persons, not groups," and require that "all 
goyernmental action based on race-a group classification long recognized as in most circum-
stances inelevant and therefore prohibited-should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to 
ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed") (citation 
omitted). 
400 Adaranei, 515 U.S at 227 (declaring that racial classifications are suspect "irrespective of 
the race of the burdened or benefited group"); see also Powell, supra note 389, at 228 (arguing 
that at some stage in the twentieth century, the legal understanding of constitutional equality 
shifted dramatically from an anticaste principle into an antidifferentiation principle). 
401 See ~~)'gant, 476 U.S. at 273 (stating that: "[t]he Court has recognized that the leyel of 
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In these ways, the now sacred altar of colorblindness has become 
an important discursive site in the transformation and extension of 
white supremacy in the post-Brown era, even as it represents an ideo-
logical grave marker to the earlier forms of white supremacy and judi-
cial complicity.402 As Professor John Morrison has observed, white in-
sistence on non-race consciousness amounts to white denial of racial 
guilt. 403 If Euro-Americans do not acknowledge race, then they cannot 
be guilty of racial subordination.404 Similarly, Professor Gary Peller has 
argued that colorblindness was the ideological flipside of "a more 
diffuse and widespread cultural avoidance that seemed to include 
measures of guilt, desires for atonement, and needs for absolution. "405 
scrutiny does not change merely because the challenged classification operates against a group 
that historically has not been subject to governmental discrimination .... In this case, Article XII 
of the CBA operates against whites and in favor of certain minorities"); Fullilm'e v. K1utznick, 448 
U.S. 448, 491 (1980) (declaring that "[a]ny preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must 
necessarily receive a most searching examination to make sure that it does not conflict with 
constitutional guarantees"); Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96 (arguing that "[i]n this case, blacks 
constitute approximately 50% of the population of the city of Richmond. Fh'e of the nine seats 
on the city council are held by blacks. The concern that a political majority "'ill more easily act 
to the disadvantage of a minority based on ull\\'arranted assumptions or incomplete facts ,,'ould 
seem to militate for, not against, the application of heightened judicial scnttiny in this case"); 
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (holding that "all racial classifications, imposed by whate\'er federal, 
state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a revie"'ing court under strict scrutiny"). 
As Professor Derrick Bell succinctly summarized, contemporary civil rights doctrines of strict 
scrutiny and colorblindness have operated together to protect ",hites as the "discrete and insular 
minority": 
1) Because most policies challenged by blacks as discriminatory make no mention 
of race, blacks can no longer evoke the strict scrutiny shield in absence of proof of 
intentional discrimination-at which point, strict scrutiny is hardly needed. 
2) \"11ites challenging racial remedies that usually contain racial classifications 
are now deemed entitled to strict scrutiny ,,'ithout any distinction bel\\'een policies 
of invidious intent and those with remedial purposes. Thus, for equal protection 
purposes, whites have become the "discrete and insular minority." 
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., California's Proposition 209: A Temporal)' Diversioll on the Road to Disaster, 30 
Loy. LA L. REI'. 1447, 1458 (1997). 
402 See supra notes 397-401 and accompam'ing text. On the role of "colorblindness" to ,,'hite 
supremacy in the post-Brown era, see generally BRYAN K. FAIR, NOTES OF A RACIAL CASTE BABY: 
COLOR BLINDNESS AND THE END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 67-113 (1997); Flagg, supra note 397, 
at 953; Gotanda, supra note 389; David Kairys, Unexj)lainabie on Grounds Other than Rare, 45 AI-I. 
U. L. REv. 729, 737, 748-49 (1996); Amy L. Knickmeier, Blind Leading the "Colorblind": The 
Evisaration of Affirmative Action and a Dream Still Deferred, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 305 (1997); 
Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 
29 STAN. L. REv. 317, 349-55 (1987) [hereinafter The 1d]; John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, 
Individuality, and Merit: An Anal)'sis of the Rhetoric Against Affirmative Action, 79 10ll'A L. REI'. 
313,316-24 (1994); Powell, supra note 389; Herbert O. Reid, Sr., Assault 011 Affinllatille Action: 
The Delusion of a Color-Blind America, 23 HoII'. LJ. 381, 427 (1980); David Strauss, the Myth of 
Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REI'. 99. 
40~MolTison, supra note 402, at 340 (claiming that "[a]t the heart of colorblindness lies 
Euro-American's racial guilt"). 
404Id. 
405 Peller, Race Consciousness, supra note 379, at 842. 
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The historicity of colorblindness as a response to the group-based 
biological determinism of the segregation era actually places it in close 
epistemological proximity to scientific racisms that view people of color 
as inherently inferior. In Hegelian terms, the "sublation" of Brown 
colorblindness that occurs through the dialectic it forms with biologis-
tic racism, which destroys/preserves (Aujhebung) aspects of both, con-
ditions the meaning and politics of neoconservative colorblindness.406 
In short, the ideology of colorblindness remains forever bound up with 
biologically deterministic forms of white supremacy. 
The increasing dominance of colorblind morality in racial juris-
prudence today suggests that we have circled back to Brown through 
a dehistoricized 1950s' understanding ofracial inequality as individual 
"prejudice." This superficial and incomplete understanding of racial 
subordination, pried from its original context, is sufficiently locked-in 
to prevent dialogue about a more systemic approach to oppression. 
Instead, colorblindness draws on a strategic pre-civil rights discourse 
of resistance to provide the Court with a mantra, cited and recited in 
the judicial attack on racial remedies.41J7 Accordingly, the Brown-era's 
repudiatory proclamations of racial equality and burial of historic and 
ongoing racial injuries have become crucial to the effective transfor-
mation of white supremacy during the post-Warren Court era. 
In its late-redemption stage, the Court is able to reintegrate white-
ness into its moral canon. This reintegration can be traced through 
references to white innocents in affirmative action cases. 41J8 Beginning 
-lOG GEORG W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT' 261 (T.M. Knox trans., 1952) (1821). 
-l07 See Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 378, at 288 (criticizing antidiscrimination 
law's failure to offer a racial remedy unless there are "identifiable perpetrators who have purposely 
and intentionally caused harm to identifiable victims"); Lawrence, The ld, supra note 402, 325-26 
(arguing that the intent requirement in antidiscrimination cases assigns individualized fault for 
racial discrimination and creates a class of white innocents who feel "resistance to and resentment 
of affirmative action programs and other race-conscious remedies for past and continuing dis-
crimination"); Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial DisClimination Thmugh Antidiscrimination Law: 
A C,itical Revie-w of Supreme Court Doctlille, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1055 (1978) ("The fault 
concept ... creates a class of 'innocents' who need not feel any personal responsibility fot, the 
conditions associated with discrimination, and who therefore feel great resentment when called 
upon to bear any burdens in connection with remedying violations"); see also supra Part III.C.I-2. 
-lU8 See, e.g., Baklie, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (plurality opinion) (pointing out the inequity 
of "forcing innocent persons" to "bear the burdens of redressing grie\'ances not of their making"); 
Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448, 514 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that racial remedies should 
not be apprm'ed on the basis of societal discrimination without consideration to the concept's 
mer-expansive impact on "innocent people"); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 Oustice Powell, joined by 
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Burger) (expressing his concern about "legal 
remedies that work against innocent people"); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 
609 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (articulating concern over impact of affirmative action 
program to "persons denied an opportunity Or right based on race"); United States v. Paradise, 
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with Bakke in 1976, we see Justice Powell lamenting the dangers ofaffir-
mative action policies which amount to "forcing innocent persons ... 
to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making."409 
In Fullilove, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, upheld the 
federal affirmative action plan in large part because innocent whites 
were not impermissibly burdened.4lfI Wygant epitomizes the Court's 
obsession with white innocence. Professor Ross points out that the 
Wygant Court characterizes whites as "innocent" no less than five times 
in two paragraphs.4l1 Such a rhetoric of innocence continued injustice 
Stevens' concurrence in City of Richmond v. Croson which warned that 
"the disadvantaged class of white contractors presumably includes ... 
480 V.S. 149, 197 (1987) (O'Connor j., dissenting) (noting that [e]ven more flexible 'goals,' 
however, also may trammel unnecessarily the rights of non minorities") ; Paradise, 480 V.S. at 193 
(Stevens, j., concurring) (referring to "innocent ,'ktims" of affirmative action). 
For an exploration of the narrath'e of "innocent whites" in affirmative action cases, see 
generally Ansley, supra note 248, at 1005-23; Robert Belton, Reflections on Affirmatil/e Action After 
Paradiseandjohnson, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 115, 122-24 (1988); Da\'id Chang, DiscriminatOl), 
Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent Victims: judicial Conservatism or Consel'lIative justices? 91 
COLUM. L. REv. 790, 790-93 (1991); Deborah E. Klein, Wygant ". Jackson Board of Education: 
Affirmative Action and the Innocent Party, 18 V. TOL. L. REv. 519, 53~1 (1987); Syh'ia R. Lazos 
Vargas, Deconstrtlcting Homo{geneous] Americans: The R7lite Ethnic Immigrant Narrative and its 
Exclusionary Effect, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1493, 1539-43 (1998); Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative 
Action, 43 VAND. L. REv. 297 (1990) [hereinafter Innocence]; Ross, Rhetorical Tapestr)~ supra note 
343; Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. RE,'. 381 (1989); Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78,84-96 (1986); 
Frederick A. Morton, Jr., Note, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Another Illustration of Aml'17ca 
Denying the Impact of Rnce, 45 RUTGERS L. RE\,. 1089, 1132-36 (1993). For a ,'elated discussion 
on the "rights of whites" embodied in the Supreme Court's 1989 decisions, see Linda S. Greene, 
Rnce in the 21st Century: Equality Through Law? 64 TuL. L. RE,'. 1515, 1533-38 (1990). 
409 Bakke, 438 V.S. at 298. 
410 Fullilove, 448 V.S. at 484 (upholding a federal affirmative action plan in gO\'ernmental 
contracting because the innocent parties are not found to be impermissibly burdened). 
4ll Ross, Innocence, supra note 408, at 297 n.21. Justice Powell states in "')gant 
We have recognized, however, that in order to remedy the effects of prior discrimi-
nation, it may be necessary to take race into account. As part of this Nation's 
dedication to eradicating racial discrimination, innocent persons may be called upon 
to bear some of the burden of the remedy. "'\11en effectuating a limited and 
properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination, such a "sharing 
of the burden" by innocent parties is not impermissible. We have previously ex-
pressed concern over the burden that a preferen tial-Iayoffs scheme imposes on 
innocent parties. In cases involving valid hiring goals, the burden to be borne by 
innocent individuals is diffused to a considerable extent among society generally. 
Though hiring goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do not 
impose the same kind of i,~ury that layoffs impose. Denial of a future employment 
opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an existing job. 
Id. (quoting Wygant, 476 V.S. at 280-83 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted) 
(quoting Fullilove v. K1utznick, 448 V.S. 448, 484 (1980)). 
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some who have never discriminated against anyone on the basis of 
race."H~ 
From Bakke, the first major affirmative action case decided in 
1978, through Croson in 1989, the Supreme Court consistently hy-
pothesized and ultimately asserted the innocence of whiteness, thereby 
privileging perceived infringements against innocent whites over racial 
iI~uries to people of color and distorting the historical record of power 
relations between dominant whites and people of color. However, by 
the time Adamnd was decided in 1995, the Court no longer had to 
make such express assertions.m The Adamnd Court conspicuously 
avoids any mention of "innocence" in its majority and concurring 
opinions. Instead, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, empha-
sizes a new triad of constitutional principles to be applied to racial 
remediation-"skepticism," "consistency" and "congruence."m Notice-
ably, none of the principles in this triad has as its immediate historical 
referent the pre-Brown or Brown-era problematic of whiteness as en-
cumbered by white supremacy.415 White innocence is now naturalized; 
it is the Court's default assumption, signaling that whiteness has been 
restored to its fullest value through the successful completion of the 
racial project of redemption begun in Brown. 
IV. RACIAL REDEMPTION AS SOCIOLEGAL-RACE CRITICAL THEORY 
The theory of racial redemption presented in this Article uses a 
form of psycho-biographic historiography to understand the link be-
tween societal racial formation and the racial jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court. In doing so, three levels of analysis are brought to-
gether-the individual, the social and the judicial-institutional-in a 
way that requires further theoretical elaboration. What model suf-
ficiently explains how these three levels interrelate in order to ground 
the argument mounted in this article? To answer this question, I turn 
to the sociopolitical work of Michael Omi and Howard Winant who 
have developed a theory of racial formation in American society. 
·m Croson, 488 U.S. at 516; see also Ross, Innocence, supra note 308, at 306 (discussing Stevens' 
concurrence in Croson within the context of the rhetoric of white innocence). 
413 See generall)' Adaralld, 515 U.S. at 223-24 (grounding decision instead on the "general 
propositions" of "skepticism," "consistency" and "congruence"). 
414Id. 
41:, Id. For a race-based critique of these seemingly neutral principles, see Kairys, supra note 
402 (pointing out various examples of the Conrt's inconsistency in applying its skpeticism toward 
measnres disadvantaging whites as opposed to people of color or women). 
December 1998] 19 B.G. THIRD WORLD LAWjOCRXAL 73 155 
As applied to my work on Warren, the 'Court and racial redemp-
tion, racial formation theory helps explain the ways in which the 
different levels of analysis presented here may be linked. In particular, 
I have borrowed three conceptual tools from Omi and Winant's theory 
of racial formation: the racial project,41G the racial state417 and the 
concept of race-historical trajectort1R to ground this particular race 
critical-sociolegal analysis. While I do not claim a "perfect fit" between 
racial formation theory (sociopolitical in nature) and my theory of 
racial redemption (race critical-sociolegal in nature), Omi and Wi-
nant's work elaborates specific types of mechanisms and processes that 
may encompass a psycho-social race jurisprudential construct such as 
that suggested in racial redemption theory. 
A. Redemption as Racial Project 
In seeking to explain the unique role of race in American society 
and politics, Omi and Winant develop a theory of racial formation, 
defined generally as "the sociohistorical process by which racial cate-
gories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed."419 This de-
finition reflects the basic understanding of race and racial formation 
as products of social, cultural and political pr9cesses. Racial formation 
theory, however, goes far beyond this basic insight. Omi and Winant 
further break down racial formation into its smaller component parts, 
referred to as racial projects. These racial projects are social and 
political manifestations that one may, at the risk of great oversimplifica-
tion, liken to movements or campaigns.421! Racial projects "do the ideo-
logical work" of linking two levels of social theory that often remain 
unintegrated: the structural (material and institutional) and the rep-
resentational (cultural and discursive) components of a society's racial 
formation. 421 
As Omi and Winant explain: ''A racial project is simultaneously an 
interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics, and an ef 
fort to reorganize and redistribute resources along particular racial lines. "422 
Stated in slightly different terms: "Racial projects connect what race 
means in a particular discursive practice and the ways in which both 
416 See infra notes 419-30 and accompanying text. 
417 See infra notes 431-42 and accompanying text. 
418 See infra notes 443-82 and accompanying text. 
4190MI & WINANT, supra note 10, at 55. 
420 [d. at 55-56. 
421 [d. at 56. 
422 [d. 
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social structures and everyday experiences are racially organized, based 
upon that meaning. "423 Both subjects and structures are accounted for 
in the theory, for the racial project reconciles the role of individual 
agency with the constraints of social structure (thereby transcending 
this perennial social theory dilemma). Finally, racial projects may be 
either regressive or progressive, liberal or conservative; they may in-
volve society's micro-level interactions or macro-level actions, involving, 
for example, state institutions and electoral politics.424 
Racial redemption can be thought of generally as a racial project, 
containing both a structural-material and a representational-cultural 
component. As described above, the meaning of whiteness is at stake 
in the project of racial redemption, and the outcome will have sig-
nificant material consequences. More specifically, the value of white-
ness is maintained through its reputational rehabilitation, shown above 
to occur through the operation of various component projects, from 
repudiation of white supremacy and burial of historical complicities in 
white supremacy to transformation toward a redeemed and innocent 
whiteness. 425 The property value of whiteness and the social structure 
of racial privilege depend on this rehabilitation. 
Importantly, the theoretical construct of the racial project pro-
\ides a mechanism for linking Warren's personal history with broader 
societal and political processes of racial formation. When viewed 
through the lens of the racial project, we may postulate homologous 
and isomorphic relationships between both the personal and society-
wide drive for racial redemption. In addition to the common sense 
appeal of reading Warren's personal need for redemption into his 
Supreme Court race jurisprudence, the concept of racial project helps 
us to understand how that personal need arose within, and was condi-
tioned by, a broader matrix of social and political forces and relations. 
From the perspective of the racial project, we cannot plausibly 
divorce Warren's personal story (and the kind of individual and spiri-
tual/religious redemption he perhaps sought) from the broader con-
tours of racial formation in his society. Understanding Brown as inte-
gral to the process of racial redemption becomes, in part, an exercise 
in placing the "personal" motivations of Warren in their proper social 
context. Warren's individual intentionality, the primary focus of most 
biographical narratives regarding his remorse for the internment, and, 
to some extent, his race jurisprudence, becomes a false category of 
mId. 
~~~O~II & WINANT, supra note 10, at 56-59. 
~~5 See supra Part III. 
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analysis. As it unfolded within the universe of postwar racial projects, 
Warren's processing of his role in internment and his role on the Court 
are not primarily manifestations of purely subjective processes, but 
rather must be understood first as outcomes and constituents of objec-
tive processes of racial formation. 
When understood as a racial project, racial redemption does not 
necessarily imply coordinated actions by conspiratorial groups of 
whites openly and consciously seeking to maintain white domination 
over peoples of color. The theory of racial formation and the racial 
project are more nuanced than that, accounting for race-conservative, 
"well-intentioned" liberal interventions, and progressive resistances to 
such domination.426 The actions of individuals and groups occur within 
a field of thoroughly racialized relations, structures, discourses and 
meanings.427 So, in the case of Chief Justice Warren, we may bracket 
linear notions of causality and motivation in understanding how he 
perceived his actions in the internment of Japanese Americans, what 
he did to rectify those wrongs and how he effected race jurisprudence 
as a member of the Supreme Court. According to the racial formation 
theory, Warren is always already within the racial matrix, and our job 
is to construct a coherent theory for grasping the nature of racial 
projects to which he contributed. 
In this sense, we might place Warren in a more direct relationship 
with neoconservatives of the post-civil rights era whose racial project 
has been to "rearticulate"428 the meaning of various liberational con-
cepts of the previous era such as colorblindness and "re\'erse discrimi-
nation."429 Warren's relationship to later rearticulatory practices, as 
discussed above, has been one of complicated antecedence. This am-
biguous posture has allowed modern neoconservath'es to deploy War-
ren's legacy in their racial project of rearticulating the meaning of 
Brown's racial equality as colorblind individualism rather than as a 
42GOMI & WINANT, supra note 10, at 58-59 (describing contemporary racial projects in the 
U.S. as ranging from those of the "far right" emphasizing biologistic and racist ,'iews of difference, 
"new Right" projects asserting "colorblind" views that simultaneously manipulate racial fears, and 
"radical democratic" projects the in\'Oke difference in cOI~unction with egalitarian policies). For 
one of the few legal scholars analyzing the significance of "racial projects" to law and the Court's 
race jurisprudence, see john Calmore, ExplOling Michael Omi's "Mess)'" Real norld of Race: An 
Essa)1 for "Naked People Longing to Swim Free, " 15 L\\\' & INEQ, J. 25, 37-56 (1997). 
4270MI & WINANT, supra note 10, at 60 (identifYing racial formation as a synthesis of the 
interaction between social signification and social structure). 
428 According to Omi and Winant, rearticulation is the process of developing a new subjec-
tivity based upon one's pre-existing information and knowledge. Id. at 99. 
429 Id. at 131 (describing the neoconser\'ati\'e rearticulation of racial collecti\'ity as "re\'erse 
discrimination") . 
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"group or collective concern. "4~lIJ Again, this racial project analysis says 
nothing about Warren's intentionality. Instead, it argues that the ten-
sions inherent in the repudiatory and burial stages of his racial re-
demption create conditions conducive to subsequent retrenchment of 
(reformulated) white supremacy. 
B. The Racial State 
When Omi and Winant characterize the state in the context of 
the United States as a racial state, they mean that the state is "inher-
ently racial"-Le., racial in its structures.!3l They argue that the state 
does not merely intenene in racial conflicts, rather "the state is itself 
increasingly the pre-eminent site of racial conflict. "432 Moreover, 
"[t]hrough policies which are explicitly or implicitly racial, state insti-
tutions organize and enforce the racial politics of everyday life."433 The 
theory of the racial state is not mlgarly deterministic; rather, it under-
stands the state as a field of struggle, operating in the present conjunc-
ture according to hegemonic principles.434 In other words, the out-
comes of racial conflicts, as mediated by the state, will produce order 
"secured by a complex system of compromises, legitimating ideologies 
(i.e., the 'rule of law'), by adherence to established political rules and 
bureaucratic regularities, etc. "435 Further, the racial state is thoroughly 
embedded in social relations, meaning that state actors and agencies 
are linked in complicated and myriad ways to racialized constituen-
cies. 436 The social relations within which states operate include cultural 
and technical norms that, in the United States, are structurally driven 
by difference. 437 
The theory of the racial state as the site of racial struggle, embed-
ded in social relations and producing hegemonic order, further 
strengthens the argument made here. Racial redemption and the 
meaning of whiteness are highly conflicted, involving racial projects 
launched from various points on the political spectrum. From the per-
spectiye of the theory of the racial state, it makes sense that redemption 
would proceed, in part, at the level of the Supreme Court's race 
jurisprudence. The Court has slowly absorbed radical race-political 
no See id. at 130. 
mId. at 82. 
"'\~O~II & WI:>;ANT, supra note 10, at 82 . 
. J:\:\ Id. at 83. 
mId. at 84. 
",)5 Id. 
"3°ld. 
m O~II & WINANT, supra note 10, at 84. 
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challenges to the existing social order through the standard rule-of-Iaw 
mechanisms of neutral principles and procedures.438 More subtly, as 
shown above, the Court has transformed the image of whiteness 
through its discourse of innocent white victimization.439 This move has 
been more significant to the hegemonic functioning of the Court than 
its usual deployment of legal liberalism because of the uniquely racial 
nature of social divisions and social conflict in the United States, as 
well as the racial nature of the state as a whole.440 
By reclaiming white innocence, the Court has undermined a cru-
cial component of progressive race politics and thrown askew the 
moral compass of progressive challengers to the racial status quo. A 
redeemed white innocence renders claims of injustice incomprehensi-
ble because it imposes a system of "shared" racial meanings wherein 
there are no "wrongdoers" and no unjust beneficiaries of racial privi-
lege-merely sets of competing interest groups that must not be "un-
necessarily trammeled"441 under Pareto principles of efficiency.442 How-
ever, it should be noted that the Court's iteration of innocent whiteness 
may prove to be such an effective endgame maneuver that it ultimately 
pushes us beyond the equilibriating reinstatement of a racial hegem-
ony. It may help create a new set of disequilibria that will lead to 
reformulated challenges to the state and the current racial order. 
The racial project of racial redemption, then, is effected not only 
at the level of the individual and society at-large, but also on the 
terrain of the racial state and its adjudicatory institutions. White it1ll0-
cence represents cultural-representational claims that are operational-
ized within the state legal structure, which exercises the pivotal func-
438 Indeed, the radical race movements of the 1960s and 1970s have been absorbed by the 
jurisprudence of affirmative action and the limitations imposed by strict scrutiny re\'iew to balance 
the interests of minorities against those of "innocent whites." See sujJ/,{/ discussion notes 389-91, 
408-12 and accompanying text. Stated more succinctly, Black Power has become absorbed 
through legal process theory. 
439 See supra notes 408-12 and accompanying text. 
4400n the racial nature of the state, Derrick Bell identifies ten prm'isions in the allegedly 
colorblind Constitution, inserted to protect the property interest in slm'ery. See BELL, ~'1D WE 
ARE NOT SAYED, supra note 314, at 34-35; see also 01\11 & '>\'INANT, supra note 10, at 81-88. 
441 See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 637-38 (1987); 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Webel; 443 U.S. 193,208 (1979) (approving voluntary affinnati\'e 
action plans as long as they do not "unnecessarily trammel" the interests of white males). 
442 According to Pareto optimal definitions of efficiency, a redistribution of resources is 
efficient when someone is better off and no one is worse off. Affirmative action (and antidiscrimi-
nation laws generally) would not be considered Pareto-optimal because, while protected groups 
such as people of color and women will benefit, white males will not. See MICHAEL ZIMMER ET 
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 83-84 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing 
Pareto optimal definitions of efficiency). 
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tion of declaring the limits of race-conscious affirmative relief from 
white supremacy. 
C. The "Trajectory" oj Racial Jurisprudence 
1. Racial Projects and Unstable Equilibria 
Omi and Winant refer to the trajectory of racial politics as the 
cyclical disruption and restoration of the racial order. 443 The racial 
order in the U.S. is "equilibrated by the state-encoded in law, organ-
ized through policy-making, and enforced by a repressive apparatus. "4H 
Because racial identities and meanings are fluid and shifting, the racial 
order imposed by the state is inherently temporary and thus subject to 
ongoing disruption and restoration. 445 Racially based social movements 
that arise in the form of political projects defy and define the racial 
state by creating ruptures that lead to the restoration of a new equilib-
riumYG In turn, the racial state "co-opts" racial movements by absorbing 
the least threatening demands through the creation of new rules, 
policies, programs and agencies. H7 
From the period of the Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877448 to 
World War II, the U.S. racial state preserved a relatively undisturbed 
equilibrium. Omi and Winant descrihe the state as "despotic" insofar 
as the state exercised its primary objectives of repression and exclusion 
through its racial policies.449 Accordingly, there was limited political 
space to contest the prevailing racial order prior to World War II. After 
the war, the Black freedom movement and other racially based move-
ments hegan to "open up" the state. They made contestation of domi-
nant racial ideologies possible through "normal politics" (electoral, 
legislative, litigation, institutional reform, etc.) and direct action 
·143 O~II & \'1'INANT, supra note 10, at 78, 85 (defining trajectory as "the pattern of conflict 
and accommodation which takes shape over time between racially based social movements and 
the policies and programs of the state). Omi and Winant identifY the racial order as linking the 
system of political nile to the racial classification of individuals and groups. See id. at 79. 
mid. at 84. 
H5 See id. at 84-85. 
446 See id. at 86 ("Racially based political movements as we know them are inconceivable 
without the racial state, which pro\·ides a focus for political demands and structures the racial 
order. The racial state, in its turn, has been historically constructed by racial movements; it 
consists of agencies and programs which are the institutionalized responses to racial movements 
of the past."). 
Hi See id. at 87 (explaining effecti,·e mobilization by racial movements as triggering a crisis 
for the racial state that is eventually met with policies of absorption and insulation). 
H8 See infra notes 458-61. 
H90~1I & WINANT, supra note 10, at 81. 
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"movement" strategies.450 This postwar period produced the possibility 
of oppositional racial politics and enhanced the instability of the racial 
order. 
Using the racial trajectory framework, we can trace the ebbs and 
flows of the Court's redemption jurisprudence, beginning with Brown, 
(which represents a racial crisis) the NAACP's civil rights litigation, the 
"cold war imperative" and the postwar, post-Nuremberg consciousness 
generally. From Brown in 1954 through roughly 1974, the Court as a 
racial state institution established a new equilibrium using liberal in-
tellectual paradigms. Neoconsenative challenges to the existing equi-
librium arose from within liberal paradigms that had always embraced 
"limiting principles" in their equality projects. Between 1974 and 1978, 
the Burger Court created a "rupture" in the equilibriating racial juris-
prudence of the previous period by unequh"ocally restricting racial 
remedies to situations where plaintiffs could make near-impossible 
showings of causation and discriminatory intent, as seen in Milliken I, 
Washington and Arlington Heights. 4'>1 
From 1978-89, a new jurisprudential equilibrium was estab-
lished452 that rested on neoconservative racial jurisprudence and a 
greatly truncated vision of state-provided racial justice. By 1989, the 
New Right's various racial projects created another rupture. These 
projects achieved racial regression by rearticulating equality as synony-
mous with a colorblind and noninterventionist state. The 1989 term 
yielded a number of controversial decisions that reflected the New 
Right program of rhetorically colorblind, yet racialized and judicially 
activist constitutional jurisprudence.453 Congress, however, in perhaps 
its last reconstructive moment (of the Second Reconstruction), re-
versed many of these Title VII decisions in the Civil Rights Act of 
1991.454 The back-and-forth compromises between Congress and the 
4'OId. at 85. 
451 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. il i (l9i4) (l\Iilliken I) (finding inadequate causation to 
order interdistrict busing remedies); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (l9i6) (requiring a 
showing of discriminatory intent for constitutional disparate impact claim); Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan HOlls. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (l9ii) (requiring a showing of discrimi-
natory intent for facially-neutral gm'ernmental zoning action with disparate impact); see slIjJra 
notes 380-84 and accompanying text. 
4,2 See supra discussion Part III.C.3. 
45~ See Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 3i8, at 302 (discussing lIlllds COlle 
Packing v. Atonio, Martin v. Wilks and Cit)' of Richmond v. j.A. Croson as three of the six major 
civil rights defeats of the 1989 term that "amount collectively to a repudiation of the implicit 
principles, if not the actual results" of prior antidiscrimination law foundations) (citations omit-
ted). 
454 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. § 2000e et seq., as amended (1991). 
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Court over the "declining significance" of racial discrimination reflect 
both the racialized and hegemonic nature of the state. In 1995 in 
Adarand, the Supreme Court announced what seems to be the new 
equilibrium position, recasting colorblindness in the heavily-coded 
terms of "consistency," "congruence" and "skepticism."455 
The Court's race jurisprudence reflects with amazing consistency 
the racial trajectory mapped by Omi and Winant.456 In particular, racial 
redemption represented a specific racial project, persistently pursued, 
that was instrumental in achieving the neoconservative/New Right457 
goal of realizing a "colorblind," non-redistributive regime that would 
be enforced judicially. Redeeming whiteness thus had both a discursive 
and material aspect. The redemption project was pivotal to the crea-
tion of limiting principles that halted the legal and cultural racial 
progressivism of the 1960s-70s, and it triggered ruptures that brought 
about new, regressive equilibria within the racial state. 
2. Recurring Racial Compromises and the Racial Trajectory Theory 
A redemption project, similar to the post-Warren racial project, 
followed the First Reconstruction and the Hayes-Tilden Compromise 
of 1877.458 The Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877 marked the abrupt 
end to the decade-long post-Civil War Reconstruction-era reforms. 
With this racial compromise, Democrats ceded the White House to 
Rutherford Hayes and, in exchange, Republicans recognized Demo-
cratic governors elected in three belligerent southern states-South 
Carolina, Florida and Louisiana.459 Most importantly, Republicans 
granted the South "home rule" by withdrawing federal troops moni-
These changes included restoring the burden of proof upon the employer following plaintiffs 
prima facie sho"'ing in disparate impact cases, determining that a violation of Title VII inheres 
in "mixed motive" cases once prohibited considerations motivate an employer's decision, regard-
less of whether employer would hm'e made the "same decision" absent the illegal motivation, and 
providing for jury trial and availability of compensatory and punitive damages (with limits). 
455 See supra notes 413-14 and accompanying text. 
4"G See s1lpra notes 443-82, and accompanying text. 
45; Omi and Winant distinguish neoconservatives from the New Right on the basis that the 
former do not embrace the politics of resentment, whereas the New Right explicitly organizes 
around this theme. However, the anthors acknowledge that neoconservatives "made their peace" 
with New Right adherents over the shared opposition to affirmative action to produce a new 
pubic policy and intellectual realignment on race. O~II & WINANT, supra note 10, at 131-32. 
458\\'.E.B. DuBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA (1935); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUC-
TION: <\.~IERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 575-87 (1988); C. VANN WOODWARD, 
REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION (rev. ed., 
1956). 
wlFoNER, supra note 458, at 581. 
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toring the transition from slavery to freedom in the former Confeder-
ate states.400 The chair of Kansas' Republican state committee bluntly 
stated the intended impact of the 1877 Compromise: "As matters look 
to me now, I think the policy of the new administration will be to 
conciliate the white men of the South. Carpetbaggers to the rear, and 
[n*****s] take care of yourselves. "461 
In an ironic and tragic parallel, the current redemptive proc-
ess has involved similar racial compromises between dominant political 
groupings that again have resulted in the "involuntary sacrifice" of 
people of color.462 In his first bid for the presidency in 1992, Bill 
Clinton marketed himself according to a Democratic Leadership 
Council ("DLC") blueprint for the "New Democrat" who could stand 
up to special (read: racial) interests. 4G3 Clinton displayed this new party 
identity by staging a public rebuke of Sistah Souljah, a young Mrican 
American rap artist, at an event organized by Jesse Jackson and the 
National Rainbow Coalition.464 Calculated to distance himself publicly 
from Reverend Jackson and the Rainbow Coalition power base, the 
move was a success. Polls showed a dramatic increase in white voter 
support immediately after the Sistah Souljah incident:H,;, The wooing 
of "Reagan Democrats" to the New Democrat fold represented a com-
promise between moderate and liberal white Democrats in their bid 
for the White House.466 The compromise culminated in the abolition 
of the "special interest" caucuses and the consequent disempowerment 
46() See id. at 582. 
461 !d. at 581. 
462 BELL. RACE, RACISM, supra note 370, at 34-36. 
4ti:1 See CLARENCE LUSANNE, AFRICAN AMERICANS AT THE CROSSROADS: THE RESTRUCTURING 
OF BLACK LEADERSHIP AND THE 1992 ELECTIONS 127-28 (1994) (describing the creation of the 
Democratic Leadership Council in 1985 to "revitalize the Democratic Part), and lead it back into 
the political mainstream," and denouncing jesse jackson's 1984 and 1988 presidential campaigns 
as "the purest version of liberal fundamentalism"); jon Margolis, Part)' Election Angel' jackson. 
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 2, 1985, at 1 (calling the election of Roland Burris as one of three vice-chairmen 
of the Democratic National Committee a sign of "the Democratic declaration of independence 
from the racial, ethnic, and other caucuses"); EJ. Dionne,jr., The Democmts in Atlanta: Democrats, 
AftPr Lean Years, Are Optimistic as Thl!)' Gat/lei; N.V. TIMES, july 17, 1988, at I (describing the 
Democrats' goal at their 1988 convention to reclaim issues of economic growth and basic values 
from the Republicans, as evidenced by their chairman, Paul Kirk arguing against "exotic issues" 
and "narrow agendas"). 
4(H See LUSANNE, supra note 463, at 118 (describing Clinton's disciplining of rap artist Sistah 
Souljah at the National Rainbow Coalition leadership summit as a staged event "through which 
Clinton was able to distance himself from Uesse] jackson and the progressive \ling of the 
Democratic party"). 
465 See id. at 120 (describing Clinton's rise in the polls almost exclushdy among whites 
following his disciplining of Sistah Souljah at the Rainbow Coalition e\'ent). 
4GGGOLDFIELD, supra note 379, at 362. 
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of grassroots-oriented racial, gender and sexuality based political com-
munities within the Democractic Party.~67 
More evidence of the new racial compromise came to light in Clin-
ton's re-election campaign. That year, Proposition 209, entitled the 
California Civil Rights Initiative, was placed on the ballot in Califor-
nia to outlaw race-based affirmative action in publicly-funded institu-
tions.~Ii~ In order to mount a competitive campaign against well-
financed anti-affirmative action forces led by Governor Pete Wilson, 
affirmative action organizers expected financial assistance from the 
Democratic Party, but their expectations were frustrated. The Demo-
cratic Party feared the affirmative action issue was too controversial to 
fund in a presidential election year. Again seeking to curry favor with 
the Reagan Democrats, Clinton's Democratic Leadership Council in 
effect found common ground with Wilson's minions by adopting a 
race-averse party platform and national funding strategy.469 As a result, 
Proposition 209 narrowly passed, and the enrollments of students of 
color at the state's top campuses, such as UC Berkeley and UCLA, have 
since plummeted dramatically, effectively (re)segregating public post-
secondary education in CaliforniaYo 
A similar racial compromise has occurred during the same time 
span between conservative and liberal white intellectuals. In the early 
1990s, neoconservatives criticized diversity movements nationwide by 
.J67 See All But 3 Democratic CauCllses Stripped of Official Recognition, L.A. TIMES, May IS, 19S5, 
at 3 (reporting on how the Democratic Party's executive committee stripped official recognition 
from all except three of its caucuses); Democrats Oppose Caucuses, N.Y. TIMES, May IS, 1995, at 
33 (covering criticism of Democratic party's elimination of caucuses "behind closed doors" and 
absent consultations) . 
.JG8The California Civil Rights Initiative as passed in Proposition 209 amended the Califomia 
Constitution to read: "The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, 
any indhidual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the 
operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting." CAL. CONST. an. I, 
§ 31 (a). State was defined as "includ[ing], but not necessarily [] limited to, the state itself, any 
city, county, city and county, public university system, including the University of Califomia, 
community college district, school district, special district .... " Id. § 31 (f) . 
.J(jg See id . 
.J700n the resegregation of higher education, see Michelle Locke, Steep Drop in Minority 
Students Hits Law Schools, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, July 13, 1997, at A4 (reporting on declines of 
students of color from 1996 to 1997 after enactment of affirmative action prohibitions with 
University of Texas recording a S3% and 51 % decline in African American and Latino admissions 
respectively and University of California admissions reflecting SI % and 50% declines respec-
tively); Scott Shepard, Declining Enrollment to be Civil Rights Target of Protest, ATLANTA CONST., 
July 13, 1997, at 14A (stating that enrollmen ts of students of color at University of Texas and UC 
Berkeley law schools "have virtually disappeared"); Berheley Law School to Enroll Only One Blach 
First-Year Stlldent, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,July 11, 1997, at A23; Minmity Applications and Admis-
sions at U. of Texas Plllnge, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. IS, 1997, at A2S. 
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tarring them with the brush of "political correctness" ("P.C.").471 Mem-
bers of the white left intelligentsia joined white consenati\'es and 
repackaged the P.C. critique with a similar attack on diversity mm'e-
ments as "identity politics."472 Both critiques, from the Right and the 
Left, reflected discomfort with the spotlight that had been placed on 
institutional racism and the increasing significance of political leader-
ship by people of color. Specifically, anti-apartheid and diversity mm'e-
ments organized predominantly by people of color were perceived as 
a threat to the centrality of straight white men of all political persua-
sions. 473 
Arguably, as both cause and consequence of the racial compro-
mises of the 1990s stands this increasing affinity of competing groups 
of whites-of course, to the overall detriment of racial minority inter-
ests. The new compromises resulted in the elimination or general 
weakening of progressive racial projects, remedies or structures, be 
that in the form of the OLC's elimination of racial caucuses,474 the 
banning of affirmative action in the states of California and Washing-
ton475 or the converging Right/Left attack on race-based student or-
ganizing.m These compromises represent the nadir of the postwar 
Second Reconstruction and reflect the perfection of whiteness re-
deemed. 
The current period of redemption shares some disturbing simi-
larities with the first. For example, in the wake of the First Reconstruc-
tion and the Hayes-Tilden Compromise, southern states organized 
constitutional conventions for the explicit purpose of disenfranchising 
African Americans.477 At the end of the Second Reconstruction, we now 
471 For this analysis, see Sumi Cho, Essential Politics, 2 HAR\,. LATINO L. RE,'. 433, 449-51 
(1997). 
472 See id. 
473 See id. at 451-52 n.38. 
474 See supra note 467 and accompanying text. 
475 See supra notes 468-70 and accompanying text for California's ban. On Washington's 
prohibitions, see Heath Foster, Affirmative Action Rules Tossed Out fly State l'oten, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, No\,. 4, 1998, at Al (reporting on Washington state yoters' Q\'erwhelming ap-
proval of anti-affirmative action ballot measure, "Initiath·e-200"). 
476 See supra notes 4 7I -73 and accompanying text. 
477 See BELL, RACE, RACISM, supra note 370, at 186, n.3 (discussing the constitutional com-en-
tions held in Mississippi, South Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama, and Virginia between the years 
1890 and 1902). Bell cites V. WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI, 1865-1890, at 199-215 
(1947); A. KIRWAN, RE\,OLT OF THE REDNECKS, MISSISSIPPI POLITICS: 1876-1925, at 58-64 (1964); 
C. TINDALL, SOUTH CAROLINA NEGROES, 1877-1900, at 68-91 (1952);]. BRITTAIN, NEGRO SUF-
FRAGE AND POLITICS IN ALABAMA SINCE 1870, at 125-70 (1958); C. WYNES, RACE RELATIONS IN 
VIRGINIA, 1870-1902, at 51-67 (1961 );J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN POLITICS 
139-81 (1974) for a general discussion of the conyentions. 
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see the return of "home rule" in the devolution of federal authority to 
states to "manage" their racial affairs.478 Consistent with patterns that 
arose during the First Redemption, the Second Redemption produces 
similar forms of racial subordination: judicial complicity with regressive 
regimes;-l79 the rapid proliferation of state-sponsored segregation;480 the 
deployment of racial \iolence as disciplinary spectacle and a resur-
gence in scientific racism.481 
47~ See supra note 460 and accompanying text. 
47~ The Supreme Court played a key role in dismantling the First Reconstruction by curtailing 
federal power to craft effective racial remedies and by restricting the reach of the postbellum 
Amendments and ci\,il rights legislation. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Adarand curtailed 
f«;deral power to enact affirmative action remedies by imposing strict scrutiny review on even 
federal governmental affirmative action plans. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. Moreover, the Court 
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting race-conscious remedies. See Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 U.S. 267 (1986). Consequently, the Court's denial of certiorari in the 
Fifth Circuit's attempt to overturn Bakke in Hopwood signals to other regressive circuits and states 
its approval of local self-determination of racial justice. See Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 
(1996) (cen. denied). 
4~O In the wake of the First Reconstruction and the HayeiS'Tiiden Compromise, southern states 
organized constitutional conventions for the explicit purpose of disenfranchising African Ameri-
cans. At the end of the Second Reconstruction, we now see the return of "home rule" manifesting 
itself first in the western states of California and Washington, where state-by-state initiatives 
eliminate access recently granted to people of color to quality education and public employment 
under affirmative action. See supra notes 468-70 on California's Prop. 209 and its impact; Foster, 
supra note 475, at Al on Washington's Initiative 200. Only in an era ofredeemed whiteness could 
such racially regressive initiatives and their foreseeable resegregative results be packaged and 
interpreted as "civil rights." In addition to the return to home rule for affirmative action, the 
"Welfare-to-Work" legislation effectively transfers to the states responsibility for welfare "reform." 
For another characterization of the contemporary period as the "Second Redemption," see 
Adrienne D. Da\'is, Identity Notes Part II: Redeeming the Body Politic, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 267, 
274 (1997). 
481 The period following Reconstmction and the onset of segregation produced an upsurge 
in racial \'iolence as spectacle. White men, women and children attended lynchings of African 
Americans as public sporting events designed to entertain and excite. The denial of racial guilt 
and the affirmation of whiteness under Redemption unleashed a social atmosphere in which 
open season would be declared against Black bodies. Following anti-affirmative action victories 
and legal and political endorsements of racial home rule, a disturbing pattern of spectacular 
racial violence is reemerging. On March 21, 1997, three white youths brutally beat 13-year-old 
Lenard Clark nearly to death for transgressing racial boundaries and playing basketball in the 
"m'ong" neighborhood. The racially-moth'ated attack, during which racial epithets were used, left 
Clark permanently brain damaged.Janan Hanna, Deal Lets 2 in Clark Case Stay out of Jail: Suspects 
in Beating of Black Youth Agree to Offer of Probation, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 1998, at 1; ImperfectJltstice 
for Lellmd Clark, CHI. TRIB. Oct. 22, 1998, at 26. Two of Clark's attackers received probation, and 
one was sentenced to eight years in prison. Janan Hanna, 2 Receive Probation in Clark Beating: 
Jasas, Kwidzinski Pleads Guilty to Charges, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 19, 1998, at 1. Part of the reason the 
prosecutor failed to convict Caruso on the attempted murder charge and agreed to plead out 
with the other two was due to severe witness problems, i.e. one was murdered and another 
disappeared. Id. On July 25, 1997, two white men after an evening of drinking doused with 
gasoline their fellow party-goer, "G.P." Johnson, an African American ex-marine. Earlier in the 
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CONCLUSION 
It has been my objective in this article not to impugn the record 
of Earl Warren, but rather to understand the complexity of his actions 
during World War II and later as Chief Justice. In so doing I have 
sought to understand the meaning of the silence, downplayillg and 
apologia surrounding Warren's role in internment practiced by both 
judicial biographers and internment historians. In one sense, I agree 
with Warren's many admiring biographers who have suggested that 
Warren stands as the personification of the American spirit and char-
evening, one of the men had bragged that he '''as "going to kill a n--." The two white men 
set Johnson on fire and then decapitated his charred corpse "'ith a splitting maul. Johnson was 
alive when he was set afire but died upon decapitation. His killers buried his head underneath 
his body in a 13-inch-deep hole. Michael Paul Williams, Slaying Case in Grayson Stirs Questions, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 8, 1998, at BI; Diane Stl"llzzi, A Tlial in Grayson Count)": A 
Crime Against the Community, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Feb. 15, 1998, at AI. Despite the 
gruesomeness of the murder, the crime escaped national attention until the Congressional Black 
Caucus ("CBC") questioned why the killing was not being investigated as a hate crime and called 
upon President Clinton to intervene. See Rex BO\\1Jlan, Cullen Ca{{s for Probe but Says llilit, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 20, 1997, at B4 (reporting on ,"ictim's family's and Congres-
sional Black Caucus' calls for the federal government to investigate the case); Diane Struzzi, 
Detenninillg the Hate in Crime: Gra)'soll COllllt)' Interracial Case Pills a Spotlight 01/ How Holf Climes 
are Defined, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Aug. 17, 1997 at BI (stating that CBC called on 
President Clinton "to keep a watchful eye on the case"). On June 7, 1998, another post-civil rights 
"lynching" OCCUlTed in eastern Texas. James Byrd, Jr., a disabled 49-year-old Black man, ,,,as 
chained to a pickup truck by three white men and dragged to his death on a rural road in the 
outskirts of Jasper. Bp"d was dragged until he was decapitated and dismembered. The victim's 
blood was discovered on the shoes of all three defendants. See Patty Reinert & Richard Stewart, 
A Day in Court for VVhite Supremacist: Victim Conscious Before Dragged to Death: Pros/Jectille Juro1"5 
Briefed on First Day of Jasper Trial, HOUSTON CHRoN.,Jan. 26, 1999, at 1. 
In addition to these spectacles of racial violence that ednce the return of a dominant and 
arrogant whiteness, more subtle examples also abound. Following the trial in the Lenard Clark 
beating case, an angry crowd erupted after Judge Daniel Locallo sentenced lead defendant, Frank 
Caruso,Jr. to eight years in prison. The angry crowd criticized the sentence as "compromised by 
racial politics." Terry Wilson & John Chase, AIlg7)' Crowd Erupts 05 CIa/ii Sentence Upheld: JlIdge 
Refuses to Gille Ground on Caruso's Tennfor Beating, CHIC. TRIB., Oct. 23, 1998, at I. \\11en Locallo 
upheld his sentencing of the instigator in a later hearing, he was jeered by a crowd that brought 
the courtroom to the brink of disorder. v\llat is significant about this story is that the angry crowd 
consisted of Caruso's white defenders who argued that the eight-year sentence was too harsh! See 
id. As the defendant's father, Frank Caruso, Sr., told Judge Locallo, "I feel the scales of justice 
weren't tipped. The robe was actually ripped off the lady." Id. A woman in the angry crowd 
promised that "the Italians will fight Judge Locallo." Id. 
For a discussion of the resurgence in scientific racism see RICHARD HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES 
MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE (1994) (becoming a national bestseller in 1994). For a thorough 
tracing of postwar neo-eugenical scholarship, see generally WILLIAM TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND 
POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 138-295 (1994). For a detailed analysis of the proliferation of 
right-wing think tanks and foundations, see generally JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, No 
MERCY: How CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL 
AGENDA (1997). 
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acter. That spirit and character, however, embody a troubling dualism 
inherent in the simultaneous promise and betrayal of equality at the 
indhidual, institutional and societal levels, which are assessed in this 
article through the theory of racial redemption. 
A theory of racial redemption is useful in analyzing the politics of 
race in the post-civil rights era for at least three reasons. First, racial 
redemption explains the seeming paradox that arises when an increas-
ing discourse of equality is accompanied by policies that produce a 
decreasing yield in racial justice. Brown and its progeny removed the 
rationale of white supremacy from legitimate legal and public debate, 
while simultaneously permitting a reformulated regime of white su-
premacy to remain intact. It seems the political challenge for race 
progressives today is to analyze and expose how conservatives are able 
to "turn civil rights on its head" and succeed at winning popular 
support for anti-affirmative action initiatives posing as "civil rights 
initiatives." Toward this end, racial redemption theory offers a frame-
work to link postmodernist, discursively-oriented legal scholarship with 
modernist structural and materialist critiques of law. In other words, 
cultural represen tations through legal texts (cases, doctrines, legal 
principles and holdings) can be seen as connected to material struc-
tures of the racial state (laws, courts, legal institutions) in the mainte-
nance of hegemony (consensually legitimated norms, values, racial 
"common sense" and status quo). 
Second, racial redemption answers Professor Tushnet's challenge 
of how we might begin to view Brown and the Warren Court in a 
non-triumphalist way. By acknowledging the duality of the Brown deci-
sion-its promise and its betrayal of racial equality-we can better 
understand why it represents a link, rather than a discontinuity, be-
tween the pre-Warren Courts (from Marshall to Vinson) and the cur-
rent Rehnquist Court. For example, the valorization of "colorblind-
ness" as the legal and moral principle of Brown set the stage for the 
Burger-Rehnquist era's narrowing of affirmative action jurisprudence. 
At the time of Brown, colorblindness may have served as a useful moral 
principle for repudiating a strain of white supremacy that was based 
on the assumed biological inferiority of Mrican Americans and other 
peoples of color. However, that the idea of colorblindness has become 
even more entrenched after the fall of biological determinism can be 
explained by grasping its relationship to the overall redemptive frame-
work and the reinstatement ofinnocent whiteness. Colorblindness now 
insulates whiteness from its supremacist past, while inserting an indi-
vidualist framework that protects "innocent whites" and, not coinciden-
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tally, their property interests by leaving access to the best jobs and 
educational opportunities unencumbered by affirmative action. 
Finally, racial redemption as illustrated through Earl Warren, in-
ternment and Brown, is nuanced enough to shed light on the increas-
ingly important phenomenon of racial brokering-Le., the pitting of 
groups of color against one another for the purpose of maintaining 
redeemed whiteness, even as racial retrenchment accelerates. The case 
of Earl Warren well illustrates how racial injustices for one outsider 
group may be directly related to racial advances for another. In short, 
the guilt that plagued Warren over his role in the internment may have 
manifested itself positively in his pro-civil rights decisions. Recall Bell's 
interest convergence equations: 
White Racism v. Justice = White Racism 
White Racism v. White Self-Interest = Justice4R2 
A theory of racial redemption would allow us to understand how 
white racism and white self-interest are not, as suggested by the 
second equation, occasionally oppositional, but rather in a multi-ra-
cial society are more complexly, but positively, correlated. So, 'Jus-
tice" might result when wrongdoing toward one group of color can 
be redeemed by working in favor of another group of color. White 
racism (toward the wronged group) and white self-interest can 
actually result in a compromised and particularized justice for the 
second group of color, but, more importantly, racial redemption for 
whites. Taking the historical example of Warren, internment and 
Brown or the contemporary anti-affirmative action campaign in 
California, which invokes alleged "Asian American victims" of affix-
mative action to combat charges of racism, we might formulate the 
following equations: 
Advocacy against Asian Americans + Ad"ocacy for Mrican 
Americans = White Liberal Redemption 
Advocacy against Mrican Americans + Advocacy for Asian 
Americans = White Conservative Redemption 
The adoption of a racial group, or even an individual of color by 
a white political figure or constituency-a practice I refer to as mascot-
ting-is necessary to deflect charges of racism and preserve the re-
deemed status of whiteness. Indeed, is it possible to imagine a winning 
482 BELL, RACE, RACISM, supra note 370, at 46. 
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campaign by the anti-affirmative action movement absent the conser-
vative deployment of racial mascots? It hasn't happened yet. 
Standing at the threshold of the Second Redemption, we might 
wonder how things would be if earlier actors such as Warren had 
proven themselves truly heroic. As we look to past leadership for 
inspiration for future action, it is unfortunate that we observe Chief 
Justice Warren being personally unable and judicially ineffective at 
transgressing what historian George Lipsitz calls the "possessive invest-
ment in whiteness."483 Because Warren settled for a halfway racial 
politics, he left his legacy available to regressive racial projects that have 
sought white supremacy's "preservation through transformation." Us-
ing racial formation theory to link Warren's personal past with his 
Court's and society's racial trajectory allows us to defeat facile under-
standings of his and other liberal reform efforts that indulge the 
narrative of "putting race out of business. "484 Warren's story shows that, 
as a project of racial redemption, these reforms were all about an 
ongoing racialization of the political and the legal. Race got a new 
storefront perhaps, but it has not gone out of business as a primary 
axis of social subordination and organization . 
• K3 See generall) GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN \VHITENESS (1998) . 
• 8. See :-Janey Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a "Post-Structu-
ralist" Age, 212 NEW LEFT REv. 68, 87, 91 (1995) (calling for a blurring of group differentiation 
and for the transformatiye remedy of "socialism in the economy plus deconstruction in the 
culture") . 
